52-1-1.  Short title.

Constitutionality.

Generally.

Applicability.

Attorney fees.

Chiropractor.

Compensation.

Consolidation of causes.

Consolidation of faces.

Construction.

Construction with other law.

Contract.

Costs.

Defenses.

Eligibility.

Employees.

Employer.

Employer liability.

Error.

Evidence.

           —Insufficient.

           —Sufficient.

Exclusive remedy.

Expert.

Failure to give notice.

Fees.

“Going and coming” rule.

Going and coming rule.

Judgment.

Jurisdiction.

Legislative authority.

Legislative intent.

Liability.

Negligence action.

Notice.

Place of business.

Practice and procedure.

Protections.

Proximate cause.

Purpose.

Recovery.

Refusal to pay settlement.

Rehabilitation.

Releases.

Removal to federal court.

Review.

Scope of employment.

Summary judgment.

Time limitations.

Totally disabled.

Vocational rehabilitation services.

           —Employee must establish need.

Workers’ compensation.

New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-1 to 52-1-70 NMSA 1978 does not violate the due process clause of N.M. Const. art II  § 18, because the act requires the workers’ compensation judge to consider the unique facts of each claim in order to arrive at an impairment rating, because 52-1-26 NMSA 1978 and 52-1-26.4 NMSA 1978 provide that any finding of impairment may be modified by the workers’ compensation claimant’s age, education, and physical capacity, and because the American Medical Association Guide incorporated in 52-1-24 provides a guideline to be used in conjunction with the expertise of a medical professional in order to arrive at a percentage of impairment based on the unique circumstances of each claim. Madrid v. St. Joseph Hosp., 1996-NMSC-064, 122 N.M. 524, 928 P.2d 250, 1996 N.M. LEXIS 431 (N.M. 1996).

In an action by three injured workers, the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq. was found constitutional; the required use of the american medical association guide was not an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to a non-governmental entity, the statute provided workers a meaningful hearing to address the unique aspects of their claim, and the legislature’s adoption of the most recent addition of the association guide to evaluation impairment was not violative of equal protection in determining the existence or extent of disability. Madrid v. St. Joseph Hosp., 1996-NMSC-064, 122 N.M. 524, 928 P.2d 250, 1996 N.M. LEXIS 431 (N.M. 1996).

Worker’s claim, that the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation statute deprived him of due process because it did not provide an amount which worker deemed was a sufficient compensation amount, was without merit. The worker’s claim was based solely on the basis of the dollar amount of the disability benefits and failed to consider the other benefits of an economic nature which were conferred by the statute, which included a uniform scale of compensation, medical and related benefits, rehabilitation services and a right to compensation which eliminated legal defenses favorable to the employer. Casillas v. S.W.I.G., 1981-NMCA-045, 96 N.M. 84, 628 P.2d 329, 1981 N.M. App. LEXIS 716 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 96 N.M. 116, 628 P.2d 686, 1981 N.M. LEXIS 2342 (N.M. 1981).

In an employee’s action against his employer in which he sought recovery under the New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 to 52-1-69 NMSA 1978 for an alleged work-related injury and for wrongful discharge, the employee was permitted to elect whether to file his action under the Act or under common law if the employer failed to comply with 52-1-4 NMSA 1978; therefore dismissal of the employee’s action under Rule 1-012 NMRA was improperly denied and the action was remanded for a determination as to which claim the employee chose to pursue. Shores v. Charter Servs., 1987-NMSC-109, 106 N.M. 569, 746 P.2d 1101, 1987 N.M. LEXIS 3813 (N.M. 1987).

Commencing on December 1, 1986, all claims, regardless of when the injury or death may have occurred, were to be filed with the workers’ compensation administration. Wylie Corp. v. Mowrer, 1986-NMSC-075, 104 N.M. 751, 726 P.2d 1381, 1986 N.M. LEXIS 3076 (N.M. 1986).

Trial court erred in awarding a worker pre-judgment interest after finding that his psychological disability was compensable. Neither 56-8-4 NMSA 1978 nor the Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq. authorizes such an award. Lopez v. Smith's Management Corp., 1986-NMCA-054, 106 N.M. 416, 744 P.2d 544, 1986 N.M. App. LEXIS 717 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).

New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq., is to be construed liberally in favor of the workman. However, its provisions may not be disregarded in the name of liberal construction. Taylor v. Delgarno Transp., 1983-NMSC-052, 100 N.M. 138, 667 P.2d 445, 1983 N.M. LEXIS 2307 (N.M. 1983).

Pursuant to former 59-10-19.2, 1953 Comp., an employee who had been determined to be entitled to total and permanent disability benefits was also entitled to vocational rehabilitation services. Trujillo v. Beaty Elec. Co., 1978-NMCA-021, 91 N.M. 533, 577 P.2d 431, 1978 N.M. App. LEXIS 541 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978).

