52-1-29.  Notice of accident to employer; employer to post clear notice of requirement.

Generally.

Accident.

Accident report.

Claim.

Construction.

Dismissal.

Evidence.

           —Sufficient.

Intent, knowledge.

Knowledge.

Latent injuries.

Liability.

Notice.

           —Insufficient.

Oral communications.

Requirements.

Sufficient notice.

Time limitations.

Workers’ compensation.

Purpose of the notice requirement of former 59-10-13.4, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-29 NMSA 1978) is to enable the employer to investigate the facts while they are accessible and, if necessary, to employ doctors so as to speed recovery, while another purpose is to allow the employer to protect himself against simulated or aggravated claims. In an employee’s action against his employer and its carrier to recover workers’ compensation benefits, where the evidence on the question of notice of a compensable injury was conflicting and the purpose of the notice requirement was not satisfied as a matter of law, the trial court did not err in failing to resolve the notice issue in the employee’s favor as a matter of law. Clark v. Duval Corp., 1971-NMCA-091, 82 N.M. 720, 487 P.2d 148, 1971 N.M. App. LEXIS 806 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971).

Written notice is not required where the employer, his superintendent, or other agent has actual knowledge of the occurrence of the accident; employee believed he suffered a minor injury while carrying “mud sacks” but was hospitalized over a week later for continuing pain, and evidence that employee’s wife called his superintendent to notify him of the injury, and employee gave a verbal report of the accident to the superintendent from the hospital, from which a written report was made, was substantial evidence to support a trial court’s finding that the employer had actual knowledge of the accident. Waymire v. Signal Oil Field Serv., 77 N.M. 297, 422 P.2d 34, 1966 N.M. LEXIS 2821 (N.M. 1966).

Employer’s timely knowledge that its worker suffered a heart attack while on a long-haul truck delivery did not establish that the employer also knew that the injury was work-related; the worker was not excused from the written notice requirement former 59-10-13.4, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-29 NMSA 1978). Mere notice to the employer that the employee became sick while at work cannot be considered actual notice of injury within the provisions of the act excusing notice. Wilson v. Navajo Freight Lines, 1964-NMSC-032, 73 N.M. 470, 389 P.2d 594, 1964 N.M. LEXIS 2108 (N.M. 1964).

Although a claimant could not identify whether he was moving or hanging sheet rock at work, the claimant suffered an accident within the meaning of the workmen’s compensation act where the claimant sustained a sharp pain while at work and the employer had notice of the injury as required by former 59-10-13.4B, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-29 NMSA 1978) because an insurance accident report was completed and signed by the employer. Ortiz v. Ortiz & Torres Dri-Wall Co., 1972-NMCA-005, 83 N.M. 452, 493 P.2d 418, 1972 N.M. App. LEXIS 721 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972).

Finding that an employer had actual notice of an injury as required by 52-1-29 NMSA 1978 was supported by evidence given by the employer’s personnel director that the claimant informed him of the matter shortly after it occurred. Di Matteo v. County of Dona Ana, 1985-NMCA-099, 104 N.M. 599, 725 P.2d 575, 1985 N.M. App. LEXIS 633 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985).

The court affirmed a judgment awarding a cowboy for a total and permanent disability because, as required by former 59-10-13.3B, 1953 Comp., the cowboy presented substantial evidence to prove a causal connection between the accidental injury and the disability even though the injury was attributable in part to a preexisting condition; furthermore, the cowboy gave proper notice of the accident when it occurred, as required by 59-10-13.4, 1953 Comp. Moorhead v. Gray Ranch Co., 1977-NMCA-017, 90 N.M. 220, 561 P.2d 493, 1977 N.M. App. LEXIS 580 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d 1347, 1977 N.M. LEXIS 1165 (N.M. 1977).

Under former 59-10-13.4B, 1953 Comp., the actual knowledge required by an employer in a workmen’s compensation case is knowledge of an accident and knowledge of a compensable injury; hence, a trial court properly denied an employee’s claim for workmen’s compensation benefits where the evidence supported the finding that the employer did not have actual knowledge of a compensable injury. Gutierrez v. Wellborn Paint Mfg. Co., 1968-NMCA-086, 79 N.M. 676, 448 P.2d 477, 1968 N.M. App. LEXIS 513 (N.M. Ct. App. 1968).

