In an action to recover damages for a personal injury sustained by an employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such or for death resulting from personal injuries so sustained in which recovery is sought upon the ground of want of ordinary care of the employer, or of the officer, agent or servant of the employer, it shall not be a defense:
A. that the employee, either expressly or impliedly, assumed the risk of the hazard complained of as due to the employer’s negligence;
B. that the injury or death was caused, in whole or in part, by the want of ordinary care of a fellow servant; and
C. that the injury of [or] death was caused, in whole or in part by the want of ordinary care of the injured employee where such want of care was not willful.
Any employer who has complied with the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act [this article] [52-1-1 NMSA 1978] relating to insurance or any of the employees of the employer, including management and supervisory employees, shall not be subject to any other liability whatsoever for the death of or personal injury to any employee, except as provided in the Workers’ Compensation Act, and all causes of action, actions at law, suits in equity, and proceedings whatever, and all statutory and common-law rights and remedies for and on account of such death of, or personal injury to, any such employee and accruing to any and all persons whomsoever, are hereby abolished except as provided in the Workers’ Compensation Act.
HISTORY:
Laws 1937, ch. 92, § 3; 1941 Comp., § 57-905; 1953 59-10-5; Laws 1971, ch. 253, § 2; 1973, ch. 240, § 3; 1989, ch. 263, § 6.
Notes to Decisions
Analysis
Manager’s intentional misconduct.
Constitutionality.
Exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act which, for purposes of compensation, classify a non-dependent survivor of a deceased employee differently from dependent survivors or ordinary tort victims, did not violate equal protection by limiting the benefits such survivor could receive under 52-1-46A NMSA 1978 because the limitation of benefits is rationally related to the purposes of the act. Sanchez v. M.M. Sundt Constr. Co., 1985-NMCA-087, 103 N.M. 294, 706 P.2d 158, 1985 N.M. App. LEXIS 586 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985).
Construction with other law.
Worker was entitled to a 10% increase in workers' compensation benefits for an employer's failure to use a “wet floor” sign because (1) the sign was not used where the worker was hurt, (2) the sign could not effectuate the sign's purpose if it were kept in storage, (3) written policies and providing such signs to custodians did not meet the statute, which obligated an employer to furnish adequate safety devices, and (4) NMSA 1978, § 52-1-8 barred blaming custodial staff. Benavides v. E. N.M. Med. Ctr., 2014-NMSC-037, 338 P.3d 1265, 2014 N.M. LEXIS 364 (N.M. 2014).
Generally.
New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq. (Act), does not look to the fault of an employer. The employer is liable to the injured employee for compensation if the employer has complied with the provisions of the Act relating to insurance and is not subject to any other liability as specified in the Act under 52-1-8 NMSA 1978. Taylor v. Delgarno Transp., 1983-NMSC-052, 100 N.M. 138, 667 P.2d 445, 1983 N.M. LEXIS 2307 (N.M. 1983).
Where the employer failed to minimally comply with the workmen’s compensation by failing to file a policy of insurance, a certificate of proof thereof, a security bond, or a certificate of self-insurance with the clerk of court, the administrator’s wrongful death action was not foreclosed under the provisions of former 59-10-5, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-8 NMSA 1978). Williams v. Montano, 1976-NMSC-022, 89 N.M. 252, 550 P.2d 264, 1976 N.M. LEXIS 805 (N.M. 1976).
Agreement.
Where an employee released an employer and its predecessor from a claim under the New Mexico Occupational Disease Disablement Act, the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act, and otherwise, the agreement released the predecessor only in its role as a previous employer, and whether the predecessor and the employer were sufficiently connected so as to be a single corporate employer entitled to the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act and the release, was a matter for a jury in the employee’s action for damages for brucellosis. Garrity v. Overland Sheepskin Co., 1996-NMSC-032, 121 N.M. 710, 917 P.2d 1382, 1996 N.M. LEXIS 205 (N.M. 1996).
Applicability.