Despite argument by employer and its insurer that, because none of an employee’s doctors specifically mentioned the word “disability,” using “injury” or “accident” instead, the mandatory requisites of former 59-10-13.3B, 1953 Comp., had not been met, a medical expert was not required to state an opinion in positive, dogmatic language or in the exact language of the statute, and the employee was properly awarded total and permanent disability benefits. Trujillo v. Beaty Elec. Co., 1978-NMCA-021, 91 N.M. 533, 577 P.2d 431, 1978 N.M. App. LEXIS 541 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978).

Employee who worked as a truck driver gathering and delivering milk did not engage in an extra-hazardous occupation and his survivors were not entitled to workers’ compensation death benefits under § 57-910, 1941 Comp. (now 52-1-1 NMSA 1978). Hernandez v. Border Truck Line, 1946-NMSC-002, 49 N.M. 396, 165 P.2d 120, 1946 N.M. LEXIS 410 (N.M. 1946).

The words “employer and employee” as used in the Workman’s Compensation Act, are used in their natural sense and intended to describe the conventional relation between an employer who pays wages to an employee for his labor. One of the tests of the relationship of employer and employee is that the employer retains the right to direct the manner in which his business shall be done and the result to be accomplished. Mendoza v. Gallup Southwestern Coal Co., 41 N.M. 161, 66 P.2d 426, 1937 N.M. LEXIS 12, 1937 N.M. LEXIS 13 (N.M. 1937).

Employee’s allergic reaction to cigarette smoke in the work environment, which caused him to eventually collapse, was a compensable, accidental injury under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, former 59-10-1, 1953 Comp. et seq. (now 52-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.). Schober v. Mountain Bell Tel., 1978-NMCA-115, 93 N.M. 337, 600 P.2d 283, 1978 N.M. App. LEXIS 650 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978), cert. quashed, 92 N.M. 621, 593 P.2d 62, 1979 N.M. LEXIS 1423 (N.M. 1979).

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to an employer in an employee’s action under the former New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act, on the ground that the employee’s allergic reaction to cigarette smoke in the work environment provided by his employer was not an “accidental injury” as a matter of law because an accidental injury could result from gradual happenings and several different accidents. Schober v. Mountain Bell Tel., 1978-NMCA-115, 93 N.M. 337, 600 P.2d 283, 1978 N.M. App. LEXIS 650 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978), cert. quashed, 92 N.M. 621, 593 P.2d 62, 1979 N.M. LEXIS 1423 (N.M. 1979).

Where defendant employer did not carry workers’ compensation insurance, and he had not relieved himself of such requirement as required by former 59-10-3, 1953 Comp., the employer was not operating under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and, given those circumstances, plaintiff worker could not conclusively have been presumed to have accepted the provisions of the act; consequently, an action at law was tenable in favor of the employee and against the employer, and the defenses of former 59-10-5, 1953 Comp. were not available to the employer. Addison v. Tessier, 1957-NMSC-002, 62 N.M. 120, 305 P.2d 1067, 1957 N.M. LEXIS 878 (N.M. 1957).

Conservancy district worker who was injured while performing maintenance work was entitled to disability benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, former 59-10-1, 1953 Comp. et seq., because maintenance activities were held to fit under the engineering exception to exclusion in former 59-10-12(g), 1953 Comp. Armijo v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 1955-NMSC-033, 59 N.M. 231, 282 P.2d 712, 1955 N.M. LEXIS 1012 (N.M. 1955).

Prison guard who was injured during a prison riot could not recover against the penitentiary under former § 45-101, 1941 Comp., and the Workmen’s Compensation Statutes, former 57-901 to 57-931, 1941 Comp. (now 52-1-1 NMSA 1978), where the penitentiary took no step to comply with the Act and did not file a notice in writing of its election not to accept the provisions of the Act, because the state did not expressly consent to be sued. Day v. Penitentiary of New Mexico, 1954-NMSC-064, 58 N.M. 391, 271 P.2d 831, 1954 N.M. LEXIS 1139 (N.M. 1954).

Children of a deceased employee could not recover under the New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act for their father’s death in an automobile collision that occurred while the father was attempting to pass a truck loaded with gravel while his vision was obscured by a cloud of dust. The evidence established that there was no negligence on the part of the driver of the on-coming truck that struck the father’s vehicle because he could not have known that the father would try to pass the loaded truck. Caviness v. Driscoll Const. Co., 1935-NMSC-065, 39 N.M. 441, 49 P.2d 251, 1935 N.M. LEXIS 70 (N.M. 1935), overruled,  Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1987-NMSC-007, 105 N.M. 503, 734 P.2d 743, 1987 N.M. LEXIS 3520 (N.M. 1987).