Although, under the circumstances of the case, the verbal reporting of an accident and injury compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act of New Mexico to the employer or his agent could satisfy the requirement of written notice or actual notice in former 59-19-13, 1953 Comp., the question of actual notice to the employer by the employee was a fact question given that the initial notice was oral and the employee had returned to work without apparent limitations, so the employer was entitled to a new trial. The question of notice only became a question of law when the facts were not in dispute. Baca v. Swift & Co., 1964-NMSC-104, 74 N.M. 211, 392 P.2d 407, 1964 N.M. LEXIS 2175 (N.M. 1964).

Even though an employer did not have actual knowledge of a compensable injury, the notice requirement of former 59-10-13.4B, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-29 NMSA 1978) was satisfied and written notice was excused because the employer had actual knowledge of the employee’s accident. Norris v. Amax Chem. Corp., 1973-NMCA-010, 84 N.M. 587, 506 P.2d 93, 1973 N.M. App. LEXIS 658 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973).

Because lack of notice was an affirmative defense under 52-1-29 NMSA 1978 to a claim for compensation, the trial court properly refused to allow the employer to amend its answer to include the defense of lack of notice where it raised this issue for the first time on the first day of trial. Beyale v. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 1986-NMCA-071, 105 N.M. 112, 729 P.2d 1366, 1986 N.M. App. LEXIS 677 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).

Determination of whether an employer had actual notice of a employee’s accident within 30 days of its occurrence is made from a consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances. Powers v. Riccobene Masonry Constr., 1980-NMCA-172, 97 N.M. 20, 636 P.2d 291, 1980 N.M. App. LEXIS 990 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).

Injured cowboy gave proper notice of his work-related accident when it occurred and he was not required to give notice of the injury to his knees at that time because he did not have actual notice of the injury. Moorhead v. Gray Ranch Co., 1977-NMCA-017, 90 N.M. 220, 561 P.2d 493, 1977 N.M. App. LEXIS 580 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d 1347, 1977 N.M. LEXIS 1165 (N.M. 1977).

Period limited for the 30-day notice under 59-10-13.4, 1953 Comp. begins to run from the time the workman knows, or should know by the exercise of reasonable diligence, that he has sustained injury by accident in the course of his employment. Knowledge means knowledge of a compensable injury and the period for written notice does not begin to run until the workman is charged with such knowledge. Anaya v. Big Three Indus., 1974-NMCA-027, 86 N.M. 168, 521 P.2d 130, 1974 N.M. App. LEXIS 638 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974).

There are two parts to a written notice issue under 59-10-13.4, 1953 Comp.: (1) the time for giving written notice and (2) the person to whom written notice is given. Anaya v. Big Three Indus., 1974-NMCA-027, 86 N.M. 168, 521 P.2d 130, 1974 N.M. App. LEXIS 638 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974).

Although an employee gave written notice of his injury to an adjustor rather than the employer, notice to the adjustor was notice to an agent of the employer under 59-10-13.4, 1953 Comp. Anaya v. Big Three Indus., 1974-NMCA-027, 86 N.M. 168, 521 P.2d 130, 1974 N.M. App. LEXIS 638 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974).

Court reversed a finding that no written notice of an accident and injury was given to the employer within the time periods provided in 59-10-13.4A, 1953 Comp., where there was no evidence that the claimant knew or should have known of a compensable injury until he went to his doctor several weeks after the injury and the written notice was sent within 30 days of that time. Anaya v. Big Three Indus., 1974-NMCA-027, 86 N.M. 168, 521 P.2d 130, 1974 N.M. App. LEXIS 638 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974).

Where no written notice was given, an employee’s workmen’s compensation claim was barred unless the employer had “actual knowledge” under former 59-10-13.4B, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-29 NMSA 1978), and if the employer had “actual knowledge,” it acquired that knowledge by plaintiff’s verbal notice where the verbal notice given 34 days after the accident was insufficient to charge the employer with “actual knowledge.” Rohrer v. Eidal Int'l, 1968-NMCA-089, 79 N.M. 711, 449 P.2d 81, 1968 N.M. App. LEXIS 515 (N.M. Ct. App. 1968).

Under former statute, actual knowledge by an employer of an accident did not excuse the giving of written notice; rather, the knowledge must be of an accident and compensable injury. Roberson v. Powell, 1967-NMSC-131, 78 N.M. 69, 428 P.2d 471, 1967 N.M. LEXIS 2736 (N.M. 1967).

