52-1-54.  Fee restrictions; appointment of attorneys by the director or workers’ compensation judge; discovery costs; offer of judgment; penalty for violations.

Constitutionality.

Generally.

Abuse of discretion.

Additional fees.

Appeal.

Applicability.

Apportionment.

Attorney’s fees.

Authority of trial court.

Bad faith.

Chilling effect.

Compensation.

Construction.

Construction with other law.

Costs.

Deposition expense.

Discovery.

Double representation.

Due process.

Economic loss.

Equal protection.

Evidence.

           —Sufficient.

Fees.

Finality.

Future medical expenses.

Hearing.

Minimal scrutiny test.

Offer of judgment.

Policy.

Present value.

Release.

Requirements.

Res judicata.

Subsection E.

Subsection F.

Waiver.

Workers’ compensation.

Cap on attorney fees in 52-1-54 NMSA 1978 violates the equal protection clause of N.M. Const. art II  § 18 because it places a cap on a worker’s attorney fees but not on an employer’s attorney fees, and because it creates at least two categories of workers by distinguishing workers whose workers’ compensation claims have been handled in bad faith from those whose claims have been resisted in good faith. Corn v. New Mexico Educators Fed. Credit Union, 1994-NMCA-161, 119 N.M. 199, 889 P.2d 234, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 150 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, 889 P.2d 203, 1995 N.M. LEXIS 36 (N.M. 1995), overruled,  Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305, 1998 N.M. LEXIS 338 (N.M. 1998), superseded by statute as stated in Meyers v. Western Auto, 2002-NMCA-089, 132 N.M. 675, 54 P.3d 79, 2002 N.M. App. LEXIS 73 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002).

Relationship between the purposes and means in 52-1-54 NMSA 1978 is so attenuated as to render the distinctions arbitrary or irrational. Corn v. New Mexico Educators Fed. Credit Union, 1994-NMCA-161, 119 N.M. 199, 889 P.2d 234, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 150 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, 889 P.2d 203, 1995 N.M. LEXIS 36 (N.M. 1995), overruled,  Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305, 1998 N.M. LEXIS 338 (N.M. 1998), superseded by statute as stated in Meyers v. Western Auto, 2002-NMCA-089, 132 N.M. 675, 54 P.3d 79, 2002 N.M. App. LEXIS 73 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002).

Because counsel’s first obligation is to a client, even at the expense of attorneys’ fees, 52-1-54A NMSA 1978 is not unconstitutional. Pineda v. Grande Drilling Corp., 1991-NMCA-004, 111 N.M. 536, 807 P.2d 234, 1991 N.M. App. LEXIS 108 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).

Workers’ compensation judge has implicit authority under 52-1-54I NMSA 1978 to require an employer’s counsel to file a pleading stating the number of hours expended on a case and the amount charged as legal fees as a means of facilitating the legislative policy behind 52-1-54 NMSA 1978. Jurado v. Levi Strauss & Co., 1996-NMCA-112, 122 N.M. 519, 927 P.2d 1057, 1996 N.M. App. LEXIS 93 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).

In an action whereby it was determined that an inmate participating in an inmate-release program who was injured while performing work at a private jobsite was entitled to benefits pursuant to the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-1 to 52-1-70 NMSA 1978, on remand, the inmate’s attorney fees on appeal were to be provided for in accordance with 52-1-54 NMSA 1978. Benavidez v. Sierra Blanca Motors, 1996-NMSC-045, 122 N.M. 209, 922 P.2d 1205, 1996 N.M. LEXIS 250 (N.M. 1996).

There was no basis under 52-1-54F NMSA 1978 to require appellant employer to pay 100 percent of appellee worker’s attorneys’ fee because the worker did not make an offer that complied with 52-1-54F(4) NMSA 1978 where attorney fees awarded after a formal hearing or trial were not costs within the contemplation of the Workers’ Compensation Act; thus, there was no basis for the workers’ compensation judge to order a payment regimen different from that contemplated by 52-1-54J NMSA 1978. Cordova v. Taos Ski Valley, 1996-NMCA-009, 121 N.M. 258, 910 P.2d 334, 1995 N.M. App. LEXIS 155 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995).

If appellant employer’s letter was an offer for a compensation order under 52-1-54 NMSA 1978, the workers’ compensation judge could not rely on the cost shifting provision of 52-5-54F(1) NMSA 1978 to shift attorney fees because 52-1-54J NMSA 1978 only allowed fee-shifting if the court found 52-1-54F(3) NMSA 1978 or (4) applied; also, fees awarded under the Workers’ Compensation Act after a trial or formal hearing, as opposed to after approval of a settlement, were treated in New Mexico as part of the judgment proper and not as costs, and to allow shifting of the attorney fee obligation under 52-1-54F(l) NMSA 1978 would make 52-1-54F(3) and (4) NMSA 1978 merely redundant, or worse, superfluous. Cordova v. Taos Ski Valley, 1996-NMCA-009, 121 N.M. 258, 910 P.2d 334, 1995 N.M. App. LEXIS 155 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995).

Pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-54D NMSA 1978, the amount awarded in attorney fees was within a reasonable discretionary range and there was no abuse of discretion where the workers’ compensation judge had available appellee worker’s counsel’s petition, which contained a detailed list of time expended on the case, and she heard arguments during the hearing about counsel’s skill, experience caseload, and regular hourly fee; she also had available appellant employer’s objections to the petition and heard oral argument based on the written objections. Cordova v. Taos Ski Valley, 1996-NMCA-009, 121 N.M. 258, 910 P.2d 334, 1995 N.M. App. LEXIS 155 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995).

Upon appeal, workers’ compensation judge abused his discretion under 52-1-54 NMSA 1978 in awarding attorney’s fees from an employer to a partially disabled employee because the judge appeared to have taken into account more than the actual benefits to the employee attributable to the attorney’s efforts when calculating the attorney’s fee award and under 52-1-54F NMSA 1978, the judge was to consider only those benefits that the attorney was responsible for securing. County of Bernalillo v. Sisneros, 1994-NMCA-156, 119 N.M. 98, 888 P.2d 980, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 157 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994), limited, Medina v. Berg Constr., 1996-NMCA-087, 122 N.M. 350, 924 P.2d 1362, 1996 N.M. App. LEXIS 74 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).

Where a worker was initially refused workers’ compensation benefits but obtained more benefits on appeal and preserved her past benefits through the use of an attorney on appeal, the worker was entitled to an award of attorney fees under 52-1-54E NMSA 1978. Gomez v. Bernalillo County Clerk's Office, 1994-NMCA-102, 118 N.M. 449, 882 P.2d 40, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 106 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).