In a workmen’s compensation action under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, former 59-10-1, 1953 Comp., et seq., (now 52-1-1 NMSA 1978), where an employer and its insurer challenged the trial court’s award of interest on the award of attorney fees, arguing that the fees were costs, not damages, the court held that because the award of attorney fees was included within the compensation award, the fees were considered part of the judgment and interest thereon was proper. Genuine Parts Co. v. Garcia, 1978-NMSC-059, 92 N.M. 57, 582 P.2d 1270, 1978 N.M. LEXIS 955 (N.M. 1978).

Where an employee suffered a work-related low back injury, and the employer sent him to a medical doctor for treatment, but the employee discontinued medical treatment and returned to the chiropractor he had visited previously, the trial court, finding that the disability from the time the employee discontinued treatment was caused by a fight with his ex-wife and by unnecessary and unreasonable chiropractic treatment, improperly accepted only the doctor’s testimony on causation; the chiropractor’s testimony, however, was admissible as expert medical testimony required in contested cases under 52-1-28B NMSA 1978 to establish the causal connection between the work-related injury and disability, and the chiropractor was a health care provider capable of providing diagnosis and treatment of injuries compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 through 52-1-69 NMSA 1978. Vallejos v. KNC, Inc., 1987-NMSC-030, 105 N.M. 613, 735 P.2d 530, 1987 N.M. LEXIS 3568 (N.M. 1987).

Employer and Second Injury Fund were liable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq., for compensation paid to an injured employee based on what percentage the employee’s overall work life was shortened by the work-related condition and the preexisting condition. Rader v. Don J. Cummings Co., 1989-NMCA-079, 109 N.M. 219, 784 P.2d 38, 1989 N.M. App. LEXIS 90 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 131, 782 P.2d 384, 1989 N.M. LEXIS 293 (N.M. 1989).

Where an employee had finished working, had clocked out, and slipped and fell as she left the store where she worked, and she did not prove that her employer was negligent, compensation for her injury was precluded by 52-1-9 NMSA 1978 and 52-1-19 NMSA 1978 since her injury would have been compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq., only if it was both “arising out of” and “in the course of” employment, but compensation was not allowed under the “going and coming” rule where her injury occurred while she was leaving work, and the trial court’s award of compensation was reversed. Romero v. S. S. Kresge Co., 1981-NMCA-001, 95 N.M. 484, 623 P.2d 998, 1981 N.M. App. LEXIS 677 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981), overruled,  Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1987-NMSC-007, 105 N.M. 503, 734 P.2d 743, 1987 N.M. LEXIS 3520 (N.M. 1987).

Continued payment of an officer’s salary who suffered a heart attack while digging his vehicle out of the snow did not amount to payment of compensation so as to suspend the officer’s right to sue under the former Workmen’s Compensation Act, § 57-910,  1941 Comp. Hathaway v. New Mexico State Police, 57 N.M. 747, 263 P.2d 690, 1953 N.M. LEXIS 1050, 1953 N.M. LEXIS 1051 (N.M. 1953).

Under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, former § 57-912(l), 1941 Comp. (now 52-1-1 NMSA 1978 et. seq.), because the employee had left her employment by the time she ate her evening meal, which allegedly caused her illness, the injury was not compensable, even though she ate the meal in her uniform and while on call. Clower v. Grossman, 1951-NMSC-075, 55 N.M. 546, 237 P.2d 353, 1951 N.M. LEXIS 776 (N.M. 1951).

Widow was properly awarded death compensation where her husband died from a fall at work, his employment contract disclaiming workmen’s compensation in which he agreed not to be bound by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, former 1929 Code, § 156-101 (now 52-1-1 NMSA 1978) was invalid, and there was no willful misconduct given no knowledge of his condition. Christensen v. Dysart, 1938-NMSC-008, 42 N.M. 107, 76 P.2d 1, 1938 N.M. LEXIS 7 (N.M. 1938).

Employer’s payment of a reduced amount after it had commenced payment of the maximum amount due for permanent and total disability, constituted a refusal to pay workers’ compensation for purposes of the limitation period for filing a claim in former 1929 Code, § 156-113. Bearup v. Peru Min. Co., 1934-NMSC-081, 38 N.M. 531, 37 P.2d 535, 1934 N.M. LEXIS 82 (N.M. 1934).

Assignment to the employer of a portion of the claim of the workman against the wrongdoer responsible for his injuries arises because the employer has paid and the workman has accepted compensation under the compensation statute. Kandelin v. Lee Moor Contracting Co., 1933-NMSC-058, 37 N.M. 479, 24 P.2d 731, 1933 N.M. LEXIS 72 (N.M. 1933).

In a workmen’s compensation action it was determined that under former 1929 Code, § 156-118 payments of compensation for different injuries, that arose out of the same accident, should run consecutively and not concurrently. Maestas v. American Metal Co., 1933-NMSC-026, 37 N.M. 203, 20 P.2d 924, 1933 N.M. LEXIS 27 (N.M. 1933).