Where an employee was in an accident on the job when he was hit with a board, but never apprised the employer that he sustained a disabling injury, he failed to comply with statutory notice provisions of former 59-10-13.4, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-29 NMSA 1978), and his claim was barred. Roberson v. Powell, 1967-NMSC-131, 78 N.M. 69, 428 P.2d 471, 1967 N.M. LEXIS 2736 (N.M. 1967).

Where claimant reported his accident and injury to the employer, the superintendent made out an accident report, and the workmen’s compensation carrier paid benefits, no further notice was required for claimant to be eligible for benefits. Geeslin v. Goodno, Inc., 77 N.M. 408, 423 P.2d 603, 1967 N.M. LEXIS 2639 (N.M. 1967).

Where only evidence of notice of a compensable injury was a casual conversation between an employee and his supervisor, the employee’s worker compensation claim for benefits was properly denied for his failure give notice of a compensable injury to employer. Simmons v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 77 N.M. 100, 419 P.2d 756, 1966 N.M. LEXIS 2775 (N.M. 1966).

Primary purpose of requiring an injured employee to give written notice is to enable the employer to investigate the facts while they are accessible and, if necessary, to employ doctors so as to speed recovery; where an employee believed he suffered a minor injury but was hospitalized a week later for continuing pain, his wife called his superintendent to notify him of the injury, and the employee verbally reported the accident to the superintendent while at the hospital, such information was adequate to satisfy the purpose of the notice requirement. Waymire v. Signal Oil Field Serv., 77 N.M. 297, 422 P.2d 34, 1966 N.M. LEXIS 2821 (N.M. 1966).

Pursuant to former 59-10-13.4, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-29 NMSA 1978), the information given by appellee claimant to his superior was adequate to satisfy the purposes of the notice; claimant told his superior that he thought the accident occurred on the forth or fifth day of June, 1964. A check of the drilling log revealed the correct date as June sixth. Waymire v. Signal Oil Field Serv., 77 N.M. 297, 422 P.2d 34, 1966 N.M. LEXIS 2821 (N.M. 1966).

Employee’s notice to the employer of a work-related injury under former 59-10-13.4, 1953 Comp. did not comply with the statute because the notice gave the employer notice of the injury, but not of the accident, as required. Bell v. Kenneth P. Thompson Co., 1966-NMSC-117, 76 N.M. 420, 415 P.2d 546, 1966 N.M. LEXIS 2675 (N.M. 1966).

Employee was barred from seeking workmen’s compensation benefits for a hernia because he failed to give employer the required notice. Michael v. Bauman, 1966-NMSC-079, 76 N.M. 225, 413 P.2d 888, 1966 N.M. LEXIS 2635 (N.M. 1966).

There is a proviso in 59-10-13.4, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-29 NMSA 1978) that notice in writing need not be given if the employer or his superintendent had actual knowledge of the occurrence of the accident; notice as provided by the statute is a condition to the right of a workman to recover compensation. Geeslin v. Goodno, Inc., 1965-NMSC-053, 75 N.M. 174, 402 P.2d 156, 1965 N.M. LEXIS 1541 (N.M. 1965).

In an employee’s action for workmen’s compensation benefits, the court would not extend the statutory actual knowledge exception for written notice found in former 59-10-13.4, 1953 Comp. to include an employee’s mentioning his injury in conversation to the employer’s agent 13 days after the injury allegedly occurred. Scott v. General Equip. Co., 1964-NMSC-056, 74 N.M. 73, 390 P.2d 660, 1964 N.M. LEXIS 2134 (N.M. 1964).

Trial court properly dismissed an action by a workers’ compensation claimant who did not give written notice of his claim to his employer within 30 or 60 days of his accident, and no agent of the employer in charge of the work had actual notice. Daulton v. Laughlin Bros. Drilling Co., 1963-NMSC-208, 73 N.M. 232, 387 P.2d 336, 1963 N.M. LEXIS 2071 (N.M. 1963).

Under certain circumstances, verbal reporting of an injury by accident, arising out of and in the course of employment, to the employer or the employee’s manager, satisfies the requirement of actual knowledge. Lozano v. Archer, 1962-NMSC-164, 71 N.M. 175, 376 P.2d 963, 1962 N.M. LEXIS 1505 (N.M. 1962).

