52-1-47.  Limitations on compensation benefits.

Text

Subject to the limitation of compensation payable under Subsection G of Section 52-1-46 NMSA 1978 and except for provision of lifetime benefits for permanent total disability awarded pursuant to Section 52-1-41 NMSA 1978:

     A. compensation benefits for any combination of disabilities, whether temporary or permanent, or any combination of disabilities and death shall not be payable for a period in excess of seven hundred weeks;

     B. compensation benefits for any combination of disabilities or any combination of disabilities and death shall not exceed an amount equal to seven hundred multiplied by the maximum weekly compensation payable at the time of the accidental injury resulting in the disability or death under Section 52-1-41 NMSA 1978, exclusive of increased compensation that may be awarded under Sections 52-1-10, 52-1-28.1 and 52-1-46 NMSA 1978 and exclusive of any attorney fees awarded under Section 52-1-54 NMSA 1978;

     C. in no case shall compensation benefits for disability continue after the disability ends or after the death of the injured worker; and

     D. the compensation benefits payable by reason of disability caused by accidental injury shall be reduced by the compensation benefits paid or payable on account of any prior injury suffered by the worker if compensation benefits in both instances are for injury to the same member or function or different parts of the same member or function or for disfigurement and if the compensation benefits payable on account of the subsequent injury would, in whole or in part, duplicate the benefits paid or payable on account of the prior injury.

History

HISTORY:
1953 59-10-18.8, enacted by Laws 1959, ch. 67, § 26; 1963, ch. 269, § 8; 1967, ch. 151, § 6; 1968, ch. 46, § 1; 1969, ch. 173, § 4; 1971, ch. 261, § 4; 1973, ch. 240, § 8; 1975, ch. 284, § 12; 1987, ch. 235, § 20; 1990 (2nd S.S.), ch. 2, § 19; 2015, ch. 70, § 3.

Annotations

Amendment Notes.

The 2015 amendment, effective June 19, 2015, substituted “permanent total disability” for “total disability” in the introductory language; added “whether temporary or permanent” in A; added “52-1-28.1” in B; and substituted “the prior injury” for “such prior injury” at the end of D.

Notes to Decisions

Generally.

Aggravation of previous injury.

Applicability.

Burden of proof.

Compensation.

Construction.

Construction with other law.

Contribution.

Credit/reduction amount.

Death.

Double recovery.

Error.

Evidence.

           —Insufficient.

           —Sufficient.

Findings.

Future medical benefits.

Jurisdiction.

Legislative intent.

Liability.

Multiple payees.

Payee classes.

Reduction in benefits for subsequent disability.

Right to credit/reduction.

Settlements.

           —Intent of parties.

Subsequent injury.

Summary judgment.

Workers’ compensation.

      Generally.

Payments of benefits to an employee for a subsequent injury did not create a double recovery disqualifying him for workers’ compensation benefits for a prior injury; former 59-10-18.8D, 1953 Comp. did not apply to a situation where benefits were received from a subsequent injury and not a prior injury. Maes v. John C. Cornell, Inc., 1974-NMCA-061, 86 N.M. 393, 524 P.2d 1009, 1974 N.M. App. LEXIS 672 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974).

Former 59-10-18.8D, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-47 NMSA 1978) does not state that a workman may not receive compensation benefits for successive injuries, but the benefits for the subsequent injury may not duplicate benefits paid or payable for the prior injury. Gurule v. Albuquerque-Bernalillo County Economic Opportunity Bd., 1972-NMCA-094, 84 N.M. 196, 500 P.2d 1319, 1972 N.M. App. LEXIS 811 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 84 N.M. 180, 500 P.2d 1303, 1972 N.M. LEXIS 931 (N.M. 1972).

      Aggravation of previous injury.

This section is operative where an employer or insurer has paid or must pay a worker for medical benefits or disability compensation for a prior accidental injury when the worker has suffered an aggravation or later injury to the same member or function and the compensation benefits payable on account of the subsequent injury would, in whole or in part, duplicate the benefits paid or payable on account of such prior injury. Tom Growney Equip. Co. v. Jouett, 2005-NMSC-015, 137 N.M. 497, 113 P.3d 320, 2005 N.M. LEXIS 292 (N.M. 2005).

      Applicability.