The issue of attorney fees in a workers’ compensation action is governed by the law in effect at the time of the disability. Leo v. Cornucopia Restaurant, 1994-NMCA-099, 118 N.M. 354, 881 P.2d 714, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 93 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, No. 22,302, 1994 N.M. LEXIS 319 (N.M. Sept. 1, 1994).

Where the Court of Appeals of New Mexico reversed an award by a judge of the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Administration of scheduled injury benefits and vocational rehabilitation benefits, the judge had to recalculate attorney fees to reflect the change in benefits recovered by the worker’s attorney, so the Court did not address the worker’s constitutional challenge to the attorney fee cap established by 52-1-54G NMSA 1978. Murphy v. Duke City Pizza, 1994-NMCA-085, 1994-NMCA-085, 118 N.M. 346, 881 P.2d 706, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 94 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, No. 22,305, 1994 N.M. LEXIS 320 (N.M. Sept. 1, 1994).

It was not error for a judge of the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Administration to deny an injured worker’s claim for bad faith attorney fees, since it was within the administration judge’s discretion and the denial was not clearly irrational; therefore, given that conclusion and the refusal of the Court of Appeals of New Mexico to address a constitutional challenge to the attorney fee cap established by 52-1-54G NMSA 1978, the Court did not address the worker’s arguments regarding the 25 percent requirement found in 52-1-54H NMSA 1978. Murphy v. Duke City Pizza, 1994-NMCA-085, 1994-NMCA-085, 118 N.M. 346, 881 P.2d 706, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 94 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, No. 22,305, 1994 N.M. LEXIS 320 (N.M. Sept. 1, 1994).

Worker’s contention that the employer’s dispute of her full-time status showed that the employer used bad faith in settling workers’ compensation claim was insufficient grounds for the trial court to award attorney’s fees in excess of the cap established by 52-1-54G NMSA 1978. Murphy v. Duke City Pizza, 1994-NMCA-085, 1994-NMCA-085, 118 N.M. 346, 881 P.2d 706, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 94 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, No. 22,305, 1994 N.M. LEXIS 320 (N.M. Sept. 1, 1994).

Order awarding an employee attorney fees for legal services rendered in a proceeding to change her health care provider pursuant to 52-1-49 NMSA 1978 was not final or appealable because the workers’ compensation claim filed by the employee was pending at the time the attorney fees order was entered and pursuant to 52-1-54M NMSA 1978, fees could not be paid until the claim was settled or adjudged. Alcala v. St. Francis Gardens, 1993-NMCA-134, 116 N.M. 510, 864 P.2d 326, 1993 N.M. App. LEXIS 123 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).

Because a claimant was not awarded benefits in the trial court, the appellate court could not award attorney fees pursuant to 52-1-54D NMSA 1978 on appeal. Todacheene v. G & S Masonry, 1993-NMCA-126, 116 N.M. 478, 863 P.2d 1099, 1993 N.M. App. LEXIS 117 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 116 N.M. 364, 862 P.2d 1223, 1993 N.M. LEXIS 333 (N.M. 1993).

In a workers’ compensation claim, pursuant to the claimant’s request, attorney’s fees were awarded under 52-1-54G NMSA 1978. Crespin v. Consolidated Constructors, 1993-NMCA-109, 116 N.M. 334, 862 P.2d 442, 1993 N.M. App. LEXIS 107 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 116 N.M. 334, 862 P.2d 442, 1993 N.M. LEXIS 315 (N.M. 1993).

Amount awarded to a worker’s attorney was considered fair and reasonable under this section; the attorney secured substantial benefits for the worker which did not include future medical benefits. Toynbee v. Mimbres Memorial Nursing Home, 1992-NMCA-057, 114 N.M. 23, 833 P.2d 1204, 1992 N.M. App. LEXIS 48 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).

Under 52-1-54E NMSA 1978, a claimant is entitled to attorneys fees in a workers’ compensation case only if the claimant is successful in establishing increased disability or the employer is unsuccessful in establishing that the claimant’s disability has diminished, including an employer’s request for credit for benefits already paid. Baca v. Highlands Univ., 1992-NMSC-010, 113 N.M. 170, 824 P.2d 310, 1992 N.M. LEXIS 24 (N.M. 1992).

Under 52-1-54D(1) NMSA 1978, the employee was entitled to attorneys fees after being awarded compensation because the employer’s request for credit for benefits already paid, along with its denial of causation, was the same as a refusal to pay, thereby putting the employee’s benefits in jeopardy. Baca v. Highlands Univ., 1992-NMSC-010, 113 N.M. 170, 824 P.2d 310, 1992 N.M. LEXIS 24 (N.M. 1992).

Although an employee was successful in obtaining workers’ compensation benefits, and although the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq., specifically 52-1-54F NMSA 1978 required a court to take into consideration the relationship that pretermination counseling bore to the successful recovery of a claimant’s workers’ compensation award, 52-1-54D(2) NMSA 1978 did not impede the claimant from recovering attorney fees greater than the benefits claimed for services performed prior to the termination of benefits. Sanchez v. Siemens Transmission Sys., 1991-NMSC-093, 112 N.M. 533, 817 P.2d 726, 1991 N.M. LEXIS 332 (N.M. 1991).

Section 52-1-54 NMSA 1978 does not fix attorney fees at any specific percentage of the benefits awarded to the workman; comparison with other cases is not the proper means to determine the reasonableness of the amount awarded because each case must be judged on its own merits. Ulibarri v. Homestake Mining Co., 1991-NMCA-078, 112 N.M. 389, 815 P.2d 1179, 1991 N.M. App. LEXIS 178 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).

Where the appropriate factors were considered, the issues were hotly contested, and the compensation award exceeded the settlement offered by the employer, an award of attorney’s fees under 52-1-54 NMSA 1978 would not be reversed merely because it was 63 percent of the claimant’s benefits award. Fuyat v. Los Alamos Nat'l Lab., 1991-NMCA-045, 112 N.M. 102, 811 P.2d 1313, 1991 N.M. App. LEXIS 146 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).

An award of attorney’s fees under 52-1-54 NMSA 1978 to a claimant seeking workers’ compensation benefits is not proper unless the claimant qualifies for an award of compensation or medical benefits. Douglass v. State, Regulation & Licensing Dep't, 1991-NMCA-041, 112 N.M. 183, 812 P.2d 1331, 1991 N.M. App. LEXIS 153 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 112 N.M. 77, 811 P.2d 575, 1991 N.M. LEXIS 168 (N.M. 1991).