Although a police officer’s accident occurred four years before, the city had no notice of his workers’ compensation claim until his latent injury emerged, and the claim was premature when it was filed thereafter but prior to expiration of the notice period under 52-1-29 NMSA 1978. Swallows v. Albuquerque, 1955-NMSC-042, 59 N.M. 328, 284 P.2d 216, 1955 N.M. LEXIS 1027 (N.M. 1955).

Claim for workmen’s compensation was not subject to the time limits of § 57-913, 1941 Comp. of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, because the employer’s agent was present when the accident injuring the claimant’s eye occurred, the employer’s doctor who examined the eye shortly afterwards passed the injury off as trivial, and it was not until the claimant gradually lost all sight in the eye did an examination by claimant’s doctor discover the piece of metal in the eye that caused the injury. Anderson v. Contract Trucking Co., 1944-NMSC-020, 48 N.M. 158, 146 P.2d 873, 1944 N.M. LEXIS 35 (N.M. 1944).

Former § 57-913, 1941 Comp. provided of the notice and claims periods that employees were to follow with respect to filing a workers’ compensation claim. Anderson v. Contract Trucking Co., 1944-NMSC-020, 48 N.M. 158, 146 P.2d 873, 1944 N.M. LEXIS 35 (N.M. 1944).

Because defendant employer had notice of all three of plaintiff employee’s accidents at the time of their occurrence, under the terms of former § 57-913, 1941 Comp., the necessity of formal written notice was avoided. The requirement of such notice, under circumstances was expressly waived by former § 57-913, 1941 Comp. Elsea v. Broome Furniture Co., 1943-NMSC-036, 47 N.M. 356, 143 P.2d 572, 1943 N.M. LEXIS 43 (N.M. 1943).

Under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, notice was waived because the employer had as much knowledge concerning the employee’s injuries as could have been conveyed to it at any time pertinent by any written notice. Elsea v. Broome Furniture Co., 1943-NMSC-036, 47 N.M. 356, 143 P.2d 572, 1943 N.M. LEXIS 43 (N.M. 1943).

Dismissal of a claim was upheld where failure to give notice as required by statute barred a claim for, or the recovery of, benefits; actual knowledge was required before written notice could be dispensed with; the failure to give the notice as required by former 59-10-13.4, 1953 Comp. (now 51-1-29 NMSA 1978) barred a claim for, or the recovery of, compensation, former 59-10-13.6, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-31 NMSA 1978) because notice in casual conversation was insufficient to give notice. Higgins v. Board of Directors, 1964-NMSC-034, 73 N.M. 502, 389 P.2d 616, 1964 N.M. LEXIS 2111 (N.M. 1964).

On an employee’s claim for disability benefits arising under the Occupational Disease Disablement Law, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the employer because the employee failed to comply with the 30-day statutory notice provision of former 59-11-16.1, 1953 Comp. (now 53-3-19 NMSA 1978). Similarly to former 59-10-13.4, 1953 Comp. of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (now 52-1-29 NMSA 1978), untimely notice was not satisfied under former § 59-11-16.1(B), 1953 Comp. by an oral communication with the doctor because the doctor was not in a position of authority and was not an employer, superintendent, foreman, or other agent in charge of the work in connection with which the disablement was occasioned; furthermore, the untimely notice was not excused under former 59-11-16.7, 1953 Comp. (now 52-3-25 NMSA 1978) by the closing of the offices because the employee made not attempt to give written notice or to locate the employer until after the statutory notice period had expired. Sanchez v. Azotea Contractors, 1973-NMCA-039, 84 N.M. 764, 508 P.2d 34, 1973 N.M. App. LEXIS 688 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973).

Verbal reporting of an accidental injury to an employer or its agent may possibly satisfy the requirement of former 59-10-13.4, 1953 Comp., (now 52-1-29 NMSA 1978). However, the fact that a verbal report has been made is not, in itself, determinative of whether the requirement has been satisfied; all of the circumstances of the case must be considered. Marez v. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., 1978-NMCA-128, 93 N.M. 9, 595 P.2d 1204, 1978 N.M. App. LEXIS 649, 1978 N.M. App. LEXIS 652 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 532, 591 P.2d 286, 1979 N.M. LEXIS 1368 (N.M. 1979).

Employer’s actual notice of an employee’s accident was sufficient to satisfy notice requirement. Actual notice of the specific injuries caused by the accident was not required. Beckwith v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 1972-NMCA-168, 84 N.M. 565, 505 P.2d 1241, 1972 N.M. App. LEXIS 884 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972).

