A. The respective boards of regents of New Mexico state university, New Mexico institute of mining and technology, the university of New Mexico and the New Mexico military institute at Roswell shall determine and fix the standard of requirements for admission to their respective institutions.
B. In determining the standard of requirements for admission to their respective institutions, boards of regents shall not require a student who has completed the requirements of a home-based or nonpublic school educational program and who has submitted test scores that otherwise qualify the student for admission to that institution to obtain or submit proof of having obtained a high school equivalency credential. In determining requirements for admission, boards of regents shall evaluate and treat applicants from home-based educational programs or nonpublic schools fairly and in a nondiscriminatory manner.
HISTORY:
Laws 1912, ch. 83, § 2; Code 1915, § 5162; C.S. 1929, § 130-1312; 1941 Comp., § 55-2801; 1953 73-30-1; 1997, ch. 127, § 1; 2015, ch. 122, § 1.
Amendment Notes.
The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, in the first sentence of B, substituted “qualify the student” for “qualify him”, and “high school equivalency credential” for “general education development certificate” at the end.
Temporary provisions.
Laws 2014, ch. 31, § 2A provides: “All references in law to a ‘general education diploma’, a ‘general equivalency diploma’, a ‘general education development certificate’, a 'certificate of general equivalency’, a ‘graduate equivalent diploma’, a ‘GED certificate’, a ‘high school equivalency diploma’, a ‘certificate of equivalency’ and an ‘equivalency diploma’ shall be deemed to be references to a ‘high school equivalency credential’.”
Notes to Decisions
Generally.
Former § 21-1-1(93), 1953 Comp. did not provide a substitute for appeal. It was a post-conviction remedy, civil in nature, substantially equivalent to habeas corpus, and an issue not properly cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding could not furnish a basis for relief under Rule 93. Smith v. State, 1968-NMSC-144, 79 N.M. 450, 444 P.2d 961, 1968 N.M. LEXIS 1996 (N.M. 1968).
A former 21-1-1(93), 1953 Comp. (now 31-11-6 NMSA 1978) motion cannot be employed to question the action of a warden of the state penitentiary or his interpretation of a judgment, commitment or applicable statute. State v. Walburt, 1967-NMSC-271, 78 N.M. 605, 435 P.2d 435, 1967 N.M. LEXIS 2869 (N.M. 1967).
Affirmative defense.
In a promisee’s action to recover on a promissory note executed by the promisor, where an asserted defense was an affirmative defense under former 21-1-1(8)(c), 1953 Comp. and as such the promisor had the burden of proof, because the trial court failed to make a finding on this material defense, such failure had to be regarded as finding such material fact against the promisor. J. A. Silversmith, Inc. v. Marchiondo, 1965-NMSC-061, 75 N.M. 290, 404 P.2d 122, 1965 N.M. LEXIS 1546 (N.M. 1965).
Appeal.
Where a party’s contention that a trial court erred in its interpretation of “total disability” was predicated very largely upon oral statements made by the trial court at the close of the presentation of the evidence by the parties, the court found that an error could not be predicated on oral opinions or oral statements because they did not constitute a decision within the meaning of 21-1-1(52)(B)(a), 1953 Comp. (now Rule 1-052), and the court noted that based on the trial court’s findings of fact, it had properly interpreted “total disability.” Getz v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 1977-NMSC-018, 90 N.M. 195, 561 P.2d 468, 1977 N.M. LEXIS 1025 (N.M.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834, 98 S. Ct. 121, 54 L. Ed. 2d 95, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 2949 (U.S. 1977).
Discretion.
In eminent-domain cases, the trial courts have extensive discretion to decide the admissibility of evidence of other sales taking into consideration among other things whether or not prices paid are sufficiently voluntary to be reasonable indices of value. Transwestern Pipe Line Co. v. Yandell, 1961-NMSC-173, 69 N.M. 448, 367 P.2d 938, 1961 N.M. LEXIS 1670 (N.M. 1961).
A district court abuses its discretion under 21-1-1(65), (66), 1953 Comp. when it allows the telephone company to appeal from an ad valorem tax valuation and enjoins the State Tax Commission from certifying the tax assessments to county assessors without notice and a hearing. State ex rel. State Tax Comm'n v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 1961-NMSC-157, 69 N.M. 295, 366 P.2d 143, 1961 N.M. LEXIS 1651 (N.M. 1961).
Dismissal.