Claimant, the widow of a deceased employee, received an award of attorney’s fees at her expense as provided by the Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-54 NMSA 1978, which was the statute in effect at the time her decedent’s accident occurred and not as provided by the statute in effect at the time of the award of compensation benefits. Bateman v. Springer Bldg. Materials Corp., 1989-NMCA-039, 108 N.M. 655, 777 P.2d 383, 1989 N.M. App. LEXIS 48 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 108 N.M. 624, 776 P.2d 846, 1989 N.M. LEXIS 193 (N.M. 1989).

Pursuant to 52-1-54 NMSA 1978, an injured employee was not entitled to attorney’s fees in a workers’ compensation action where he rejected a settlement offer and then received less than he would have had he accepted. Davis v. Los Alamos Nat'l Lab., 1989-NMCA-023, 108 N.M. 587, 775 P.2d 1304, 1989 N.M. App. LEXIS 33 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989).

Where an employer reasonably interpreted a physician’s report on an injured employee’s medical condition as indicating that the employee was able to return to work, the employer did not act in bad faith by refusing to pay further benefits for temporary total disability, and the employee was not entitled to recover her attorney’s fees under 52-1-54C NMSA 1978 when she was awarded temporary total disability; the language defining “bad faith” in 52-1-54C(2) NMSA 1978 closely paralleled the conduct required in order to award punitive damages, which are imposed for the limited purpose of punishment and deterrence. Sanchez v. Wohl Shoe Co., 1989-NMCA-003, 108 N.M. 276, 771 P.2d 984, 1989 N.M. App. LEXIS 11 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. dismissed, 108 N.M. 217, 770 P.2d 539, 1989 N.M. LEXIS 55 (N.M. 1989).

Award of attorney fees to a workers’ compensation claimant under the Interim Act, 52-1-54 NMSA 1978, could not be reviewed where the employer failed to request findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 1-052(B)(1)(f) NMRA. Urioste v. Sideris, 1988-NMCA-096, 107 N.M. 733, 764 P.2d 504, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 91 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).

Award of attorney fees under the strong statute did not make such award erroneous for lack of jurisdiction. Tallman v. ABF, 1988-NMCA-091, 108 N.M. 124, 767 P.2d 363, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 113 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 33, 781 P.2d 305, 1988 N.M. LEXIS 282 (N.M. 1988), superseded by statute as stated in Leo v. Cornucopia Restaurant, 1994-NMCA-099, 118 N.M. 354, 881 P.2d 714, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 93 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).

Where an employer paid all workers’ compensation arrearages due to its incorrect calculation of benefits and never refused to pay the arrearages, workers had no right to attorney fees for the arrearages. Redhouse v. Public Serv. Co., 1988-NMCA-034, 107 N.M. 389, 758 P.2d 803, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 34 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 308, 756 P.2d 1203, 1988 N.M. LEXIS 151 (N.M. 1988).

Costs may be taxed by a district court clerk without further proceedings, while the amount of attorney fees in workers’ compensation actions is determined by the district court under Rule 1-054(E) NMRA and this section. Schleft v. Board of Educ., 1988-NMCA-010, 107 N.M. 56, 752 P.2d 248, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 14 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).

In awarding attorney’s fees in a workers’ compensation proceeding in which an injured worker prevailed on one of her claims, the trial court erred in considering the time and effort expended in pursuit of the worker’s unsuccessful claims. Archuleta v. Safeway Stores, 1986-NMCA-092, 104 N.M. 769, 727 P.2d 77, 1986 N.M. App. LEXIS 659 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).

When evaluating and awarding attorney fees, the “present value of the award made in the workman’s favor” means the value computed as of the date of the award to the workman. Davis v. Homestake Mining Co., 1986-NMCA-082, 105 N.M. 2, 727 P.2d 941, 1986 N.M. App. LEXIS 666 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 104 N.M. 702, 726 P.2d 856, 1986 N.M. LEXIS 3067 (N.M. 1986).

Award of attorney’s fees in a workers’ compensation case was proper when the statutory factors for attorney fees contained in 52-1-54 NMSA 1978 were considered by the court. Candelaria v. General Elec. Co., 1986-NMCA-016, 105 N.M. 167, 730 P.2d 470, 1986 N.M. App. LEXIS 676 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986), superseded by statute as stated in Collado v. City of Albuquerque, 1995-NMCA-117, 120 N.M. 608, 904 P.2d 57, 1995 N.M. App. LEXIS 105 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995), superseded by statute as stated in Romero v. City of Santa Fe, 2006-NMCA-055, 139 N.M. 440, 134 P.3d 131, 2006 N.M. App. LEXIS 26 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).

In an employee’s action seeking relief from the subsequent injury fund pursuant to the former Subsequent Injury Act, 52-2-1 to 52-2-13 NMSA 1978, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under 52-1-54 NMSA 1978 in awarding $8,500 for attorney’s fees where the fee awarded fell within the range of 6 percent to somewhat less than 25 percent and where the employee’s case was not an extraordinary case. Smith v. Trailways, Inc., 1986-NMCA-001, 103 N.M. 741, 713 P.2d 557, 1986 N.M. App. LEXIS 578 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).

When determining a reasonable attorney fee, the trial court should consider: (1) the present value of the award made in the workman’s favor; and (2) the amount of any settlement offer and the stage of the proceeding at which the offer was made; the trial court should calculate the award in part upon the evidence in the case indicating whether there is a likelihood that the disability will extend beyond a six-month period. Amos v. Gilbert W. Corp., 1985-NMCA-106, 103 N.M. 631, 711 P.2d 908, 1985 N.M. App. LEXIS 611 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985).

Whether a statement of counsel as to hours spent on a case is sworn or not goes to the weight which should be accorded the statement and not to its admissibility; lawyers are officers of the court and are always under an obligation to be truthful to the court. Woodson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 1985-NMSC-018, 102 N.M. 333, 695 P.2d 483, 1985 N.M. LEXIS 2009 (N.M. 1985), superseded by statute as stated in Sanchez v. Wohl Shoe Co., 1989-NMCA-003, 108 N.M. 276, 771 P.2d 984, 1989 N.M. App. LEXIS 11 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989).

There could be no award of attorneys fees because, under 52-1-54 NMSA 1978, an award of attorneys fees should be based upon a successful recovery of workers’ compensation or other related benefits. Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 1983-NMCA-047, 99 N.M. 802, 664 P.2d 1000, 1983 N.M. App. LEXIS 704 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 740, 663 P.2d 1197, 1983 N.M. LEXIS 2302 (N.M. 1983), overruled,  Montoya v. AKAL Sec., 1992-NMSC-056, 114 N.M. 354, 838 P.2d 971, 1992 N.M. LEXIS 261 (N.M. 1992).