Decedent was not limited to the remedies provided under the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act (52-1-1 NMSA 1978) where the court found that the lessee-carrier for whom decedent was driving at the time of his death was not decedent’s employer for purposes of the act and that the carrier had specifically contracted away the benefit of the act and subjected itself to liability for negligence. Matkins v. Zero Refrigerated Lines, 1979-NMCA-095, 93 N.M. 511, 602 P.2d 195, 1979 N.M. App. LEXIS 714 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979), limited, Vigil v. Digital Equip. Corp., 1996-NMCA-100, 122 N.M. 417, 925 P.2d 883, 1996 N.M. App. LEXIS 82 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).
Former 59-10-6 and 59-10-5, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-9 and 52-1-8 NMSA 1978) did not make void an entire contract between an oil corporation and an employer but only those provisions related to the employer’s indemnification of the corporation; therefore, the employer was not subject to liability in addition to the Workers’ Compensation Act based on an action brought by an administrator against the corporation for an employee’s wrongful death. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Rota-Cone Field Operating Co., 1972-NMCA-167, 84 N.M. 483, 505 P.2d 78, 1972 N.M. App. LEXIS 885 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972), rev'd, 505 P.2d 855 (N.M. 1973).
Common law.
Summary judgment was found to have been properly granted in favor of an employee and employer in a tort action brought by another employee, which was based on a battery claim, because the common-law cause of action was not permitted under 52-1-8 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978 since the act was covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 to 52-1-69 NMSA 1978; 52-1-6D, 52-1-8, and 52-1-56C NMSA 1978 were found to accord immunity for all causes of action, all common-law rights and remedies, for negligence or wrong. Gallegos v. Chastain, 1981-NMCA-014, 95 N.M. 551, 624 P.2d 60, 1981 N.M. App. LEXIS 683 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981), overruled in part, Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148, 2001 N.M. LEXIS 376 (N.M. 2001), overruled in part as stated in Richey v. Hammond Conservancy Dist., No. 32847, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 12 (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2015).
An employer’s failure to abide by the Workers’ Compensation Act (52-1-1 NMSA 1978) entitled an injured employee to bring a common law action against the employer for damages suffered, and the employer was properly denied the opportunity to raise the common law defense of contributory negligence. Arvas v. Feather's Jewelers, 92 N.M. 89, 582 P.2d 1302, 1978 N.M. App. LEXIS 588 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978).
Construction.
Court’s interpretation of the exclusive remedy rule holding that the employer indirectly paid for the employee’s workmen’s compensation insurance premiums through payment to the temporary agency for the employee’s services, which agency purchased the requisite insurance, did not go against the established rule that the court was to liberally construe the act in favor of the worker. Garcia v. Smith Pipe & Steel Co., 1988-NMCA-078, 107 N.M. 808, 765 P.2d 1176, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 106 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 673, 763 P.2d 689, 1988 N.M. LEXIS 266 (N.M. 1988).
Construction with other law.
Summary judgment was found to have been properly granted in favor of an employee and employer in a tort action brought by another employee, which was based on a battery claim, because the common-law cause of action was not permitted under 52-1-8 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978 since the act was covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 to 52-1-69 NMSA 1978; 52-1-6D, 52-1-8, and 52-1-56C NMSA 1978 were found to accord immunity for all causes of action, all common-law rights and remedies, for negligence or wrong. Gallegos v. Chastain, 1981-NMCA-014, 95 N.M. 551, 624 P.2d 60, 1981 N.M. App. LEXIS 683 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981), overruled in part, Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148, 2001 N.M. LEXIS 376 (N.M. 2001), overruled in part as stated in Richey v. Hammond Conservancy Dist., No. 32847, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 12 (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2015).
Employer’s failure to file a copy of its workmen’s compensation insurance policy as required by former 59-10-3, 1953 Comp. until 76 days after a worker was killed in a work-related accident did not permit the worker’s administratrix to maintain a wrongful death action against the employer, because subjecting the employer to such liability for a technical delay did not further the statutory purpose of the Workmen’s Compensation Act to cause employers to obtain compensation protection; even though the failure to file was a misdemeanor under former 59-10-25D, 1953 Comp. and former 59-10-31, 1953 Comp. subjected non-filing employers to injunctions from continuing their business operations until they complied, the employer’s liability was limited to the benefits set forth in the Act by former 59-10-4F, 59-10-5 and 59-10-6, 1953 Comp. Quintana v. Nolan Bros., 1969-NMCA-083, 80 N.M. 589, 458 P.2d 841, 1969 N.M. App. LEXIS 605 (N.M. Ct. App. 1969).