Teacher appealed the decision of the district court dismissing her appeal of an adverse decision of the local board contending that she followed the method for filing a civil action as prescribed by former 21-1-1(3), 1953 Comp. (now Rule 1-003), a civil action was commenced by the filing of a complaint, she was only required to take her appeal within a reasonable time, the filing of the complaint and service thereof conferred jurisdiction in the court of the local school board, misjoinder of parties was not ground for a dismissal of action, former 21-1-1(21), 1953 Comp. (now Rule 1-007.1), and parties could be dropped or added at any stage of the action on such terms as were just, former 21-1-1(21), 1953 Comp. (now Rule 1-025), former 21-2-1(8), 1953 Comp. (now Rule 1-074); the court found that she was required to take her appeal within a reasonable time and 30 days had been held to be a reasonable time, a misjoinder of parties was not involved, and an essential party could not be added after the time allowed for appeal had expired. Brown v. New Mexico State Bd. of Educ., 1971-NMSC-089, 83 N.M. 99, 488 P.2d 734, 1971 N.M. LEXIS 1595 (N.M. 1971).
Eligibility.
Stipulation wherein it was agreed that the jury should not be permitted to return a verdict calling for the death penalty was entered into by counsel for defendant as a part of the trial strategy and should not be made the basis for relief under former 21-1-1(93), 1953 Comp. because defendant had the benefit of possible acquittal, or conviction of a lesser degree of homicide, without risking the death penalty. There was no deprivation of any constitutionally guaranteed right, nor any prejudice in defendant having been given a trial free from the risks incident to having the jury consider the possibility of imposing death as the penalty, in the event of a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree. Smith v. State, 1968-NMSC-144, 79 N.M. 450, 444 P.2d 961, 1968 N.M. LEXIS 1996 (N.M. 1968).
Employees.
In a reporter’s action to compel the disclosure of non-academic staff personnel records, the reporter was entitled to a ruling that he be granted the right to inspect those portions of the personnel records that were not specifically exempted by statute and which were not considered to be confidential; the fact that the reporter did not specifically request such relief in his pleadings did not preclude such a ruling. State ex rel. Newsome v. Alarid, 1977-NMSC-076, 90 N.M. 790, 568 P.2d 1236, 1977 N.M. LEXIS 1082 (N.M. 1977), overruled in part, Republican Party v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2012-NMSC-026, 283 P.3d 853, 2012 N.M. LEXIS 248 (N.M. 2012), overruled in part as stated in Edenburn v. N.M. Dep't of Health, 2013-NMCA-045, 299 P.3d 424, 2012 N.M. App. LEXIS 145 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012).
Instructions.
Where in a tort case based on a vehicular crash the defense makes no objection to the jury instructions on account of the alleged omission of any reference to proximate cause, the appellate court uses that as part as its rationale for finding that there is no reversible error regarding the jury charge and proximate cause in the case. Sturgeon v. Clark, 1961-NMSC-125, 69 N.M. 132, 364 P.2d 757, 1961 N.M. LEXIS 1619 (N.M. 1961).
Trial court jury instruction on the doctrine of unavoidable accident is unappealable because plaintiffs failed to object at trial as required by Rule 21-1-1(51)(g) NMRA, and the jury instruction on unavoidable accident is proper because the evidence supports such an instruction. Lucero v. Torres, 1960-NMSC-034, 67 N.M. 10, 350 P.2d 1028, 1960 N.M. LEXIS 1141 (N.M. 1960).
Notice.
Summons is not served in a manner reasonably calculated to bring proceeding to defendant’s attention as required by 21-1-1(4)(e)(1), 1953 Comp. because the papers were rolled up and inserted in the door handle of defendant’s screen door. Moya v. Catholic Archdiocese, 1978-NMSC-078, 92 N.M. 278, 587 P.2d 425, 1978 N.M. LEXIS 975 (N.M. 1978).
Orders.
Where a pretrial order is made and entered without any objections or exceptions to it, and, thereafter, no motion is made to modify it, the course of the trial is controlled by it, and it becomes the law of the case. Transwestern Pipe Line Co. v. Yandell, 1961-NMSC-173, 69 N.M. 448, 367 P.2d 938, 1961 N.M. LEXIS 1670 (N.M. 1961).
Question of fact.
Pursuant to 21-1-1(56)(c), NMSA 1978, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the city in the contractor’s action for declaratory judgment on a contract because there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the city’s allegation that it informed the contractor that the pipe would have to be purchased by the city, if the allegation is true the contractor’s requested recovery would be limited, as he would not have clean hands. Danley v. Alamogordo, 1978-NMSC-031, 91 N.M. 520, 577 P.2d 418, 1978 N.M. LEXIS 920 (N.M. 1978).
Research References and Practice Aids
New Mexico Law Review.
Article “If At First You Do Succeed: Judicial Estoppel In New Mexico’s State And Federal Courts”, Michael D. Moberly, 29 N.M. L. Rev. 201 (1999).