Notice requirement under former 59-10-13, 1953 Comp., required that the injured claimant for workers’ compensation show that notice was given or that the employer had actual knowledge of what caused the injury. Bolton v. Murdock, 1957-NMSC-019, 62 N.M. 211, 307 P.2d 794, 1957 N.M. LEXIS 888 (N.M. 1957).

Injured worker’s claim for compensation benefits was not barred due to his failure to give his employer written notice of his accident and injury within 30 days of their occurrence as required by 52-1-29 NMSA 1978, because the 30-day notice period did not begin to run until the worker knew or had reason to know that he had suffered a compensable injury; the 30-day period did not begin to run until one and one-half months after the worker’s accident and injury occurred, because until that time, he had not experienced pain of sufficient severity as to charge him with knowledge that he had suffered a compensable injury. Gomez v. B.E. Harvey Gin Corp., 1990-NMSC-057, 110 N.M. 100, 792 P.2d 1143, 1990 N.M. LEXIS 570 (N.M. 1990).

Workers’ compensation claimant who waited until he could no longer work before notifying his employer of an injury he had sustained six months earlier still notified the employer in a timely manner under 52-1-29 NMSA 1978, because he gave notice within 30 days from the time he no longer could work, which in this case was when a reasonable person would have believed that he or she had sustained a compensable injury. Martinez v. Darby Constr. Co., 1989-NMSC-069, 109 N.M. 146, 782 P.2d 904, 1989 N.M. LEXIS 337 (N.M. 1989).

Under this section, a worker’s notice to his employer of his injury was found to be untimely despite the fact the worker’s testimony that he informed his employer of his injury the day after the injury because the factfinder could properly disregard that testimony after the worker’s credibility had been impeached concerning the circumstances of the accident. Nunez v. Smith's Management Corp., 1988-NMCA-109, 108 N.M. 186, 769 P.2d 99, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 119 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).

Written notice provision former 59-10-13.4, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-29 NMSA 1978) applies to the substitute provision for actual knowledge; the employer must have actual knowledge of the accident within 30 days after its occurrence. Herndon v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 1978-NMCA-072, 92 N.M. 635, 593 P.2d 470, 1978 N.M. App. LEXIS 645 (N.M. Ct. App.), rev'd, 1978-NMSC-090, 92 N.M. 287, 587 P.2d 434, 1978 N.M. LEXIS 978 (N.M. 1978).

Where a workmen’s compensation claimant injured his back, the trial court properly found that an employer had no actual knowledge of the injury, as the conflicting testimony was resolved in favor of the employer; however, the trial court erred when it found no written notice of the injury within the time limitations provided by former 59-10-13.4, 1953 Comp. as written notice was received by the insurer’s adjuster within 30 days of the time the claimant knew or should have known of a compensable injury. Anaya v. Big Three Indus., 1974-NMCA-027, 86 N.M. 168, 521 P.2d 130, 1974 N.M. App. LEXIS 638 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974).

Employer, who presented an affidavit showing that after the treating physician reported that the employee had no disability and the accident report was closed, the employer received no further notice of a compensable injury, made a prima facie showing that no actual knowledge of a compensable injury was acquired within the time provided for written notice. Norris v. Amax Chem. Corp., 1973-NMCA-010, 84 N.M. 587, 506 P.2d 93, 1973 N.M. App. LEXIS 658 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973).

A log entry of an injury on a different date than the employee’s injury was not adequate notice and the trial court properly denied the employee’s workmen’s compensation claim as untimely. Hammond v. Kersey, 1972-NMCA-003, 83 N.M. 430, 492 P.2d 1293, 1972 N.M. App. LEXIS 725 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972).

Employee, whose leg was amputated as a result of an infection from a blister she developed at work, was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits because she did not provide notice to her employer of her accident within the time required by statute and casual conversations concerning the existence and time of development of the blister and subsequent casual conversations concerning the fact that her foot was hurting and that she had consulted a doctor were not sufficient to charge her employer with knowledge of the occurrence of an accident and of a compensable injury resulting therefrom. Smith v. State, 1968-NMCA-013, 79 N.M. 25, 439 P.2d 242, 1968 N.M. App. LEXIS 440 (N.M. Ct. App. 1968).