Section 52-1-47 NMSA 1978 did not entitle the employer to a credit against benefits being paid to a worker for a work-related injury by the amount of benefits the employer was paying to the worker for a previous work-related injury that occurred in another state and that was governed solely by the other state’s laws. Yates v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 1994-NMCA-087, 118 N.M. 167, 879 P.2d 799, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 78 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).

Employee was not entitled to those portions of the award which involved overlapping compensation benefits from an award from another state, pursuant to 52-1-47 NMSA 1978 which provides that a reduction applies when there is an overlap in compensation benefits. Smith v. Albuquerque, 1986-NMCA-113, 105 N.M. 125, 729 P.2d 1379, 1986 N.M. App. LEXIS 686 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986), superseded by statute as stated in Barela v. Midcon of New Mexico, 1989-NMCA-093, 109 N.M. 360, 785 P.2d 271, 1989 N.M. App. LEXIS 100 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989).

Trial court properly applied 52-1-47D NMSA 1978 and reduced the 1980 workers’ compensation award by an amount equal to the value of his 1977 workers’ compensation judgment, arising from a 1974 accident, that remained after his 1978 accident to eliminate the overlap. Smith v. Trailways Bus Sys., 1981-NMCA-041, 96 N.M. 79, 628 P.2d 324, 1981 N.M. App. LEXIS 717 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).

      Burden of proof.

Where a reduction is sought under 52-1-47D NMSA 1978, the burden of proof to establish a right to a deduction is ordinarily shared by the second employer and the New Mexico Subsequent Injury Fund (Fund). Where the second employer withdraws its request for credit at the beginning of trial, the Fund had the burden to establish both its right to a reduction and the amount of the reduction. Lea County Good Samaritan Village v. Wojcik, 1988-NMCA-102, 108 N.M. 76, 766 P.2d 920, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 107 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).

      Compensation.

Under former 59-10-18.8D, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-47 NMSA 1978), an injured worker who received total workman’s compensation disability payments for five years, got a subsequent job, and then re-injured the same body part was entitled to permanent total disability benefits. Gurule v. Albuquerque-Bernalillo County Economic Opportunity Bd., 1972-NMCA-094, 84 N.M. 196, 500 P.2d 1319, 1972 N.M. App. LEXIS 811 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 84 N.M. 180, 500 P.2d 1303, 1972 N.M. LEXIS 931 (N.M. 1972).

      Construction.

Even if the limitations contained in 52-1-47 NMSA 1978 apply to limit any worker’s receipt of workers’ compensation benefits to a lifetime maximum, regardless of how unrelated successive disabilities were, they do not apply to benefits received under the laws of another state. Yates v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 1994-NMCA-087, 118 N.M. 167, 879 P.2d 799, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 78 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).

52-1-47 NMSA 1978 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq., does not place a limitation on all the benefits authorized by 52-1-41 to 52-1-46 NMSA 1978. 52-1-47 NMSA 1978 says nothing about payment of disability benefits to which the worker was entitled prior to death. Holliday v. Talk of the Town, 1985-NMCA-024, 102 N.M. 540, 697 P.2d 959, 1985 N.M. App. LEXIS 545 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985).

      Construction with other law.

Pursuant to former 52-2-11A NMSA 1978, an employer or its insurer is solely responsible for the payment of workmen’s compensation benefits for the first eight weeks of a worker’s disability, and is not entitled to reimbursement from the New Mexico Subsequent Injury Fund for that period; thereafter, liability between the Fund and the employer is controlled by the apportionment ordered by a court, and the employer is entitled to reimbursement to the extent that it paid in excess of its apportioned liability, pursuant to former 52-2-11B NMSA 1978. Mares v. Valencia County Sheriff's Dep't, 1988-NMCA-003, 106 N.M. 744, 749 P.2d 1123, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 2 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).

      Contribution.

Where an employee was injured but not disabled while working for a first employer, then his injury was aggravated while working for the second and third employers, there could not be contribution from the three employers based on theories outside workers’ compensation law because workers’ compensation is an exclusive remedy under 52-1-6E NMSA 1978, although this section allowed a subsequent employer to reduce its payments to avoid overlap of an initial employer’s payments. The liability of the employer(s) depended on when the employee’s disability began, and whether there was proper notice under 52-1-29A NMSA 1978. Tom Growney Equip. Co. v. Jouett, 2005-NMSC-015, 137 N.M. 497, 113 P.3d 320, 2005 N.M. LEXIS 292 (N.M. 2005).