Under New Mexico’s Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq., a trial court did not err in granting employer credit against workers’ compensation benefits for monies paid to employer under its accident and disability plans, which controlled the rights of the parties and did not allow duplication of benefits; where the Act was silent, fundamental fairness controlled. Carter v. Mountain Bell, 1986-NMCA-103, 105 N.M. 17, 727 P.2d 956, 1986 N.M. App. LEXIS 670 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).

Because workers’ compensation statutes should be liberally construed in the worker’s favor and because any reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the workman, the language of 52-1-42A NMSA 1978 relating to “one arm at or near the shoulder,” should be construed to include only injuries to the arm itself and not injuries to the shoulder. Carter v. Mountain Bell, 1986-NMCA-103, 105 N.M. 17, 727 P.2d 956, 1986 N.M. App. LEXIS 670 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).

Phrase “which results in a permanent disability, that is materially and substantially greater than that which would have resulted from the subsequent injury alone” in former 52-2-9A NMSA 1978 of the former Subsequent Injury Act, 52-2-1 NMSA 1978 et seq., does not mean that the subsequent injury must result in permanent disability without regard to the pre-existing condition. The Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 to -69 NMSA 1978, to which reference was made in former 52-2-9A NMSA 1978, has been interpreted as allowing recovery where the accidental injury aggravates a pre-existing condition, resulting in greater liability on the part of the employer than would be the case for the subsequent injury alone. Smith v. Trailways, Inc., 1986-NMCA-001, 103 N.M. 741, 713 P.2d 557, 1986 N.M. App. LEXIS 578 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).

Words “employer and employee” as used in the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act are used in their natural sense and are intended to describe the conventional relation between an employer who pays wages to an employee for his labor. Burton v. Crawford & Co., 1976-NMCA-070, 89 N.M. 436, 553 P.2d 716, 1976 N.M. App. LEXIS 598 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 7, 558 P.2d 619, 1976 N.M. LEXIS 989 (N.M. 1976).

Workmen’s Compensation Act contemplates and approves of settlements. Durham v. Gulf Interstate Eng'g Co., 1964-NMSC-130, 74 N.M. 277, 393 P.2d 15, 1964 N.M. LEXIS 2202 (N.M. 1964).

Although the New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act should be construed liberally in favor of claimants, the court may not extend the coverage of the act beyond the purview of the statute. Aranbula v. Banner Min. Co., 1945-NMSC-032, 49 N.M. 253, 161 P.2d 867, 1945 N.M. LEXIS 417 (N.M. 1945).

Although an employee’s sex discrimination claims under the Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-1 to 52-1-70 NMSA 1978, and the New Mexico Human Rights Act, 28-1-1 to 28-1-15 NMSA 1978, stemmed from the same set of facts, the two statutes remedied very different types of injuries that the employee claimed to have suffered. Sabella v. Manor Care, 1996-NMSC-014, 121 N.M. 596, 915 P.2d 901, 1996 N.M. LEXIS 120 (N.M. 1996), limited, Mitchell-Carr v. McLendon, 1999-NMSC-025, 127 N.M. 282, 980 P.2d 65, 1999 N.M. LEXIS 154 (N.M. 1999).

Employer’s defense predicated on former § 57-908, 1941 Comp. (now 52-1-1 NMSA 1978), which provides that no compensation shall become due or payable from any employer for injuries or death occasioned by the intoxication of the employee, was rejected by a jury where the deceased employee’s intoxication was a result of conducting the employer’s business in letting contracts for the employer with contractors the employee met with after hours in bars and nightclubs as was the custom in the employer’s business. Southwestern Portland Cement Co. v. Simpson, 135 F.2d 584, 1943 U.S. App. LEXIS 3329 (10th Cir. N.M. 1943).

Prisoner, also a claimant of workmen’s compensation benefits, is denied benefits for injuries sustained by him while working on the city streets, while he is a prisoner, pursuant to a city ordinance because as long as his status is that of a prisoner, there cannot exist the employer-employee relationship resulting from a contract of hire as contemplated by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, former 59-10-1, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-1 NMSA 1978). Scott v. Hobbs, 1961-NMSC-167, 69 N.M. 330, 366 P.2d 854, 1961 N.M. LEXIS 1660 (N.M. 1961), overruled,  Benavidez v. Sierra Blanca Motors, 1996-NMSC-045, 122 N.M. 209, 922 P.2d 1205, 1996 N.M. LEXIS 250 (N.M. 1996), overruled in part as stated in State v. Dartez, 1998-NMCA-009, 124 N.M. 455, 952 P.2d 450, 1997 N.M. App. LEXIS 127 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).