When an employer and employee’s widow settled the widow’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits before trial, 52-1-54C NMSA 1978 applied to a determination of attorneys’ fees, not 52-1-54D NMSA 1978. Morgan v. Public Serv. Co., 1982-NMCA-152, 98 N.M. 775, 652 P.2d 1226, 1982 N.M. App. LEXIS 957 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982).

The son of a deceased employee was entitled to attorney fees on appeal for defending a trial court’s award of death benefits; where an employer was not defending a decision to award benefits to the surviving beneficiary, attorney fees were proper. Aragon v. Anaconda Mining Co., 1982-NMCA-076, 98 N.M. 65, 644 P.2d 1054, 1982 N.M. App. LEXIS 855 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982).

Initiation of a claim for workers’ compensation benefits against an employer and its insurer by an attorney on behalf of an employee was a “proceeding” for which the attorney was entitled to collect attorney’s fees from the employer. Rumpf v. Rainbo Baking Co., 1981-NMCA-037, 96 N.M. 1, 626 P.2d 1303, 1981 N.M. App. LEXIS 706 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).

In a workmen’s compensation case, a trial court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing prior to awarding attorney fees in favor of the employee; the statute only requires evidentiary support of such fees and lists factors for the judge to consider. Lopez v. K. B. Kennedy Eng'g Co., 1981-NMCA-011, 95 N.M. 507, 623 P.2d 1021, 1981 N.M. App. LEXIS 686 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).

A trial court was not found to have erred in refusing to award attorney fees in connection with a hearing on an employee’s motion to increase disability benefits because there was no evidence that the employer had refused to pay for any medical prescriptions as required for an award of attorney fees to be made under 52-1-54D NMSA 1978. Tafoya v. Leonard Tire Co., 1980-NMCA-106, 94 N.M. 716, 616 P.2d 429, 1980 N.M. App. LEXIS 915 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).

Pursuant to 52-1-54B, C, D, E NMSA 1978, attorneys fees awarded for successful representation of injured claimants are recoverable against the employer as a separate and distinct award, apart from the workman’s award. In a widow’s action against the compensation carrier for her husband’s employer, where the husband died from an unrelated condition during negotiations between his attorney and his employer’s compensation carrier relating to total permanent disability benefits, the attorney’s agency was revoked upon the client’s death; therefore, there was no separate recovery available to the attorney under 52-1-54 NMSA 1978 because there was no interest distinct from the attorney’s power to settle that survived his client’s death. Brazfield v. Mountain States Mut. Casualty Co., 1979-NMCA-100, 93 N.M. 417, 600 P.2d 1207, 1979 N.M. App. LEXIS 705 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 93 N.M. 205, 598 P.2d 1165, 1979 N.M. LEXIS 1379 (N.M. 1979).

Amount of work expended by a claimant’s attorney, or the novelty and difficulty of the issues involved, are not determinative of the amount of a reasonable attorney fee in a workers’ compensation case; however, the failure to consider the work performed in determining the fee is an abuse of discretion. Lamont v. New Mexico Military Inst., 1979-NMCA-047, 92 N.M. 804, 595 P.2d 774, 1979 N.M. App. LEXIS 828 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 675, 593 P.2d 1078, 1979 N.M. LEXIS 1410 (N.M. 1979).

Possibility of a future reduction in benefits cannot be a feasible consideration in the award of attorney fees because such a possibility cannot always be anticipated. Marez v. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., 1978-NMCA-128, 93 N.M. 9, 595 P.2d 1204, 1978 N.M. App. LEXIS 649, 1978 N.M. App. LEXIS 652 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 532, 591 P.2d 286, 1979 N.M. LEXIS 1368 (N.M. 1979).

Where the court of appeals affirmed an award of workman’s compensation benefits to petitioner and increased the amount of the award to reflect the proper date of total disability, the court of appeals erred in failing to award additional attorney’s fees under former 59-10-23 NMSA 1978. Herndon v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 1978-NMSC-090, 92 N.M. 287, 587 P.2d 434, 1978 N.M. LEXIS 978 (N.M. 1978).

In an action in which the uncontradicted evidence showed that a workmen’s compensation claimant was totally disabled within the meaning of former 59-10-12.18, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the claimant an attorney fee of $500 for services in the trial court resulting in the award of temporary total disability; there was nothing in the appellate record concerning the provisions of former 59-10-23D, 1953 Comp., and there was nothing showing the time and services rendered. Pacheco v. Alamo Sheet Metal Works, 1978-NMCA-057, 91 N.M. 730, 580 P.2d 498, 1978 N.M. App. LEXIS 571 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978).

The use of the word “or” in former 59-10-23D, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-54E NMSA 1978) was merely a matter of legislative imprecision and was not meant to bar awards of attorney fees on appeal. Shahan v. Beasley Hot Shot Serv., 1978-NMCA-014, 91 N.M. 462, 575 P.2d 1347, 1978 N.M. App. LEXIS 537 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978).

Based on the time and effort expended by the employee’s attorney in the trial court as reflected by the record on appeal, the court increased the trial court’s award of the workman’s attorney fees. Martinez v. Fluor Utah, 1977-NMCA-096, 90 N.M. 782, 568 P.2d 618, 1977 N.M. App. LEXIS 653 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977).

Under former 59-10-13.10A, 1953 Comp., the trial court properly adopted the employer’s suggested amount of attorney fees for the employee after the employee’s attorney caused delays in the employee’s workmen’s compensation case; the statute required prompt disposition of workmen’s compensation claims and the employee’s attorney prevented that from happening. Casaus v. Levi Strauss & Co., 1977-NMCA-063, 90 N.M. 558, 566 P.2d 107, 1977 N.M. App. LEXIS 622 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977).

Where a deceased workman’s first wife and his third wife both claimed workmen’s compensation benefits under former 59-10-12.10B, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-17 NMSA 1978) based on the workman’s death while in the course of his employment, despite the fact that the workmen’s employer did not appeal a judgment that denied both their claims, the employer had refused to pay compensation and, pursuant to former 59-10-23D, 1953 Comp., the employer had to pay the appellate attorney fees incurred by appellee second wife as mother and next friend of the workmen’s children. Lauderdale v. Hydro Conduit Corp., 1976-NMCA-095, 89 N.M. 579, 555 P.2d 700, 1976 N.M. App. LEXIS 620 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976).