      Credit/reduction amount.

To entitle the New Mexico Subsequent Injury Fund (Fund) to establish its right to a credit or reduction under 52-1-47 NMSA 1978 where a worker, his employer, and the employer’s insurance carrier have entered into a court-approved lump-sum settlement under the Workers’ Compensation Act involving a prior injury, the Fund must prove at least four facts by a preponderance of the evidence. Where proper evidence as to each of the four facts is presented, the fact finder may determine the amount, if any, of the deduction to be granted by subtracting from the total amount of compensation the specific amounts proven to have been paid for medical expenses, vocational rehabilitation, or other benefits and attorney fees, then dividing the remainder by the weekly compensation rate applicable at the time of the prior injury to determine the number of weeks of compensation that have been paid to the worker to determine objectively the number of weeks of benefits that remain to be paid, if any, from the maximum weekly limitation and calculate any overlap between the amounts paid for the prior disability and the benefits payable as the result of the second injury. Lea County Good Samaritan Village v. Wojcik, 1988-NMCA-102, 108 N.M. 76, 766 P.2d 920, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 107 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).

      Death.

Under the clear language of 52-1-47C NMSA 1978, disability compensation benefits terminate upon the death of an injured workman; therefore, in a widow’s action against the compensation carrier for her husband’s employer, alleging that a settlement agreement had been reached between the carrier and her husband’s attorney for a lump-sum payment of weekly payments of total permanent disability compensation, the carrier’s obligation to pay benefits ceased and the attorney’s agency terminated when the husband died from an unrelated disease during the negotiations. Brazfield v. Mountain States Mut. Casualty Co., 1979-NMCA-100, 93 N.M. 417, 600 P.2d 1207, 1979 N.M. App. LEXIS 705 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 93 N.M. 205, 598 P.2d 1165, 1979 N.M. LEXIS 1379 (N.M. 1979).

      Double recovery.

Compensation benefits under 52-1-47 NMSA 1978 of the New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act are limited to 600 weeks for the maximum weekly benefits payable at the time of an accidental injury, and those limitations are adopted in the New Mexico Subsequent Injury Act at former 52-2-12 NMSA 1978; thus, a trial court erred in making an award that resulted in a partial double recovery to a worker. Mares v. Valencia County Sheriff's Dep't, 1988-NMCA-003, 106 N.M. 744, 749 P.2d 1123, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 2 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).

      Error.

Workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) erred when she assessed all liability for future medical expenses against a worker’s current employer in light of the WCJ’s finding that the worker’s disability was caused by both a prior accident at the worker’s previous employer and by the subsequent accident at the worker’s current employer. McMains v. Aztec Well Serv., 1994-NMCA-126, 119 N.M. 22, 888 P.2d 468, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 162 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).

      Evidence.

           —Insufficient.

Facts recited by an employer and its insurer in the memorandum they presented at a hearing did not constitute valid evidence to support the granting of an offset of workers’ compensation benefits under 52-1-47D NMSA 1978. Munoz v. Deming Truck Terminal, 1990-NMCA-084, 110 N.M. 537, 797 P.2d 987, 1990 N.M. App. LEXIS 84 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).

Employer and insurer failed to prove that they were entitled under 52-1-47D NMSA 1978 to deduct from a permanent disability award prior payments made to a workers’ compensation claimant because there was no overlap with the first of these awards and the employer and insurer failed to demonstrate the specific basis for any compensation payments which were then being received by the claimant pursuant to prior settlement awards, did not present evidence indicating the total amount of any weekly payments then being received by the claimant, and failed to establish the extent to which payments for the last disability duplicated payments being received by the claimant under prior awards of disability. Munoz v. Deming Truck Terminal, 1990-NMCA-084, 110 N.M. 537, 797 P.2d 987, 1990 N.M. App. LEXIS 84 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).

Trial court’s denial of a credit to the New Mexico Subsequent Injury Fund under 52-1-47 NMSA 1978 was proper where the fund’s evidence failed to clearly delineate what portion of a worker’s settlement regarding his first workers’ compensation claim was specifically allocated for compensation benefits, future medical expenses, vocational rehabilitation benefits, or any other specific benefits. Lea County Good Samaritan Village v. Wojcik, 1988-NMCA-102, 108 N.M. 76, 766 P.2d 920, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 107 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).