While participation in a prisoner-work program is voluntary, 33-2-43D NMSA 1978, those who choose to work must be compensated for their efforts at no less than prevailing market rates and must be provided with similar conditions of employment as regular employees, 33-2-43B NMSA 1978; and in turn, participants are required to pay the State for the costs incident to administering the program and for their confinement, 33-2-43C NMSA 1978; therefore, inmates act for their own benefit under the program, subject to certain restrictions such that they could be considered employees pursuant to the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-1 NMSA 1978. Benavidez v. Sierra Blanca Motors, 1996-NMSC-045, 122 N.M. 209, 922 P.2d 1205, 1996 N.M. LEXIS 250 (N.M. 1996).

Claimant was neither a workman under former 59-10-12.9, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-16 NMSA 1978) nor a contractor under former 59-10-12.15, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-22 NMSA 1978) but he was an independent contractor based on the claimant’s work and its relationship to the purported employer’s business, and therefore, he was not entitled to workman’s compensation benefits under former 59-10-1, 1953 Comp. et. seq. (now 52-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.). Burton v. Crawford & Co., 1976-NMCA-070, 89 N.M. 436, 553 P.2d 716, 1976 N.M. App. LEXIS 598 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 7, 558 P.2d 619, 1976 N.M. LEXIS 989 (N.M. 1976).

Because a working partner was not a “workman” as defined in former  59-10-12I, 1953 Comp., he could not recover compensation as an employee. Jernigan v. Clark & Day Exploration Co., 1959-NMSC-033, 65 N.M. 355, 337 P.2d 614, 1959 N.M. LEXIS 913 (N.M. 1959).

Parents were not entitled to workmen’s compensation benefits for their son’s death from a trailer manufacturer, because, within the purview of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, substantial evidence supported a trial court’s conclusion that the son had been an employee of an independent contractor, whose employee hired him and who was responsible for the son’s pay. Nelson v. Eidal Trailer Co., 1954-NMSC-051, 58 N.M. 314, 270 P.2d 720, 1954 N.M. LEXIS 1127 (N.M. 1954).

Where an employer owned several businesses that, in total, employed more than four employees, the employer was an employer within the meaning of former 59-10-2, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-2 NMSA 1978), 59-10-4, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-6 NMSA 1978) and 59-10-12.8, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-15 NMSA 1978) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, former 59-10-1, 1953 Comp. et seq. (now 52-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.), and an employee’s widow was entitled to compensation benefits resulting from the death of her husband who was killed in an automobile accident while returning home from a business trip. Clark v. Electronic City, 1977-NMCA-048, 90 N.M. 477, 565 P.2d 348, 1977 N.M. App. LEXIS 613 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977).

New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq. (Act), does not look to the fault of an employer. The employer is liable to the injured employee for compensation if the employer has complied with the provisions of the Act relating to insurance and is not subject to any other liability as specified in the act under 52-1-8 NMSA 1978. Taylor v. Delgarno Transp., 1983-NMSC-052, 100 N.M. 138, 667 P.2d 445, 1983 N.M. LEXIS 2307 (N.M. 1983).

In a workmen’s compensation case, the district court erred in awarding the employee disability benefits under 52-1-41 NMSA 1978 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq., because the loss of use of one eye was included within the scope of 52-1-43D NMSA 1978; thus, the limitation of 120 weeks applied. Crane v. San Juan County, 1983-NMCA-133, 100 N.M. 600, 673 P.2d 1333, 1983 N.M. App. LEXIS 806 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).

Where an injured employee missed over 52 weeks of work, her employment contract stated that a disability leave could be terminated after 52 weeks, and she was terminated from her employment, the employer’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 1-012(b)(6) NMRA, properly was granted; the employer and employee both having been covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 to 52-1-69 NMSA 1978, all the employee’s rights and remedies were defined exclusively by 52-1-9 NMSA 1978. Williams v. Amax Chem. Corp., 1986-NMSC-041, 104 N.M. 293, 720 P.2d 1234, 1986 N.M. LEXIS 2960 (N.M. 1986), overruled,  Michaels v. Anglo Am. Auto Auctions, 1994-NMSC-015, 117 N.M. 91, 869 P.2d 279, 1994 N.M. LEXIS 52 (N.M. 1994).

Plain meaning of 51-1-8C NMSA 1978 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978 is that the New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act), 52-1-1 through 52-1-69 NMSA 1978, is an exclusive remedy unless otherwise provided for in the Act. Kent Nowlin Constr. Co. v. Gutierrez, 1982-NMSC-123, 99 N.M. 389, 658 P.2d 1116, 1982 N.M. LEXIS 3038 (N.M. 1982).

New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq., provided the exclusive remedy for an injured employee where the alleged wrong was the refusal of her employer’s compensation carrier to pay the employee’s medical bill. Dickson v. Mountain States Mut. Casualty Co., 1982-NMSC-090, 98 N.M. 479, 650 P.2d 1, 1982 N.M. LEXIS 2884 (N.M. 1982).