Former § 57-925, 1941 Comp. was reconcilable and consistent with the spirit of the Workers’ Compensation Act and was not repealed by the enactment of former §§ 57-904, 57-905 or 57-906, 1941 Comp.; former § 57-925, 1941 Comp. served to benefit both the employer and the employee and served a good purpose by bringing to account third party tortfeasors. Rader v. Rhodes, 1944-NMSC-060, 48 N.M. 511, 153 P.2d 516, 1944 N.M. LEXIS 78 (N.M. 1944).
Damages.
Because 59A-16-30 NMSA 1978, which establishes a cause of action for damages against an insurer or agent, does not amend the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, as contained in 52-1-6D, 52-1-8, 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, a court erred in not dismissing an injured employee’s cause of action under 59A-16-30 NMSA 1978, even though he alleged that the workers’ compensation insurer for his employer refused to attempt in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of his workers’ compensation claim. Russell v. Protective Ins. Co., 1988-NMSC-025, 107 N.M. 9, 751 P.2d 693, 1988 N.M. LEXIS 79 (N.M. 1988), superseded by statute as stated in Meyers v. Western Auto, 2002-NMCA-089, 132 N.M. 675, 54 P.3d 79, 2002 N.M. App. LEXIS 73 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002), overruled in part as stated in Romero v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., 2015-NMCA-107, 357 P.3d 463, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 85 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
Employees.
Where an employee of the New Mexico human services department was attacked and injured at work by an individual whose benefits had been reduced, the employee’s tort claims were barred by 52-1-6, 52-1-8, and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, which were exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Flores v. Danfelser, 1999-NMCA-091, 127 N.M. 571, 985 P.2d 173, 1999 N.M. App. LEXIS 61 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999), overruled in part, Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148, 2001 N.M. LEXIS 376 (N.M. 2001), overruled in part as stated in Richey v. Hammond Conservancy Dist., No. 32847, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 12 (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2015).
Where a worker was placed by a temporary agency to work for lumber company, the lumber company was the worker’s special employer and was liable for workers’ compensation when the worker was injured in the lumber yard. Because the lumber company provided for workers’ compensation coverage through its contract with the temporary agency, the worker’s personal injury action against the lumber company was barred. Rivera v. Sagebrush Sales, 1994-NMCA-119, 118 N.M. 676, 884 P.2d 832, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 119 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 118 N.M. 585, 883 P.2d 1282, 1994 N.M. LEXIS 366 (N.M. 1994).
Exclusive remedy.
Where supervisors convinced police officers to stage a mock arrest of an employee, the New Mexico Workers Compensation Act (WCA) barred the tort claims against the supervisors and the employer because (1) the employee’s injuries arose out of employment since the actions amounted to horseplay, (2) there was no willfulness since the supervisors considered the consequences of the mock arrest and in no way expected the employee to suffer psychological injury, and (3) the alleged injuries fell within the scope of the WCA. Fuerschbach v. Southwest Airlines Co., 439 F.3d 1197, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 5108 (10th Cir. N.M. 2006).
Compensation benefits of the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act do not automatically and instantaneously terminate when an employee is terminated, but continue for a reasonable period while she is winding up her affairs and leaving her place of employment. Thus, the Act provides the exclusive remedy for the employee’s injuries under 52-1-6D, E; 52-1-8 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978. Martin-Martinez v. 6001, Inc., 1998-NMCA-179, 126 N.M. 319, 968 P.2d 1182, 1998 N.M. App. LEXIS 162 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 126 N.M. 532, 972 P.2d 351, 1998 N.M. LEXIS 435 (N.M. 1998).
Exclusivity provisions.