           —Sufficient.

Apportionment ruling in a workers’ compensation action after the worker suffered two injuries to her back was appropriate because a doctor’s testimony that surgery would not have been necessary had the worker not suffered her second injury was evidence that a reasonable mind could have accepted as adequate to support the workers’ compensation judge’s decision. Leonard v. Payday Prof'l, 2007-NMCA-128, 142 N.M. 605, 168 P.3d 177, 2007 N.M. App. LEXIS 103 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007).

In a workers’ compensation action, an award of permanent partial, partial temporary, and temporary total disability under 52-1-47D NMSA 1978 was granted because the evidence was substantial to support the finding that the injury was a result of a work-related accident. Smith v. Trailways Bus Sys., 1981-NMCA-041, 96 N.M. 79, 628 P.2d 324, 1981 N.M. App. LEXIS 717 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).

      Findings.

There was substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the determination of a workers’ compensation judge that a worker’s disability was materially and substantially greater as a result of the combination of an earlier impairment and a second accident than it would have been as a result of the later accident alone. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Chavez, 1990-NMCA-133, 111 N.M. 366, 805 P.2d 633, 1990 N.M. App. LEXIS 146 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).

      Future medical benefits.

Pursuant to 52-1-47D NMSA 1978, future medical benefits cannot be denied in a workers’ compensation proceeding based solely on a prediction regarding future medical needs. McMains v. Aztec Well Serv., 1994-NMCA-126, 119 N.M. 22, 888 P.2d 468, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 162 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).

      Jurisdiction.

Because a trial court cannot practically determine an employee’s future medical needs at the time of entry of a judgment finding disability, 52-1-49 NMSA 1978 authorizes entry of a judgment directing the payment of a worker’s reasonable and necessary future medical expenses, with any reductions under 52-1-47D, and invests the court with continuing jurisdiction to enforce such orders. McMains v. Aztec Well Serv., 1994-NMCA-126, 119 N.M. 22, 888 P.2d 468, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 162 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).

      Legislative intent.

Manifest intent of 52-1-47C NMSA 1978 providing that compensation benefits shall cease when the disability ends prevails over any contradictory statutory provision because it is a later declaration of legislative intent and effectively repeals by implication the earlier conflicting legislative language. Jaramillo v. Kaufman Plumbing & Heating Co., 1985-NMSC-089, 103 N.M. 400, 708 P.2d 312, 1985 N.M. LEXIS 2004 (N.M. 1985).

      Liability.

Workers’ compensation judge erred in ordering a current employer to pay for all future medical care required as a result of one of its employee’s work injuries, without any contribution from the employee’s previous employer, because the current employer was entitled to a reduction in its liability under 52-1-47D NMSA 1978, to the extent that future medical expenses were necessary as a result of the employee’s accident at the previous employer’s. McMains v. Aztec Well Serv., 1994-NMCA-126, 119 N.M. 22, 888 P.2d 468, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 162 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).

Under 52-1-47D NMSA 1978, to the extent that future medical expenses were necessary as a result of a worker’s accident with a previous employer, the worker’s current employer was entitled to a reduction in its liability. McMains v. Aztec Well Serv., 1994-NMCA-126, 119 N.M. 22, 888 P.2d 468, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 162 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).

Section 52-1-47D NMSA 1978 provides no benefit to the employer liable for the first or prior disability, but in an appropriate case, it prevents the employer and compensation carrier at the time of the second accident from being liable for the “entire” disability resulting from the second accidental injury. Garcia v. Mora Painting & Decorating, 1991-NMCA-065, 112 N.M. 596, 817 P.2d 1238, 1991 N.M. App. LEXIS 187 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).

      Multiple payees.

Given the provisions of former 59-10-12J and 59-10-18.7, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-46 NMSA 1978), because payments to a dependent minor daughter of a deceased workman did not foreclose the right of the dependent mother of the workman to compensation so long as total payments did not exceed the maximum provided, a claim by the workmen’s compensation insurer requesting that the two claimants be required to interplead and settle among themselves their claims to compensation benefits was properly denied. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Jarde, 1963-NMSC-215, 73 N.M. 371, 388 P.2d 382, 1963 N.M. LEXIS 2089 (N.M. 1963).