Thirty-day time limit for giving notice to an employer of a work-related injury under former 59-10-13.4, 1953 Comp. begins to run when an employee knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, that he has sustained an injury by accident in the course of his employment. Bell v. Kenneth P. Thompson Co., 1966-NMSC-117, 76 N.M. 420, 415 P.2d 546, 1966 N.M. LEXIS 2675 (N.M. 1966).

Where a claimant, a laborer in a pumice mill, was required to stop working and was hospitalized three or four months before giving notice by letter to the employer of the claimant’s dermatitis, the mandatory notice requirement had not been met and the claimant could not recover benefits. Sanchez v. James H. Rhodes & Co., 1964-NMSC-063, 74 N.M. 112, 391 P.2d 336, 1964 N.M. LEXIS 2146 (N.M. 1964).

Claimant’s responsibility to give notice to an employer under former 59-10-13.4, 1953 Comp. did not arise until he was aware that he had suffered a compensable injury; where the claimant gave notice to the employer within 30 days of the time that he consulted a physician, the notice was adequate. Langley v. Navajo Freight Lines, 1962-NMSC-018, 70 N.M. 34, 369 P.2d 774, 1962 N.M. LEXIS 1537 (N.M. 1962).

Period limited for giving notice of an accident and injury to an employer under former 59-10-13, 1953 Comp., began to run at the time the employee knew or should have known by the exercise of reasonable diligence that he had sustained injury by an accident in the course of his employment. Montell v. Orndorff, 1960-NMSC-063, 67 N.M. 156, 353 P.2d 680, 1960 N.M. LEXIS 1165 (N.M. 1960).

In the employee’s action for workmen’s compensation benefits after a back injury, the trial court properly found that the action was barred under the statute of limitations, former 59-10-13, 1953 Comp., where the employee knew that he had sustained a back injury and he suffered pain for some six weeks following the injury, but failed to give notice to the employer until 19 months later. Yardman v. Cooper, 1959-NMSC-043, 65 N.M. 450, 339 P.2d 473, 1959 N.M. LEXIS 926 (N.M. 1959), overruled in part, Montell v. Orndorff, 67 N.M. 156, 353 P.2d 680, 1960 N.M. LEXIS 1165 (N.M. 1960), overruled,  Montell v. Orndorff, 1960-NMSC-063, 67 N.M. 156, 353 P.2d 680, 1960 N.M. LEXIS 1165 (N.M. 1960).

Although defendant insurer had begun to pay workmen’s compensation benefits to plaintiff claimant, the payments had been stopped for more than a year before the claimant filed an action, and, in an appeal by the claimant from a trial court’s dismissal of the action as to defendant insurer on the ground that his claim was barred by the one year statute of limitations, the Supreme Court of New Mexico determined that the limitation began to run when there had been a failure or refusal to pay any “installment” of compensation to which the claimant was entitled, “installment” meant the semi-monthly benefits established under the New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act and not medical payments, and neither the payment of medical benefits nor the making of an offer of settlement, which allegedly led the claimant to believe compensation would be paid, tolled the limitation. Garcia v. New Mexico State Highway Dep't, 1956-NMSC-048, 61 N.M. 156, 296 P.2d 759, 1956 N.M. LEXIS 1064 (N.M. 1956).

Where more than six months had intervened between the employer’s failure to pay compensation for a claimant’s injury and the date that the claimant filed his claim for workmen’s compensation benefits, the claim was properly dismissed, although some alleged facts showed a possible excuse for the failure to serve written notice of the claim, they were unavailing to enlarge the limitation of time within which the claim had to be filed in the district court. Edinburg v. Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 1933-NMSC-022, 37 N.M. 139, 19 P.2d 747, 1933 N.M. LEXIS 12 (N.M. 1933), superseded by statute as stated in Knippel v. Northern Communications, Inc., 1982-NMCA-009, 97 N.M. 401, 640 P.2d 507, 1982 N.M. App. LEXIS 799 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982).

The worker was determined to have actually sustained a work-related injury and the worker, as president, chief executive officer, and sole stockholder, was deemed to have actual knowledge of the accident pursuant to 52-1-29 NMSA 1978, which requires only actual knowledge of the accident and not of any injury. Moreno v. Las Cruces Glass & Mirror Co., 1991-NMCA-074, 112 N.M. 693, 818 P.2d 1217, 1991 N.M. App. LEXIS 212 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).