Plain language of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-1 to 52-1-70 NMSA 1978, did not provide for immunity between special employees and direct employers of other special employees; the roofing company and employee were not co-employees and the company was not entitled to protection from suit by the employee under the Act’s exclusivity provisions. Street v. Alpha Constr. Servs., 2006-NMCA-121, 140 N.M. 425, 143 P.3d 187, 2006 N.M. App. LEXIS 86 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006), cert. quashed, 141 N.M. 569, 158 P.3d 459, 2007 N.M. LEXIS 133 (N.M. 2007).
Tort claims brought by an employee attacked at work by a third-party non-employee were barred by the exclusivity provisions of the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-6, 52-1-8, and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978; and her husband’s claims, including loss of consortium, were also similarly barred. Flores v. Danfelser, 1999-NMCA-091, 127 N.M. 571, 985 P.2d 173, 1999 N.M. App. LEXIS 61 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999), overruled in part, Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148, 2001 N.M. LEXIS 376 (N.M. 2001), overruled in part as stated in Richey v. Hammond Conservancy Dist., No. 32847, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 12 (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2015).
Indemnity.
Exclusive remedy provisions under former 59-10-5 and 59-10-6, 1953 Comp., in the New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act applied to the negligence claim in which the oil lease owner alleged a breach of contract by the employer, which worked for the owner, and that sought indemnity from the employer regarding any damages for which the owner was held liable as to the fire in which two workers of the employer died and a third was injured; there was only an implied agreement that the employer would not have been negligent, former 59-10-5, 1953 Comp., explicitly limited the employer’s liability and destroyed the common-law right of indemnity, and subjecting the employer to liability beyond that to which it is liable under the Act would have directly contravened the purpose of the Act regarding the limitation of the employer’s liability. Royal Indem. Co. v. Southern Cal. Petroleum Corp., 1960-NMSC-253, 67 N.M. 137, 353 P.2d 358, 1960 N.M. LEXIS 1161 (N.M. 1960).
Liability.
Under the New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act, an employee of an employer who has complied with the requirements of the Act is not subject to liability under the common law for the injury or death of a coemployee. Matkins v. Zero Refrigerated Lines, 1979-NMCA-095, 93 N.M. 511, 602 P.2d 195, 1979 N.M. App. LEXIS 714 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979), limited, Vigil v. Digital Equip. Corp., 1996-NMCA-100, 122 N.M. 417, 925 P.2d 883, 1996 N.M. App. LEXIS 82 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).
Plaintiff worker was entitled to workmen’s compensation benefits and was not entitled to sue in tort against defendant contractors because under former 59-10-5 and 59-10-6, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-8 NMSA 1978 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978), the worker was an employee as he was performing work for the contractors when he was injured and he was under the direction and control of the contractor’s field engineer. Shipman v. MacCo Corp., 1964-NMSC-091, 74 N.M. 174, 392 P.2d 9, 1964 N.M. LEXIS 2162 (N.M. 1964).
Explicit language of former § 57-905, 1941 Comp. (now 52-1-8 NMSA 1978) and § 57-906, 1941 Comp. (now 52-1-9 NMSA 1978), precluded a trucking company’s claim against an employer for contribution for injuries suffered by an employee. Hill Lines, Inc. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 222 F.2d 854, 1955 U.S. App. LEXIS 3892 (10th Cir. N.M. 1955).
Lump-sum award.
Widow was not entitled to a lump-sum workmen’s compensation award under former 59-10-25B, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-8 NMSA 1978), where her short-term financial interest in investing the money did not comport with the purposes of the compensation statutes; although former 59-10-13.5B, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-26.4 NMSA 1978) authorized the widow to petition for the lump-sum award, the lump-sum award was not authorized where it was not in the widow’s best interest. Arther v. Western Co. of N. Am., 1975-NMCA-082, 88 N.M. 157, 538 P.2d 799, 1975 N.M. App. LEXIS 685 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 318, 540 P.2d 248, 1975 N.M. LEXIS 890 (N.M. 1975).
Manager’s intentional misconduct.