Worker’s failure to give the requisite notice of accident under 52-1-29 NMSA 1978 of the Workers’ Compensation Act barred him from bringing an action against his employer. Jimerson v. Arapahoe Drilling, 1988-NMCA-097, 107 N.M. 716, 764 P.2d 143, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 92 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).

Where plaintiff state employee was injured in a parking lot owned by the New Mexico Department of Transportation (DOT) on her way to her daily commute to work by private bus, the exclusivity provisions of the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act did not bar plaintiff’s negligence action against the DOT because the going and coming rule applied under 52-1-19 NMSA 1978. The commuter lot was not provided exclusively for state employees, and plaintiff’s use of the parking lot was totally unrelated to her work duties. Quintero v. State DOT, 2010-NMCA-081, 148 N.M. 903, 242 P.3d 470, 2010 N.M. App. LEXIS 72 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010), cert. quashed, 269 P.3d 904, 2011 N.M. LEXIS 410 (N.M. 2011).

Under the protections of N.M. Const. art IV  § 34, an employee’s disability claim, filed before the amendments to the workers’ compensation laws, 52-1-1 to 52-1-69 NMSA 1978, was still within the jurisdiction of the court. DiMatteo v. County of Dona Ana, 1989-NMCA-108, 109 N.M. 374, 785 P.2d 285, 1989 N.M. App. LEXIS 99 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989).

Although a suit filed by an employer and its insurer, which sought reimbursement of workmen’s compensation payments made to the employee, was dismissed, the trial court still had jurisdiction over employee’s counterclaim for total permanent disability pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act, former 59-10-1 to 59-10-37, 1953 Comp., because the rules of civil procedure applied to workmen’s compensation cases under former 59-10-13.9, 1953 Comp., because counterclaims such as the one filed by the employee were allowed by the rules of civil procedure under former 21-1-1(13), 1953 Comp., and because the counterclaim was not prohibited by the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Sentry Ins. Co. v. Gallegos, 1975-NMCA-008, 87 N.M. 249, 531 P.2d 1222, 1975 N.M. App. LEXIS 617 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 239, 531 P.2d 1212, 1975 N.M. LEXIS 792 (N.M. 1975).

In an action by an employer to prohibit a surviving spouse of a deceased worker from an untimely filed workers’ compensation claim, prohibition was not appropriate because the trial court had jurisdiction and because it was not prepared to say that any judgment rendered would be void. (former 1929 Code, § 156-101) (now 52-1-1 NMSA 1978). State ex rel. St. Louis, Rocky Mountain & Pac. Co. v. District Court of Eighth Judicial Dist., 1935-NMSC-065, 38 N.M. 451, 34 P.2d 1098, 1934 N.M. LEXIS 65 (N.M. 1934).

Section 28-1-7A NMSA 1978 of the New Mexico Human Rights Act sought to remedy an evil that threatened not only the rights and privileges of its inhabitants, but an evil that menaced the institutions and foundation of a free democratic state; thus, an employee’s action against an employer for sex discrimination was not barred as a matter of law by her workers’ compensation claim because the Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-1 to 52-1-70 NMSA 1978 operates to insure that employees who suffered disablement as a result of injuries causally connected to their work would not become dependent upon New Mexico’s welfare programs. Sabella v. Manor Care, 1996-NMSC-014, 121 N.M. 596, 915 P.2d 901, 1996 N.M. LEXIS 120 (N.M. 1996), limited, Mitchell-Carr v. McLendon, 1999-NMSC-025, 127 N.M. 282, 980 P.2d 65, 1999 N.M. LEXIS 154 (N.M. 1999).

In enacting the transient provisions of the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act, the legislature was not concerned with detailed interrelationships between its provisions; the apparent purpose was to establish certain benchmarks and to leave to the courts the task of “rationalizing” the provisions of the Act. Gonzales v. Lovington Pub. Sch., 1989-NMCA-102, 109 N.M. 365, 785 P.2d 276, 1989 N.M. App. LEXIS 102 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 262, 784 P.2d 1005, 1990 N.M. LEXIS 13 (N.M. 1990).

Exclusivity provisions in the Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq., entitled the employer to immunity regarding the negligence claim in which the employee sought damages for the carpal tunnel syndrome that developed as a result of his work. Dimond v. J.C. Penney Co., No. CIV 94-718 BB/DJS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21913 (D.N.M. May 16, 1996), aff'd, 116 F.3d 489, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 20143 (10th Cir. N.M. 1997).

Under the notice provision of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, former § 57-913, 1941 Comp. (now 52-1-1 et. seq. NMSA 1978), the failure to give notice of the workplace injury, where notice is not excused, is jurisdictional only in the sense that it is precedent to the right to maintain an action. Clower v. Grossman, 1951-NMSC-075, 55 N.M. 546, 237 P.2d 353, 1951 N.M. LEXIS 776 (N.M. 1951).