In a workman’s compensation case by an injured workman, where only medical and hospital expenses were recovered, attorney fees could be awarded under former 59-10-23D, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-54 NMSA 1978) because medical and hospital expenses were “compensation” within the meaning of the statute. Schiller v. Southwest Air Rangers, 1975-NMSC-018, 87 N.M. 476, 535 P.2d 1327, 1975 N.M. LEXIS 824 (N.M. 1975).

Former 59-10-23, 1953 Comp., permits the trial court to set attorneys’ fees which are reasonable and proper. The award of attorneys’ fees is discretionary and will not be disturbed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Gallegos v. Duke City Lumber Co., 1975-NMCA-039, 87 N.M. 404, 534 P.2d 1116, 1975 N.M. App. LEXIS 638 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975).

Although a workers’ compensation trial may have been short and the issues not complex, disability was thoroughly contested and the claimant gained substantial results such that, although the court may not have awarded attorneys’ fees in the same amount as the trial court, it could not say, as a matter of law, that the amount awarded was an abuse of discretion. Gallegos v. Duke City Lumber Co., 1975-NMCA-039, 87 N.M. 404, 534 P.2d 1116, 1975 N.M. App. LEXIS 638 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975).

In a workmen’s compensation case, a trial court’s award of attorney fees is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion. Escobedo v. Agriculture Prods. Co., 1974-NMCA-063, 86 N.M. 466, 525 P.2d 393, 1974 N.M. App. LEXIS 680 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974).

In a workmen’s compensation case, a trial court is authorized to set attorney fees which are reasonable and proper. The amount of the award is discretionary with the trial court, which in exercising its discretion must consider the mandatory provisions of 59-10-23D NMSA 1978. Escobedo v. Agriculture Prods. Co., 1974-NMCA-063, 86 N.M. 466, 525 P.2d 393, 1974 N.M. App. LEXIS 680 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974).

Section 52-1-54 NMSA 1978 authorizes the trial court to set attorney fees, which are reasonable and proper, in a workers’ compensation case. Escobedo v. Agriculture Prods. Co., 1974-NMCA-063, 86 N.M. 466, 525 P.2d 393, 1974 N.M. App. LEXIS 680 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974).

In an injured worker’s successful action to recover workmen’s compensation benefits, a trial court followed the requirements of former 59-10-23D, 1953 Comp., and did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees to the worker, and attorney fees were also awarded to the worker for an unsuccessful appeal by the employer. Provencio v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 1974-NMCA-048, 86 N.M. 538, 525 P.2d 898, 1974 N.M. App. LEXIS 688 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 86 N.M. 528, 525 P.2d 888, 1974 N.M. LEXIS 1436 (N.M. 1974).

Award of attorney fees to a worker in his workers’ compensation suit needed to be reversed and remanded where the trial court failed to consider all of the elements that former 59-10-23D, 1953 Comp. required to be considered in the granting of attorney fees to a worker who recovered funds in excess of the amount offered by the employer and its insurer; included in these elements, the court said, was the offered sum made 30 days prior to trial, as well as the sum offered before the workman’s attorney was employed and the sum offered after he was employed but before court proceedings, and the present value of the award made in the workman’s favor. Keyser v. Research Cottrell Co., 1972-NMCA-116, 84 N.M. 173, 500 P.2d 997, 1972 N.M. App. LEXIS 834 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972).

In a workmen’s compensation case where a trial court awarded claimant medical expenses but found that he did not suffer a disability, he was not entitled to collect attorney fees under former 59-10-23D, 1953 Comp.; a prerequisite to being awarded attorney fees was the collection of compensation; that the collection of medical expenses was not the collection of compensation. Wuenschel v. New Mexico Broadcasting Corp., 1972-NMCA-096, 84 N.M. 109, 500 P.2d 194, 1972 N.M. App. LEXIS 818 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972), overruled,  Schiller v. Southwest Air Rangers, 1975-NMSC-018, 87 N.M. 476, 535 P.2d 1327, 1975 N.M. LEXIS 824 (N.M. 1975).

Under former 59-10-23D, 1953 Comp., attorneys’ fees could be awarded to a claimant in a workers’ compensation case if compensation is collected in a court proceeding, in excess of a settlement amount offered in writing 30 days or more prior to trial, with the day of the offer not included in those 30 days; where employer’s offer was made 29 days before trial, claimant was entitled to attorneys fees. Willcox v. United Nuclear Homestake Sapin Co., 1971-NMCA-126, 83 N.M. 73, 488 P.2d 123, 1971 N.M. App. LEXIS 820 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971).

Where a claimant never offered any specific or detailed evidence of the services performed by his attorney, but the record showed that the attorney prepared the complaint, took depositions, and represented the claimant at trial, and the record failed to show an offer of settlement by the employer, the claimant was entitled to attorney fees under former 59-10-23D, 1953 Comp. Brannon v. Well Units, 1970-NMCA-130, 82 N.M. 253, 479 P.2d 533, 1970 N.M. App. LEXIS 663 (N.M. Ct. App. 1970).

Under former 59-10-23D, 1953 Comp. an employee was not entitled to recover attorney fees in his suit under the Workmen’s Compensation Act of New Mexico where the employee rejected his employer’s offer to settle, and where the amount of judgment the employee received at trial was less than the amount that the employer offered in settlement. Hales v. Van Cleave, 1967-NMCA-006, 78 N.M. 181, 429 P.2d 379, 1967 N.M. App. LEXIS 149 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 78 N.M. 198, 429 P.2d 657, 1967 N.M. LEXIS 2877 (N.M. 1967).

Under former 59-1-23, 1953 Comp., the peculiar facts involving several appearances in the district court entitled the plaintiff employee’s attorney to a reasonable fee substantially above that which was originally stipulated to be paid prior to the hearings held in the district court. Turrieta v. Creamland Quality Checked Dairies, 77 N.M. 192, 420 P.2d 776, 1966 N.M. LEXIS 2801 (N.M. 1966).

Because a refusal to pay workmen’s compensation was tantamount to a denial of liability requiring the claimants to bring suit, once they were determined to be entitled to compensation, attorney’s fees would be fixed by the trial court under the provisions of former 59-10-23D, 1953 Comp.. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Jarde, 1963-NMSC-215, 73 N.M. 371, 388 P.2d 382, 1963 N.M. LEXIS 2089 (N.M. 1963).