Former employee’s action for intentional torts and negligence against her former employer and manager, which alleged that the manager broke one of her fingers by slamming a locker door on her hand after firing her, was barred by the exclusionary provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, specifically 52-1-6D, E; 52-1-8 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, because the intentional conduct of the manager was not the intentional conduct of the employer, as there was no evidence that he had an ownership interest or confidential relationship with the employer. Accordingly, the manager was not an alter ego of the employer, the managerial capacity rule was inapplicable, and the employer had not waived the Act’s protection. Martin-Martinez v. 6001, Inc., 1998-NMCA-179, 126 N.M. 319, 968 P.2d 1182, 1998 N.M. App. LEXIS 162 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 126 N.M. 532, 972 P.2d 351, 1998 N.M. LEXIS 435 (N.M. 1998).
Purpose.
Employee’s workers’ compensation coverage with its attendant quick recovery and simplified procedures justifies the loss of the employee’s right to bring a tort action. The exclusivity of compensation rests on the existence of the employment relationship. Rivera v. Sagebrush Sales, 1994-NMCA-119, 118 N.M. 676, 884 P.2d 832, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 119 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 118 N.M. 585, 883 P.2d 1282, 1994 N.M. LEXIS 366 (N.M. 1994).
Remedies.
Where an employee had a compensable claim under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, former 59-10-13.3, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-28 NMSA 1978) by reason of the alleged negligence of his employer, the employee was precluded by former 59-10-4D, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-6 NMSA 1978) from bringing a common law negligence action against the employer because the Act provided the exclusive remedy to the employee under former 59-10-6, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-8 NMSA 1978). Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Montoya, 1978-NMSC-057, 91 N.M. 788, 581 P.2d 1283, 1978 N.M. LEXIS 944 (N.M. 1978).
Requirements.
The failure of the employer to file a workman’s compensation policy, or a certificate in evidence thereof, as required by former 59-10-3, 1953 Comp. permits the workman to sue the employer for negligence. Montano v. Williams, 1976-NMCA-017, 89 N.M. 86, 547 P.2d 569, 1976 N.M. App. LEXIS 554 (N.M. Ct. App.), aff'd, 1976-NMSC-022, 89 N.M. 252, 550 P.2d 264, 1976 N.M. LEXIS 805 (N.M. 1976).
Res judicata.
Employee did not lack a comparable incentive to litigate the issue of proximate cause in a workers’ compensation proceeding because of the statutory limits on the amount of benefits and attorney fees under 52-1-41A and 52-1-54I NMSA 1978 because those limitations were offset by advantages under 52-1-8 NMSA 1978 and 52-1-54D NMSA 1978; therefore, the trial court did not err in holding that the employee’s tort action against third parties was precluded by the administrative findings that the accident was fraudulently caused by the employee. Padilla v. Intel Corp., 1998-NMCA-125, 125 N.M. 698, 964 P.2d 862, 1998 N.M. App. LEXIS 110 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998).
Special employers.
Dismissal of a worker’s tort suit for injuries sustained while working in a company’s facility (as per his employer’s service contract with the company) was proper as the company complied with workers’ compensation requirements, was a special employer, and was thus shielded from tort liability. The company and the employer shared control over the details of the worker’s work, thus making the company the worker’s special employer. Hamberg v. Sandia Corp., 2008-NMSC-015, 143 N.M. 601, 179 P.3d 1209, 2008 N.M. LEXIS 125 (N.M. 2008).
District court properly dismissed an employee’s negligence claim on the ground that a company was immune from tort liability, where the employee had made a contract of hire with the company, he performed his work as a graphic designer at the company’s facilities and in support of the company’s marketing efforts, the company provided day-to-day technical direction over the employee, and as a result, the company met the special employer test. Hamberg v. Sandia Corp., 2007-NMCA-078, 142 N.M. 72, 162 P.3d 909, 2007 N.M. App. LEXIS 54 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007), aff'd, 2008-NMSC-015, 143 N.M. 601, 179 P.3d 1209, 2008 N.M. LEXIS 125 (N.M. 2008).
Termination of benefits.