Workmen’s Compensation Act, former 1929 Code, 156-101, (now 52-1-1 NMSA 1978), created a new right and special procedure under former 1929 Code, 156-105, and the trial of a cause, either by jury or by the court, shall be conducted in a summary manner as far as possible under former 1929 Code, 156-113. Pino v. Ozark Smelting & Mining Co., 1930-NMSC-057, 35 N.M. 87, 290 P. 409, 1930 N.M. LEXIS 66 (N.M. 1930).

Where a worker signed a release for a workmen’s compensation claim that arose entirely out of New Mexico circumstances, and the worker was then a New Mexico resident, working in New Mexico, was injured in New Mexico, and his initial treatment was also in New Mexico, to allow Minnesota law to govern the release of the worker’s rights would conceivably deny the worker some of the important protections guaranteed by the New Mexico Release Act, 41-1-1 to 41-1-2 NMSA 1978 and the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 to 52-3-59 NMSA 1978. Ratzlaff v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., 1982-NMCA-071, 98 N.M. 159, 646 P.2d 586, 1982 N.M. App. LEXIS 873 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794, 1982 N.M. LEXIS 2939 (N.M. 1982).

Settlement that the workers’ compensation claimant entered with the employment agency, did not necessarily preclude the claimant from also collecting medical expense benefits from the company and a remand for further discovery was necessary in order to determine if the company was liable to the claimant where the claimant was providing service to the company when he sustained his work-related injury and the company might have been a special employer for the purposes of the workers’ compensation law under 52-1-1 to 52-10-1 NMSA 1978 because it was possible that the employee had an implied contract with the company and that the company might have exerted adequate control over the details of the claimant’s work to have formed an employer-employee relationship. Johnson v. Aztec Well Servicing Co., 1994-NMCA-065, 117 N.M. 697, 875 P.2d 1128, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 57 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).

Summary judgment for an employer was found to have been properly granted in connection with an employee’s action under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 to 52-1-69 NMSA 1978, which asked for a determination of permanent disability, past and future medical expenses, rehabilitation expenses, and attorney’s fees upon the allegation that he had unpaid medical expenses and prescribed rehabilitation for which the employer refused to pay, because there was no evidence that the employer promised to pay for the vocational rehabilitation, because the employee failed to establish his need for rehabilitation services as required. Garcia v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 1983-NMCA-056, 99 N.M. 741, 663 P.2d 1198, 1983 N.M. App. LEXIS 722 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).

Summary judgment in favor of a lumber company was inappropriate in an action under the New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act, 59-10-1 through 59-10-37, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq.), because there was a factual dispute as to the employer of a truck driver who was killed while hauling logs for the lumber company was an employee of the lumber company or an independent contractor. Yerbich v. Heald, 1976-NMCA-026, 89 N.M. 67, 547 P.2d 72, 1976 N.M. App. LEXIS 552 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976).

The summary judgment procedure is now appropriate, under proper circumstances, to all workmen’s compensation cases filed on or after July 1, 1959, the effective date of former 59-10-13.9, 1953 Comp. This section abrogated the rule that summary judgment procedure does not apply to compensation cases. Buffington v. Continental Casualty Co., 1961-NMSC-179, 69 N.M. 365, 367 P.2d 539, 1961 N.M. LEXIS 1665 (N.M. 1961).

Under 52-1-1 NMSA 1978, an employee is entitled to such vocational rehabilitation services as are necessary to return the employee to suitable employment, but the employee has the burden of presenting sufficient evidence so as to establish a need for rehabilitation benefits. Gutierrez v. Amity Leather Prods. Co., 1988-NMCA-006, 107 N.M. 26, 751 P.2d 710, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 3 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).

Under 52-1-24A NMSA 1978 of the transient provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 to -68 NMSA 1978, a hearing officer must make a determination of permanent partial disability before making a determination of permanent total disability because a finding that a worker has a percentage of permanently partially disability does not necessarily resolve the issue of whether the worker is entitled to benefits for permanent total disability. Kincaid v. WEK Drilling Co., 1989-NMCA-111, 109 N.M. 480, 786 P.2d 1214, 1989 N.M. App. LEXIS 108 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989).

It would be inconsistent with the overall purpose of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 NMSA 1978, to bar a worker’s complaint against the Fund if the worker’s complaint against the employer was not barred. Duran v. Xerox Corp., 1986-NMCA-124, 105 N.M. 277, 731 P.2d 973, 1986 N.M. App. LEXIS 706 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).

Summary judgment was improperly entered in favor of an employer with respect to an employee’s claim for workmen’s compensation benefits under the New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq., despite a finding that the employee’s claim had been barred by his failure to timely file under 52-1-31A NMSA 1978, because questions remained with respect to when the employee discovered that there was a compensable injury. Smith v. Dowell Corp., 1984-NMSC-091, 102 N.M. 102, 692 P.2d 27, 1984 N.M. LEXIS 1696 (N.M. 1984).