Claimant was entitled to receive death benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act [52-1-1 NMSA 1978] for decedent’s death from a heart attack that occurred at work during a period of work-related stress; under 52-1-29A NMSA 1978, no written notice was required because the employer had actual knowledge of the decedent’s on-the-job heart attack and of the decedent’s stressful schedule, and the hearing examiner could reasonably have inferred from the evidence that the employer through its employees knew that work-related stress induced the decedent’s heart attack and gave rise to a potential claim. Herman v. Miners' Hosp., 1991-NMSC-021, 111 N.M. 550, 807 P.2d 734, 1991 N.M. LEXIS 108 (N.M. 1991).

The purpose of the notice provision in the Workers’ Compensation Act [52-1-1 NMSA 1978] is to allow an employer to investigate an accident while the facts are accessible and, if necessary, to employ doctors to speed recovery. Jimerson v. Arapahoe Drilling, 1988-NMCA-097, 107 N.M. 716, 764 P.2d 143, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 92 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).

A worker’s failure to comply with 52-1-29 NMSA 1978 of the Workers’ Compensation Act, which requires notice of accident to his employer, also barred any claim against the subsequent injury fund. Jimerson v. Arapahoe Drilling, 1988-NMCA-097, 107 N.M. 716, 764 P.2d 143, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 92 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).

Employee’s verbal report of his accident and injury to his supervisor, coupled with their ongoing contact regarding the employee’s condition, satisfied the requirement of the employer’s actual knowledge of the accident. Mosher v. Bituminous Ins. Co., 1981-NMCA-102, 96 N.M. 674, 634 P.2d 696, 1981 N.M. App. LEXIS 769 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).

An employee’s complaint to recover workmen’s compensation benefits was properly dismissed on the ground that the employee had failed to give notice of a compensable injury. Simmons v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 77 N.M. 100, 419 P.2d 756, 1966 N.M. LEXIS 2775 (N.M. 1966).

Because the trial court failed to make any finding re statutory notice to the employer or knowledge of the accident by the employer or its superintendent, a remand was required in a workers’ compensation case where the trial court found that the worker was totally disabled. Geeslin v. Goodno, Inc., 1965-NMSC-053, 75 N.M. 174, 402 P.2d 156, 1965 N.M. LEXIS 1541 (N.M. 1965).

Notice and timely filing requirements of former 59-10-13.6, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-31 NMSA 1978) were mandatory, if the injured employee did not give notice as required by former 59-10-13.4, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-29 NMSA 1978) or failed to file his claim within the time required by statute, all of his claims and right to recovery would be barred. State ex rel. Kermac Nuclear Fuels Corp. v. Larrazolo, 1962-NMSC-134, 70 N.M. 475, 375 P.2d 118, 1962 N.M. LEXIS 1628 (N.M. 1962).

Where an employee suffered head injuries and appreciated the seriousness of his injuries as early as a few months after the work-related incident that caused them, but did not file a workmen’s compensation claim until two days before his death five years later, benefits claimed by his widow and his minor child were properly denied based on the limitations period in the Workers’ Compensation Act [52-1-1 NMSA 1978]; the provisions of 52-1-59 NMSA 1978 did not excuse the employee’s failure to file the claim required. Sanchez v. Bernalillo County, 1953-NMSC-038, 57 N.M. 217, 257 P.2d 909, 1953 N.M. LEXIS 972 (N.M. 1953).

Under 1929 Code, § 156-113 (now 52-1-29 NMSA 1978), the one-year limitation period in which a workmen’s compensation claim may be filed in a district court begins to run 31 days after either the employer fails or refuses to pay compensation, where the employer has received written notice of the employee’s accident or injury, or from when the employer has actual knowledge of the employee’s accident or injury. Samora v. Las Cruces, 1941-NMSC-002, 45 N.M. 75, 109 P.2d 790, 1941 N.M. LEXIS 3 (N.M. 1941).

Where an employer failed to object to the trial court’s findings that an employee suffered a work-related injury and gave notice of the injury as required by former Section C.S. 1929, § 156-113 (now 52-1-29 NMSA 1978), the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to the employee. Wells v. Gulf Ref. Co., 1938-NMSC-033, 42 N.M. 378, 79 P.2d 921, 1938 N.M. LEXIS 32 (N.M. 1938).

Increase or reduction in compensation based on failure of employer to provide or failure of employee to use safety devices, 52-1-10 NMSA 1978.

Claim to be filed for workers’ compensation; effect of failure to give required notice or to file claim within time allowed, 52-1-31 NMSA 1978.