A. The provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act [52-1-1 NMSA 1978] shall apply to employers of three or more workers; provided that act shall apply to all employers engaged in activities required to be licensed under the provisions of the Construction Industries Licensing Act [Chapter 60, Article 13 NMSA 1978] regardless of the number of employees. The provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act shall not apply to employers of private domestic servants and farm and ranch laborers.
B. An election to be subject to the Workers’ Compensation Act [52-1-1 NMSA 1978] by employers of private domestic servants or farm and ranch laborers, by persons for whom the services of qualified real estate sales persons are performed or by a partner or self-employed person may be made by filing, in the office of the director, either a sworn statement to the effect that the employer accepts the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act or an insurance or security undertaking as required by Section 52-1-4 NMSA 1978.
C. Every worker shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act [52-1-1 NMSA 1978] if his employer is subject to the provisions of that act and has complied with its requirements, including insurance.
D. Such compliance with the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act [52-1-1 NMSA 1978], including the provisions for insurance, shall be, and construed to be, a surrender by the employer and the worker of their rights to any other method, form or amount of compensation or determination thereof or to any cause of action at law, suit in equity or statutory or common-law right to remedy or proceeding whatever for or on account of personal injuries or death of the worker than as provided in the Workers’ Compensation Act and shall be an acceptance of all of the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act and shall bind the worker himself and, for compensation for his death, shall bind his personal representative, his surviving spouse and next of kin, as well as the employer and those conducting his business during bankruptcy or insolvency.
E. The Workers’ Compensation Act [52-1-1 NMSA 1978] provides exclusive remedies. No cause of action outside the Workers’ Compensation Act shall be brought by an employee or dependent against the employer or his representative, including the insurer, guarantor or surety of any employer, for any matter relating to the occurrence of or payment for any injury or death covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act. Nothing in the Workers’ Compensation Act, however, shall affect or be construed to affect, in any way, the existence of or the mode of trial of any claim or cause of action that the worker has against any person other than his employer or another employee of his employer, including a management or supervisory employee, or the insurer, guarantor or surety of his employer.
HISTORY:
1978 52-1-6, enacted by Laws 1990 (2nd S.S.), ch. 2, § 4.
Notes to Decisions
Manager’s intentional misconduct.
Constitutionality.
Section 52-1-6C NMSA 1978, in the light of 52-1-7 NMSA 1978, does not violate equal protection because a substantial distinction exists between an executive officer of a business or professional corporation and an ordinary workman; each of these classifications are not wholly devoid of any semblance of reason to support it as to amount to mere caprice. Shope v. Don Coe Constr. Co., 1979-NMCA-013, 92 N.M. 508, 590 P.2d 656, 1979 N.M. App. LEXIS 796 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979).
The farm labor exclusion in former 59-10-4, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-6 NMSA 1978) was germane to the title of the 1937 law which enacted this exclusion, and germane to the 1959 and 1975 laws that continued the exclusion and thus did not violate N.M. Const., art IV, § 16. Varela v. Mounho, 92 N.M. 147, 584 P.2d 194, 1978 N.M. App. LEXIS 599 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324, 1978 N.M. LEXIS 1110 (N.M. 1978).
Applicability.
Workers' Compensation Administration (WCA) lacked jurisdiction over a controversy between workers' compensation insurers because the dispute was not a claim that arose under the Workers' Compensation Act; it was not enough that the dispute between insurers generally related to a workers' compensation claim because the case contemplated complex legal issues that the WCA was simply not designed to adjudicate. Jones v. Holiday Inn Express, 2014-NMCA-082, 331 P.3d 992, 2014 N.M. App. LEXIS 70 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014).
By its terms, a dispute between insurers is simply not the type of claim the Workers' Compensation Act covers since it does not involve or affect a worker's claim for compensation; it is not enough that the dispute between insurers generally relates to a workers' compensation claim. Jones v. Holiday Inn Express, 2014-NMCA-082, 331 P.3d 992, 2014 N.M. App. LEXIS 70 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014).
Generally.