In a workmen’s compensation case, a claimant’s motion to set aside a lump-sum settlement award was properly denied where there was no mistake or misconduct under former 21-1-1(60), 1953 Comp. (now Rule 1-060 NMRA), and reasonable attorney fees were to be taxed as part of the costs to the employer; there was no misconduct by the attorney, even though the claimant asserted that there was because the attorney was selected and paid for by the employer’s insurance carrier. Herrera v. C & R Paving Co., 1963-NMSC-203, 73 N.M. 237, 387 P.2d 339, 1963 N.M. LEXIS 2072 (N.M. 1963).

Award of attorney’s fees under former 59-1-23, 1953 Comp. is to the workman’s attorney, not the workman, thus it is not an element recoverable by the employer in an action under former 59-1-25, 1953 Comp. against a negligent third party for reimbursement for compensation paid the workman. Reed v. Styron, 69 N.M. 262, 365 P.2d 912, 1961 N.M. LEXIS 1645, 1961 N.M. LEXIS 1646 (N.M. 1961).

Because the judgment was equal or less than a settlement offered by employer, worker was not entitled to attorney fees. Lee v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 1960-NMSC-003, 66 N.M. 351, 348 P.2d 271, 1960 N.M. LEXIS 1116 (N.M. 1960).

Amount of the recovery by a workers’ compensation claimant’s attorney was one of the factors to be considered in determining the amount of the fee to be allowed to the attorney for a workers’ compensation claimant. In considering the amount of the fee, the court noted that disability judgments were subject to periodic review pursuant to former 59-10-25, 1953 Comp., thus where the claimant’s medical expert was of the opinion that the disability would only continue for several months, a fee that was awarded to the claimant’s attorney was held excessive given the case involved an accidental injury of limited duration that was a total disability. Seal v. Blackburn Tank Truck Serv., 1958-NMSC-087, 64 N.M. 282, 327 P.2d 797, 1958 N.M. LEXIS 1335 (N.M. 1958).

Workers’ compensation claimant who on appeal won an increase in the duration of the award though not the amount had still prevailed on appeal for the purpose of an award of attorney’s fees. Mann v. Board of County Comm'rs, 1954-NMSC-088, 58 N.M. 626, 274 P.2d 145, 1954 N.M. LEXIS 1172 (N.M. 1954).

In an action under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, former §§ 57-901 to 57-931, 1941 Comp. (now 52-1-1 NMSA 1978), where the claimant appealed from a judgment denying total permanent disability plus 50 percent additional compensation by reason of the failure of the employer to provide reasonable safety devices as required by the Act, the claimant’s contention that a fee, in addition to the amount allowed by the trial court, for his attorney in prosecuting the appeal was warranted was without merit because the allowance of attorney fees was limited to recovery of compensation, former § 57-923, 1941 Comp., and the claimant having failed to sustain his claim, the court was without discretion in the matter of fees. Rowland v. Reynolds Elec. Eng'g Co., 1951-NMSC-046, 55 N.M. 287, 232 P.2d 689, 1951 N.M. LEXIS 743 (N.M. 1951).

Former § 57-923, 1941 Comp., the Compensation Act, provided the payment of attorney fees by the insurer or employer only if the matter was litigated to a successful conclusion and the court so ordered. If it could be said that any prejudice resulted in any way from the court’s action in permitting the question, the prejudice was cured by the court’s specific direction to the jury thereafter given to disregard all statements or remarks relating to attorney fees and kindred matters; this direction and instruction to the jury was given at defendants, the employer and the insurer’s request, and with the concurrence of counsel for plaintiff employee. Elsea v. Broome Furniture Co., 1943-NMSC-036, 47 N.M. 356, 143 P.2d 572, 1943 N.M. LEXIS 43 (N.M. 1943).

Under 52-1-54 NMSA 1978, workers’ compensation claimants whose attorney fees exceed $12,500 cannot recover those fees unless they can show bad faith on the part of an employer, and if they cannot show bad faith, the claimant cannot agree to pay his or her counsel more than $12,500. Corn v. New Mexico Educators Fed. Credit Union, 1994-NMCA-161, 119 N.M. 199, 889 P.2d 234, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 150 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, 889 P.2d 203, 1995 N.M. LEXIS 36 (N.M. 1995), overruled,  Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305, 1998 N.M. LEXIS 338 (N.M. 1998), superseded by statute as stated in Meyers v. Western Auto, 2002-NMCA-089, 132 N.M. 675, 54 P.3d 79, 2002 N.M. App. LEXIS 73 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002).

Cap on attorney fees under 52-1-54 NMSA 1978 handicaps workers vis-a-vis employer in the adjudicatory process, which requires the assistance of counsel for which employers should pay a reasonable sum and for which the New Mexico Legislature has provided significant attorney fees. Corn v. New Mexico Educators Fed. Credit Union, 1994-NMCA-161, 119 N.M. 199, 889 P.2d 234, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 150 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, 889 P.2d 203, 1995 N.M. LEXIS 36 (N.M. 1995), overruled,  Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305, 1998 N.M. LEXIS 338 (N.M. 1998), superseded by statute as stated in Meyers v. Western Auto, 2002-NMCA-089, 132 N.M. 675, 54 P.3d 79, 2002 N.M. App. LEXIS 73 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002).

Workers’ compensation claimant had standing to challenge the cap on attorney fees under 52-1-54 NMSA 1978 because the claimant was able to show a real risk of future injury resulting from the cap inasmuch as Rule 16-116(B)(5) NMRA allows an attorney to withdraw if the attorney is not paid for services rendered. Corn v. New Mexico Educators Fed. Credit Union, 1994-NMCA-161, 119 N.M. 199, 889 P.2d 234, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 150 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, 889 P.2d 203, 1995 N.M. LEXIS 36 (N.M. 1995), overruled,  Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305, 1998 N.M. LEXIS 338 (N.M. 1998), superseded by statute as stated in Meyers v. Western Auto, 2002-NMCA-089, 132 N.M. 675, 54 P.3d 79, 2002 N.M. App. LEXIS 73 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002).

Where an employer reasonably interpreted a physician’s report on an injured employee’s medical condition as indicating that the employee was able to return to work, the employer’s refusal to pay further benefits for temporary total disability triggered the employee’s right to file a compensation claim as provided in 52-1-31A NMSA 1978 but did not evidence bad faith so as to entitle the employee to recover her attorney’s fees under 52-1-54C NMSA 1978. Sanchez v. Wohl Shoe Co., 1989-NMCA-003, 108 N.M. 276, 771 P.2d 984, 1989 N.M. App. LEXIS 11 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. dismissed, 108 N.M. 217, 770 P.2d 539, 1989 N.M. LEXIS 55 (N.M. 1989).