New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq., provides the benefits and remedies for any failure to pay; thus, plaintiff is bound to follow the procedures set forth in the Act to redress an insurer’s alleged wrong. Dickson v. Mountain States Mut. Casualty Co., 1982-NMSC-090, 98 N.M. 479, 650 P.2d 1, 1982 N.M. LEXIS 2884 (N.M. 1982).

An employee may privately contract with his employer for disability benefits in addition to those provided by the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Segura v. Molycorp, Inc., 1981-NMSC-116, 97 N.M. 13, 636 P.2d 284, 1981 N.M. LEXIS 2411 (N.M. 1981).

The Workmen’s Compensation Act did not bar an illegally employed minor from bringing a common law negligence suit against his employer for injuries received when he operated a forklift for his employer. Maynerich v. Little Bear Enters., 1971-NMCA-079, 82 N.M. 650, 485 P.2d 984, 1971 N.M. App. LEXIS 711 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971).

Where an employer sought to avail itself of the Workmen’s Compensation Act as a bar to a common law action, then it had to show a valid contract of employment between it and the plaintiff. Maynerich v. Little Bear Enters., 1971-NMCA-079, 82 N.M. 650, 485 P.2d 984, 1971 N.M. App. LEXIS 711 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971).

Under former 59-10-13, 1953 Comp., workmen’s compensation claimant was not entitled to benefits because a cut to his hand did not result in a disability and a perforated ulcer was not caused by an accidental injury that arose out of and in the course of his employment. Dodson v. Eidal Mfg. Co., 1963-NMSC-052, 72 N.M. 6, 380 P.2d 16, 1963 N.M. LEXIS 1915 (N.M. 1963).

In a workmen’s compensation case, where an employee is injured while working in an oil field in Texas, it is error for the trial court to award an employee medical and surgical benefits in New Mexico under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act), former 59-10-1, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-1 NMSA 1978), prior to determining that the employer and its insurance carrier are liable to the employee for payment of workmen’s compensation benefits in New Mexico; medical and surgical treatment which the employee is entitled to receive under former 59-10-19, 1953 Comp. is incidental to and a concomitant part of a compensable injury for which the employer is liable under the Act. Pate v. Makin Drilling Co., 1960-NMSC-015, 66 N.M. 402, 349 P.2d 121, 1960 N.M. LEXIS 1126 (N.M. 1960).

Action brought in state court under the New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Law is removable to federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. § 1441(a). Fresquez v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 238 F.2d 709, 1956 U.S. App. LEXIS 4088 (10th Cir. N.M. 1956).

Employee’s claim for workmen’s compensation benefits was properly denied because the employee was hired to haul material in his own truck and his injury occurred while repairing the truck away from the job site and did not arise in the course of his employment. McDonald v. Denison, 1946-NMSC-046, 51 N.M. 386, 185 P.2d 508, 1946 N.M. LEXIS 457 (N.M. 1946).

Complaint and claim for compensation by claimant, after setting up the injuries and the circumstances of injury and alleging total and permanent injury to the whole body, could be informal in character and set forth sufficient facts for the determination of the claim under the New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act), former § 57-915, 1941 Comp. (now 52-1-1 NMSA 1978), because technical precision in pleading was not generally required in workmen’s compensation cases and the Act was to be liberally construed in favor of the workman. Lipe v. Bradbury, 1945-NMSC-002, 49 N.M. 4, 154 P.2d 1000, 1945 N.M. LEXIS 391 (N.M. 1945).

As a basis for recovery under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, some relationship between the accident relied on and the injury suffered must be established, and it cannot rest upon mere speculation. Henderson v. Texas-New Mexico Pipe Line Co., 1942-NMSC-060, 46 N.M. 458, 131 P.2d 269, 1942 N.M. LEXIS 62 (N.M. 1942).

Claimant who worked for a mining company loading bins, according to a verbal agreement, was an employee rather than an independent contractor within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Act, former 1929 Code, § 156-101, (now 52-1-1 NMSA 1978); the power of the company to discharge the claimant with or without cause dominated the elements that could be otherwise employed as tests to determine the question of whether a person in service was an employee or an independent contractor. American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Grabert, 1935-NMSC-030, 39 N.M. 173, 42 P.2d 1116, 1935 N.M. LEXIS 28 (N.M. 1935).

Where a decedent’s widow sought workers’ compensation benefits under former 1929 Code, § 156-101 et seq., the trial court did not err when it found that even though decedent had left his duties when he was fatally injured, his widow was entitled to compensation benefits; the fatal injury arose out of and in the course of the employment of the deceased within the meaning of former 1929 Code, § 156-112(l) (now 52-1-9 NMSA 1978). Cuellar v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 1932-NMSC-018, 36 N.M. 141, 9 P.2d 685, 1932 N.M. LEXIS 21 (N.M. 1932).