      Payee classes.

Former 59-10-12J, 1953 Comp. and former 59-10-18.7, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-46 NMSA 1978) did not create mutually exclusive classes such that an award to a member of a class in a higher priority excluded an award to a dependent in a lower priority even though both awards might total less than the maximum payable. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Jarde, 1963-NMSC-215, 73 N.M. 371, 388 P.2d 382, 1963 N.M. LEXIS 2089 (N.M. 1963).

      Reduction in benefits for subsequent disability.

Second insurance company, which insured an employee who was injured two times, was, under 52-1-47D NMSA 1978, entitled to a reduction in benefits payable for the employee’s second accidental work-related injury as the statute provided for a reduction in benefits payable for a second disability resulting from a prior accidental injury if the compensation benefits payable on account of the subsequent injury would wholly or partially duplicate the benefits paid or payable on account of such prior injury involving the same member or function or different parts of the same member or function. Gonzales v. Stanke-Brown & Assocs., 1982-NMCA-109, 98 N.M. 379, 648 P.2d 1192, 1982 N.M. App. LEXIS 901 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982).

      Right to credit/reduction.

To entitle the New Mexico Subsequent Injury Fund to establish its right to a credit or reduction under 52-1-47 NMSA 1978 where a worker, his employer, and the employer’s insurance carrier have entered into a court-approved lump-sum settlement under the Workers’ Compensation Act involving a prior injury, the fund must prove at least four facts by a preponderance of the evidence. First, the fund must prove the extent and nature of the worker’s disability at the time of the settlement of his claim for the prior accidental injury, which may be presented by the testimony of a physician or other expert, the worker, or any other competent evidence; the amount of the settlement for the prior injury, including the amount that is attributable to an award for compensation benefits, and the specific amount, if any, included in the settlement for payment of medical or vocational rehabilitation benefits, attorney fees, or other specific benefits; and the number of weeks of compensation benefits that were paid or payable to the worker for permanent or partial disability. Lea County Good Samaritan Village v. Wojcik, 1988-NMCA-102, 108 N.M. 76, 766 P.2d 920, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 107 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).

      Settlements.

Failure of a settlement, or an order approving a settlement, to itemize the particular components of a workers’ compensation award will not foreclose the New Mexico Subsequent Injury Fund from presenting evidence in order to secure a reduction in appropriate cases and to prevent double recovery. A court-approved settlement is, in legal effect, a final award of compensation and may be used to determine the right of a party to a deduction. Lea County Good Samaritan Village v. Wojcik, 1988-NMCA-102, 108 N.M. 76, 766 P.2d 920, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 107 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).

           —Intent of parties.

In determining the New Mexico Subsequent Injury Fund’s entitlement to a credit or reduction under 52-1-47 NMSA 1978, a court may consider evidence of the intent of the parties at the time the court approved the settlement agreement regarding allocation of specific benefits in the settlement, as well as proof of the weekly average wage payable to the worker at the time of his disability. Other factors may be considered as dictated by the nature of the settlement or the circumstances of a particular case. Lea County Good Samaritan Village v. Wojcik, 1988-NMCA-102, 108 N.M. 76, 766 P.2d 920, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 107 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).

      Subsequent injury.

52-1-47D NMSA 1978 provides for a reduction in benefits payable for a second disability resulting from an accidental injury to the extent of benefits paid or payable for a disability resulting from a prior accidental injury. Thus, if an employee has previously sustained a compensable injury under the Workers’ Compensation Act and has been awarded benefits and thereafter suffers a subsequent injury involving the same members or functions, neither the employer at the time of the second accident nor the New Mexico Subsequent Injury Fund are liable for any impairment for which the worker has already been compensated. Lea County Good Samaritan Village v. Wojcik, 1988-NMCA-102, 108 N.M. 76, 766 P.2d 920, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 107 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).

      Summary judgment.

Summary dismissal of a subsequent insurer in a workmen’s compensation case where an original insurer and the subsequent insurer were named was error because there was a genuine material issue of fact whether the worker’s initial injury was aggravated or accelerated by his continued work with the employer during a time when the employer was insured by the subsequent insurer. Pena v. New Mexico Highway Dep't, 1983-NMCA-111, 100 N.M. 408, 671 P.2d 656, 1983 N.M. App. LEXIS 778 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).

      Workers’ compensation.