52-1-54 NMSA 1978 expressly requires that defendants are to pay the cost and expense of any depositions ordered by the trial court in a workers’ compensation case. Escobedo v. Agriculture Prods. Co., 1974-NMCA-063, 86 N.M. 466, 525 P.2d 393, 1974 N.M. App. LEXIS 680 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974).

Delay in payment did not in itself constitute an “economic loss” within the meaning of 52-1-54 NMSA 1978 such that denial of attorneys’ fees pursuant to that section was appropriate where the claimant showed no other evidence of economic loss. Pineda v. Grande Drilling Corp., 1991-NMCA-004, 111 N.M. 536, 807 P.2d 234, 1991 N.M. App. LEXIS 108 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).

Although a provision authorizing an additional award of reasonable and necessary attorney fees for services on appeal has been adopted by the legislatures of a number of states, the omission of such provision in Section 52-1-54I NMSA 1978 does not invalidate the statute on equal protection grounds. Mieras v. Dyncorp, 1996-NMCA-095, 122 N.M. 401, 925 P.2d 518, 1996 N.M. App. LEXIS 76 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 122 N.M. 279, 923 P.2d 1164, 1996 N.M. LEXIS 361 (N.M. 1996).

In a workers’ compensation case where the bad faith handling of a worker’s claim was at issue, 52-1-54 NMSA 1978 entitled the worker to recover all of his attorney fees because the worker’s total award was more than his settlement offer before the hearing. Meyers v. Western Auto, 2002-NMCA-089, 132 N.M. 675, 54 P.3d 79, 2002 N.M. App. LEXIS 73 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 132 N.M. 551, 52 P.3d 411, 2002 N.M. LEXIS 297 (N.M. 2002).

In an employer’s action for reimbursement for workers’ compensation benefits paid to an employee and for a determination on what additional workers’ compensation benefits were due to the employee as a result of his accident, the workers’ compensation judge was required to reconsider the issue of attorney’s fees under 52-1-54F(3) NMSA 1978 on remand after recalculating the employer’s right to reimbursement and to consider the efforts of the employee’s attorney on appeal pursuant to 52-1-54I NMSA 1978 in reconsidering the attorney’s fees issue. Chavez v. S.E.D. Lab., 2000-NMSC-034, 2000-NMSC-034, 129 N.M. 794, 14 P.3d 532, 2000 N.M. LEXIS 405 (N.M. 2000).

Despite a worker’s expenses of $2,806.08 for expert witness fees, which the trial court found reasonable for testimony that was necessary to the workmen’s compensation case, the trial court properly limited the claimant’s recovery for those fees to $750; 38-6-4B NMSA 1978 set the rate of per diem costs and mileage for witnesses, and the statute was made applicable to cases arising under the Workmen’s Compensation Act by former 52-1-35B NMSA 1978. Schober v. Mountain Bell Tel., 1980-NMCA-113, 96 N.M. 376, 630 P.2d 1231, 1980 N.M. App. LEXIS 928 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).

When it was determined by the court, from the evidence before it, that a workers’ compensation claimant was legally entitled to benefits, which had been refused him and a recovery thereof was allowed, the court was authorized under former 59-10-23D 1953 Comp., to award attorney fees to the claimant. Scott v. Transwestern Tankers, 1963-NMSC-205, 73 N.M. 219, 387 P.2d 327, 1963 N.M. LEXIS 2068 (N.M. 1963).

Where a trial court undertook to determine an award of attorney fees, the present value of the workman’s compensation award, to be considered under 52-1-54D NMSA 1978 for purposes of determining attorney fees, should not have included future medical expenses, required by 52-1-49 NMSA 1978 to be furnished by the employer; medical expenses were compensation for purposes of awarding attorney fees, but such expenses were those that had already occurred, not expenses that might occur in the future. Board of Educ. v. Quintana, 1985-NMSC-020, 102 N.M. 433, 697 P.2d 116, 1985 N.M. LEXIS 1938 (N.M. 1985).

Because a claimant never requested that the issue of bad faith be considered at a separate hearing, and the claimant did not object to consideration of both matters at a hearing on bad faith and attorney fees, the claimant did not preserve the issue for review; thus, the court was not required to consider whether the claimant was entitled to a totally distinct hearing on bad faith under 52-1-54 NMSA 1978. Sosa v. Empire Roofing Co., 1990-NMCA-097, 110 N.M. 614, 798 P.2d 215, 1990 N.M. App. LEXIS 95 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).

Employee did not lack a comparable incentive to litigate the issue of proximate cause in a workers’ compensation proceeding because of the statutory limits on the amount of benefits and attorney fees under 52-1-41A and 52-1-54I NMSA 1978 because those limitations were offset by advantages under 52-1-8 and 52-1-54D NMSA 1978; therefore, the trial court did not err in holding that the employee’s tort action against third parties was precluded by the administrative findings that the accident was fraudulently caused by the employee. Padilla v. Intel Corp., 1998-NMCA-125, 125 N.M. 698, 964 P.2d 862, 1998 N.M. App. LEXIS 110 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998).

Workers’ compensation judge did not abuse his discretion when he awarded attorney fees where a claimant’s attorney waived the portion of the fees for which the claimant was responsible, pursuant to 52-1-54 NMSA 1978; that counsel waived a portion of the fees was not dispositive on the issue of attorney’s fees because the fees were awarded to a claimant and not to his counsel. Sosa v. Empire Roofing Co., 1990-NMCA-097, 110 N.M. 614, 798 P.2d 215, 1990 N.M. App. LEXIS 95 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).

Orders setting attorney’s fees under the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-54 NMSA 1978, need not be supported by specific findings so long as there are sufficient findings of fact to support the final conclusion. Cordova v. Taos Ski Valley, 1996-NMCA-009, 121 N.M. 258, 910 P.2d 334, 1995 N.M. App. LEXIS 155 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995).

In a workers’ compensation case, a trial court improperly awarded attorney fees to the worker under 52-1-54 NMSA 1978; appellate court held that the applicable law was 52-1-54C NMSA 1978 and 52-1-54F NMSA 1978, and remanded the case for determination of a reasonable attorney’s fee award that was consistent with the actual benefits that were secured by the worker’s attorney. County of Bernalillo v. Sisneros, 1994-NMCA-156, 119 N.M. 98, 888 P.2d 980, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 157 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994), limited, Medina v. Berg Constr., 1996-NMCA-087, 122 N.M. 350, 924 P.2d 1362, 1996 N.M. App. LEXIS 74 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).