Former employee’s action for intentional torts and negligence against her former employer and manager, which alleged that the manager broke one of her fingers by slamming a locker door on her hand after firing her, was barred by the exclusionary provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, specifically 52-1-6D, E; 52-1-8 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, because the compensation benefits of the Act did not automatically and instantaneously terminate when the employee was fired, but continued for a reasonable period while she was at her locker “winding up” her affairs and leaving her place of employment. Martin-Martinez v. 6001, Inc., 1998-NMCA-179, 126 N.M. 319, 968 P.2d 1182, 1998 N.M. App. LEXIS 162 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 126 N.M. 532, 972 P.2d 351, 1998 N.M. LEXIS 435 (N.M. 1998).
Willful.
Under former 59-10-5C, 1953 Comp., negligent conduct of an employee which causes an injury is not a defense to a claim for workmen’s compensation, but willful misconduct is a defense. Gough v. Famariss Oil & Ref. Co., 1972-NMCA-045, 83 N.M. 710, 496 P.2d 1106, 1972 N.M. App. LEXIS 764 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 83 N.M. 698, 496 P.2d 1094, 1972 N.M. LEXIS 967 (N.M. 1972).
Workers’ compensation.
In an action for workers’ compensation, the trial court concluded that the employer had not substantially complied with 52-1-6C and D, 52-1-8, and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978 that required the filing of a proof of insurance, such that workers’ compensation was not the exclusive remedy in the employee’s action. Peterson v. Wells Fargo Armored Servs. Corp., 2000-NMCA-043, 129 N.M. 158, 3 P.3d 135, 2000 N.M. App. LEXIS 34 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 129 N.M. 207, 4 P.3d 35, 2000 N.M. LEXIS 162 (N.M. 2000).
Trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of managers with respect to an employee’s tort action was proper because the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) (52-1-1 NMSA 1978) was the employee’s exclusive remedy pursuant to 52-1-6D, E; 52-1-8 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, and the employer did not waive the protection of the Act; even though the employee had been fired, the injuries she suffered while cleaning out her locker were compensable under the Act. Martin-Martinez v. 6001, Inc., 1998-NMCA-179, 126 N.M. 319, 968 P.2d 1182, 1998 N.M. App. LEXIS 162 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 126 N.M. 532, 972 P.2d 351, 1998 N.M. LEXIS 435 (N.M. 1998).
Plaintiff wife was barred from bringing a loss of consortium claim against respondents, her injured husband’s employer and co-worker, where her claim was precluded by the exclusivity provisions of the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-6, 52-1-8 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978; her claim was derivative of the injured spouse’s right to recover. Archer v. Roadrunner Trucking, 1997-NMSC-003, 122 N.M. 703, 930 P.2d 1155, 1996 N.M. LEXIS 471 (N.M. 1996).
Temporary employer was entitled to immunity from common law tort claims according to the Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-6E NMSA 1978, 52-1-8 NMSA 1978 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978 because it met the three-part test of special employer in that it was contractually assured that the general employer was to provide workers’ compensation coverage even though there was no specific evidence concerning how the special employer pays for that coverage and in that the worker at issue had signed a contract where he agreed to look to the general employer for his remedy for on-the-job injuries. Vigil v. Digital Equip. Corp., 1996-NMCA-100, 122 N.M. 417, 925 P.2d 883, 1996 N.M. App. LEXIS 82 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).
Statutory employers, as defined by 52-1-22 NMSA 1978, fall within the general definition of employers who are subject to the Act’s terms, and who, in return, are immune from tort liability under the Act’s exclusivity provisions, set forth in 52-1-6E, 52-1-8 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978. Harger v. Structural Servs., 1996-NMSC-018, 121 N.M. 657, 916 P.2d 1324, 1996 N.M. LEXIS 153 (N.M. 1996).
Injured temporary worker who received workers’ compensation benefits from his direct employer was barred as a matter of law from filing a personal injury suit against the company who contracted with the direct employer for temporary laborers because the company was a special employer and the direct employer provided workers’ compensation coverage. Rivera v. Sagebrush Sales, 1994-NMCA-119, 118 N.M. 676, 884 P.2d 832, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 119 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 118 N.M. 585, 883 P.2d 1282, 1994 N.M. LEXIS 366 (N.M. 1994).