In awarding an employee workers’ compensation for an injury to her back, a trial court properly determined the proper amount offset under 52-1-47D NMSA 1978 with respect to the medical expenses awarded for her surgery when the trial court had the authority to consider evidence of the parties’ intent at the time the settlement agreement was approved regarding the allocation of specific benefits in the settlement. under 52-1-47D NMSA 1978 where the employee had received a prior settlement providing for the possibility of the surgery. Brewster v. Cooley & Assocs., 1993-NMCA-154, 116 N.M. 681, 866 P.2d 409, 1993 N.M. App. LEXIS 144 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).

In awarding an employee workers’ compensation for an injury to her back, a trial court properly offset the medical expenses awarded for her surgery under 52-1-47D NMSA 1978 where the employee had received a prior settlement providing for the possibility of the surgery and where substantial evidence supported the trial court’s decision to offset the employee’s award. Brewster v. Cooley & Assocs., 1993-NMCA-154, 116 N.M. 681, 866 P.2d 409, 1993 N.M. App. LEXIS 144 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).

Under 52-1-47D NMSA 1978, an order that authorized a deduction from the claimant’s prior workers’ compensation award was improper because the employer and the insurance company failed to prove that duplicative payments were made to the claimant. Munoz v. Deming Truck Terminal, 1990-NMCA-084, 110 N.M. 537, 797 P.2d 987, 1990 N.M. App. LEXIS 84 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).

Where successive injuries to a workers’ compensation claimant were to different parts of his body, his employer and insurer were not entitled under 52-1-47D NMSA 1978 to offset payments made on account of the first injury against payments made for the second. Munoz v. Deming Truck Terminal, 1990-NMCA-084, 110 N.M. 537, 797 P.2d 987, 1990 N.M. App. LEXIS 84 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).

In a workers’ compensation case, where a deduction was sought under 52-1-47 NMSA 1978, the burden of proof to establish the right to a deduction was shared by the second employer and the New Mexico subsequent injury fund. Lea County Good Samaritan Village v. Wojcik, 1988-NMCA-102, 108 N.M. 76, 766 P.2d 920, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 107 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).

Although 52-1-47C NMSA 1978 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq., provides that compensation benefits for disability terminate upon death of the worker, 52-1-47 NMSA 1978 does not prohibit the payment of disability benefits to which the worker was entitled prior to death. Holliday v. Talk of the Town, 1985-NMCA-024, 102 N.M. 540, 697 P.2d 959, 1985 N.M. App. LEXIS 545 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985).

Awarded but unaccrued benefits for a decedent worker’s disability terminated upon death under 52-1-47C NMSA 1978; however, where a decedent worker had signed a release from liability in the future for an injury, a successive aggravated disability claim was properly denied and dismissed by summary judgment. Holliday v. Talk of the Town, 1985-NMCA-024, 102 N.M. 540, 697 P.2d 959, 1985 N.M. App. LEXIS 545 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985).

Under 52-1-47D NMSA 1978, an insurance company is only required to pay a portion of a second disability received by an employee in a workplace accident if the remaining amount of payment is made by another carrier. Gonzales v. Stanke-Brown & Assocs., 1982-NMCA-109, 98 N.M. 379, 648 P.2d 1192, 1982 N.M. App. LEXIS 901 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982).

Pursuant to 52-1-47 NMSA 1978, the maximum weekly compensation payable to a workers’ compensation benefits claimant was the compensation payable at the time his disability began. Casias v. Zia Co., 1980-NMCA-109, 94 N.M. 723, 616 P.2d 436, 1980 N.M. App. LEXIS 926 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).

An injured worker who received total workman’s compensation disability payments for five years after injuring his low back in a previous job and, three years later, re-injured the same bodily member while working in another job, was entitled to permanent total disability benefits because he could no longer perform any type of heavy labor; the trial court did not err under former 59-10-18.8D, 1953 Comp. by deducting from the award only a 13-week overlap for benefits received as a result of his first injury rather than for all previous benefits received. Gurule v. Albuquerque-Bernalillo County Economic Opportunity Bd., 1972-NMCA-094, 84 N.M. 196, 500 P.2d 1319, 1972 N.M. App. LEXIS 811 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 84 N.M. 180, 500 P.2d 1303, 1972 N.M. LEXIS 931 (N.M. 1972).