Pursuant to 52-1-54G NMSA 1978, there was no showing of bad faith on the part on an employer where the employer relied on the opinion of a doctor which indicated that a claimant had reached maximum medical improvement; the employer had a reasonable basis to challenge the disability issue. Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1993-NMCA-114, 116 N.M. 640, 866 P.2d 368, 1993 N.M. App. LEXIS 127 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 116 N.M. 364, 862 P.2d 1223, 1993 N.M. LEXIS 325 (N.M. 1993).

City did not deny a claimant’s workers’ compensation claim in bad faith, in violation of 52-1-54I NMSA 1978, because the city offered evidence that it reduced the claimant’s benefits in part on a physician’s opinion that the claimant had reached maximum medical improvement and, subject to certain restrictions, was able to perform light-duty work. Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1993-NMCA-114, 116 N.M. 640, 866 P.2d 368, 1993 N.M. App. LEXIS 127 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 116 N.M. 364, 862 P.2d 1223, 1993 N.M. LEXIS 325 (N.M. 1993).

In a workers’ compensation case, an employee was properly awarded attorney’s fees under the interim provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, pursuant to 52-1-54C(2) NMSA 1978, for defending an appeal where the employer failed to submit findings and conclusions prior to entry of the judgment even though it had ample time to do so; hearing officer’s decision was reviewable by the appellate court in the manner that was provided for in other cases, pursuant to 52-5-8B NMSA 1978. Pennington v. Chino Mines, 1990-NMCA-023, 109 N.M. 676, 789 P.2d 624, 1990 N.M. App. LEXIS 13 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).

The words “employer and employee” as used in the New Mexico Workman’s Compensation Act, 52-1-54 NMSA 1978, were used in their natural sense and intended to describe the conventional relation between an employer who paid wages to an employee for his labor; the words were not intended to be used in determining claims made against the subsequent injury fund. Superintendent of Ins. v. Mountain States Mut. Casualty Co., 1986-NMCA-012, 104 N.M. 605, 725 P.2d 581, 1986 N.M. App. LEXIS 648 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).

Legislative intent was to be determined primarily by the language of the Workmen’s Compensation Act; words used in the statute were to be given their ordinary and usual meaning unless a different intent was clearly indicated to hold that a claimant was entitled a reasonable fee for an attorney’s services with that fee being taxed as part of the costs against the employer under 52-1-54C NMSA 1978. Superintendent of Ins. v. Mountain States Mut. Casualty Co., 1986-NMCA-012, 104 N.M. 605, 725 P.2d 581, 1986 N.M. App. LEXIS 648 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).

A reasonable fee for claimant’s attorney was taxed as part of the costs against the employer where the jurisdiction of the court was invoked to approve a settlement of a compensation claim under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-54C NMSA 1978; however, nothing in the statute was to apply to attorneys or agents representing defending parties in any matter arising from a claim under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-54G NMSA 1978. Superintendent of Ins. v. Mountain States Mut. Casualty Co., 1986-NMCA-012, 104 N.M. 605, 725 P.2d 581, 1986 N.M. App. LEXIS 648 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).

It is proper for a trial court to consider the amount of the compensation award, and to use a percentage of that award as one factor, along with the requirements of 52-1-54 NMSA 1978 in arriving at a proper attorney fee. Woodson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 1985-NMSC-018, 102 N.M. 333, 695 P.2d 483, 1985 N.M. LEXIS 2009 (N.M. 1985), superseded by statute as stated in Sanchez v. Wohl Shoe Co., 1989-NMCA-003, 108 N.M. 276, 771 P.2d 984, 1989 N.M. App. LEXIS 11 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989).

The value of the workman’s award should be a factor in setting an attorney fee. Woodson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 1985-NMSC-018, 102 N.M. 333, 695 P.2d 483, 1985 N.M. LEXIS 2009 (N.M. 1985), superseded by statute as stated in Sanchez v. Wohl Shoe Co., 1989-NMCA-003, 108 N.M. 276, 771 P.2d 984, 1989 N.M. App. LEXIS 11 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989).

Injured employee was entitled to file a claim for benefits even though he was receiving the maximum benefits, where the employer delayed in paying a medical bill; medical expenses are compensation for the purpose of allowing attorney fees as well as for the purposes of allowing an employee to file a claim when he is otherwise receiving maximum benefits. Briscoe v. Hydro Conduit Corp., 1975-NMCA-147, 88 N.M. 568, 544 P.2d 283, 1975 N.M. App. LEXIS 745 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975).

Award of attorney fees to a worker in his workers’ compensation suit was reversed and remanded where the trial court failed to consider all of the elements that former 59-10-23D, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-54E NMSA 1978) required be considered in the granting of attorney fees to a worker. Keyser v. Research Cottrell Co., 1972-NMCA-116, 84 N.M. 173, 500 P.2d 997, 1972 N.M. App. LEXIS 834 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972).

In an appeal of a judgment reducing the level of compensation due an employee the court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case because of the trial court’s erroneous admission of certain evidence; the court declined to consider the employee’s claim that the trial court erred in denying him attorney’s fees, based on 52-1-54 NMSA 1978, as premature. Ennen v. Southwest Potash Co., 1959-NMSC-025, 65 N.M. 307, 336 P.2d 1062, 1959 N.M. LEXIS 905 (N.M. 1959).

In a workers’ compensation action, the claimant could not request the court to fix fees for her attorney in representing her on appeal under former § 57-923, 1941 Comp. (now 52-1-54 NMSA 1978) because the recovery of compensation was a prerequisite to the allowance of attorney fees and the case was remanded for a new trial. Perez v. Fred Harvey, Inc., 54 N.M. 339, 224 P.2d 524, 1950 N.M. LEXIS 641, 1950 N.M. LEXIS 642 (N.M. 1950).

Where an employer failed to object to the trial court’s findings that an employee suffered a work-related injury and gave notice of the injury as required by former 1929 Code, § 156-113 (now 52-1-29 NMSA 1978), the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to the employee pursuant to former 1929 Code, § 156-122 (now 52-1-54F(4) NMSA 1978). Wells v. Gulf Ref. Co., 1938-NMSC-033, 42 N.M. 378, 79 P.2d 921, 1938 N.M. LEXIS 32 (N.M. 1938).

Limitations on compensation benefits, 52-1-47 NMSA 1978.

Hearing procedure, 52-5-7 NMSA 1978.

Payment; periodic or lump sum; settlement, 52-5-12 NMSA 1978.