Exclusivity provision in 52-1-8 NMSA 1978 in the Workmen’s Compensation Act did not preclude a teacher from prosecuting a tort action that was based on a student’s alleged negligence in allowing a pipe to protrude from the side of the truck that he was driving on a school-related errand; the student was not the teacher’s fellow employee because the student was not a school system’s “special employee” because he was a volunteer and did not have a general employer who could have “lent” him to the school system. Trembath v. Riggs, 1983-NMCA-152, 100 N.M. 615, 673 P.2d 1348, 1983 N.M. App. LEXIS 816 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983), overruled, Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1987-NMSC-007, 105 N.M. 503, 734 P.2d 743, 1987 N.M. LEXIS 3520 (N.M. 1987).
New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq., particularly 52-1-9, 52-1-8 and 52-1-6D NMSA 1978, expressly makes the remedies provided by the Act the sole and exclusive remedies available to an employee for claims against his employer or insurer. Dickson v. Mountain States Mut. Casualty Co., 1982-NMSC-090, 98 N.M. 479, 650 P.2d 1, 1982 N.M. LEXIS 2884 (N.M. 1982).
Employer who waited until after two tort actions had been field against him to file his proof of workers’ compensation insurance did not substantially comply with the filing requirement of 52-1-4 NMSA 1978, and therefore, could not invoke the act’s exclusive remedy provisions, 52-1-8 NMSA 1978 and 52-1-6D NMSA 1978, to bar the actions. Security Trust v. Smith, 1979-NMSC-024, 93 N.M. 35, 596 P.2d 248, 1979 N.M. LEXIS 1299 (N.M. 1979).
The district court properly granted summary judgment for the employer, but not for a fellow-employee, on the ground that the wife’s right of action for negligence was barred by the exclusion provisions of former 59-10-5, 1953 Comp. Roseberry v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 1962-NMSC-029, 70 N.M. 19, 369 P.2d 403, 1962 N.M. LEXIS 1533 (N.M. 1962).
Common law action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by a minor employee while in the course of his employment was dismissed because of the exclusivity provision in the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Benson v. Export Equip. Corp., 1945-NMSC-044, 49 N.M. 356, 164 P.2d 380, 1945 N.M. LEXIS 430 (N.M. 1945).
Notes to Unpublished Decisions
Analysis
Exclusive remedy.
Unpublished decision: Plaintiffs’ negligence claim failed because they had not adequately alleged the elements of a negligence claim against any city defendant, and statutory immunities under the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act and the New Mexico Tort Claims Act protected the city defendants from liability. Tapia v. City of Albuquerque, F. Supp. 2d (D.N.M. Mar. 31, 2014).
Exclusivity provisions.
Unpublished decision: Employer was protected by exclusivity provision of this section because its contract with the employee’s co-employer required the co-employer to obtain workers’ compensation insurance for the employee, who failed to produce evidence to overcome the inference that the employer therefore contributed to paying the insurance premium.Ensey v. Ozzie's Pipeline Padder, Inc., 446 Fed. Appx. 977, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22872 (10th Cir. N.M. 2011).
Research References and Practice Aids
New Mexico Law Review.
Workers’ Compensation—The District Court Should Make The Initial Determination Of Jurisdiction In Workers’ Compensation Cases Involving Intentional Tort Claims — Eldridge v. Circle K Corp., Justin Lesky, 28 N.M. L. Rev. 665 (1998).
Trends In New Mexico Law: 1994-95: Workers’ Compensation Law — New Mexico Clarifies The Meaning Of A Special Employer As Distinct From A Statutory Employer: Rivera v. Sagebrush Sales, Inc., Christine M. Landavazo, 26 N.M. L. Rev. 655 (1996).
Comment: A Comparison Of Workers’ Compensation In The United States And Mexico, Renee L. Camacho, 26 N.M. L. Rev. 133 (1996).
Workers’ Compensation Law — The Sexual Harassment Claim Quandary: Workers’ Compensation As An Inadequate And Unavailable Remedy: Cox v. Chino Mines/Phelps Dodge, Carlos M. Quinones, 24 N.M. L. Rev. 565 (1994).