State highway department and state public defender were the same employer for the purpose of the exclusive-remedy provisions, 52-1-6 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, because employees of the two agencies have access to another state entity to grieve personnel actions per the Personnel Act, 10-9-1 to 10-9-25 NMSA 1978, are paid by the state from state funds per 9-6-1 to 9-6-5 NMSA 1978 and 10-7-2 NMSA 1978, and are employed by agencies of the executive department, headed by gubernatorial appointees per 31-15-4 NMSA 1978 and 67-3-2 NMSA 1978. Singhas v. State Highway Dep't, 1995-NMCA-089, 120 N.M. 474, 902 P.2d 1077, 1995 N.M. App. LEXIS 92 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995), aff'd, 1997-NMSC-054, 124 N.M. 42, 946 P.2d 645, 1997 N.M. LEXIS 405 (N.M. 1997).
The purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act (52-1-1 NMSA 1978) is to provide recovery and ensure prompt compensation to a worker, while at the same time giving the employer the benefit of having only limited liability under the Act’s exclusivity provision, 52-1-6D NMSA 1978. Hammonds v. Freymiller Trucking, 1993-NMCA-030, 115 N.M. 364, 851 P.2d 486, 1993 N.M. App. LEXIS 21 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
Prison guard who was injured during a prison riot could not recover against the penitentiary under former § 45-101, 1941 Comp., and the workmen’s compensation statutes where the penitentiary took no step to comply with the Act and did not file a notice in writing of its election not to accept the provisions of the Act, because the state did not expressly consent to be sued. Day v. Penitentiary of New Mexico, 1954-NMSC-064, 58 N.M. 391, 271 P.2d 831, 1954 N.M. LEXIS 1139 (N.M. 1954).
Agreement.
Where an employee released an employer and its predecessor from a claim under the New Mexico Occupational Disease Disablement Act, the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act, and otherwise, the agreement released the predecessor only in its role as a previous employer, and whether the predecessor and the employer were sufficiently connected so as to be a single corporate employer entitled to the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act and the release, was a matter for a jury in the employee’s action for damages for brucellosis. Garrity v. Overland Sheepskin Co., 1996-NMSC-032, 121 N.M. 710, 917 P.2d 1382, 1996 N.M. LEXIS 205 (N.M. 1996).
The exclusive remedy provision, 52-1-6D NMSA 1978, does not prevent an employer and an employee from entering into a private agreement for contractual disability benefits greater than those benefits provided under the legislative workmen’s compensation scheme. Segura v. Molycorp, Inc., 1981-NMSC-116, 97 N.M. 13, 636 P.2d 284, 1981 N.M. LEXIS 2411 (N.M. 1981).
Applicability.
In a negligence action against the New Mexico state highway department, the injured party and the personal representative of the deceased employee’s estate were not permitted to recover because of the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-6D NMSA 1978, which barred all tort claims by employees of one state agency where the tortfeasor was another state agency. Singhas v. New Mexico State Highway Dep't, 1997-NMSC-054, 124 N.M. 42, 946 P.2d 645, 1997 N.M. LEXIS 405 (N.M. 1997).
Consortium claim was barred by 52-1-6D NMSA 1978 of the Workers’ Compensation Act where the principal claim was also barred. Singhas v. State Highway Dep't, 1995-NMCA-089, 120 N.M. 474, 902 P.2d 1077, 1995 N.M. App. LEXIS 92 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995), aff'd, 1997-NMSC-054, 124 N.M. 42, 946 P.2d 645, 1997 N.M. LEXIS 405 (N.M. 1997).
Employer that employed only one employee in the state of New Mexico, but more than three workers in total, was not exempt from the New Mexico workers’ compensation act under 52-1-6A NMSA 1978 for injuries to a truck driver who lived and was injured in New Mexico. Hammonds v. Freymiller Trucking, 1993-NMCA-030, 115 N.M. 364, 851 P.2d 486, 1993 N.M. App. LEXIS 21 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
Fact that the employee worked for an employer that was a partner in a partnership that owned the parking lot where the employee sustained her work-related injury did not necessarily result in the exclusive remedy provisions of 52-1-6D NMSA 1978 in the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act barring the negligence action that the employee filed against the partnership; the New Mexico Uniform Partnership Act (UPA), 54-1-1 to 54-1-43 NMSA 1978, recognized that the partnership might have had a separate identity from the employer for the purpose of determining the applicability of 52-1-6D NMSA 1978 in the current action, and it was necessary to determine whether the employee had a right to recover from the partnership under 54-1-13 NMSA 1978 in the UPA that held a partnership liable for a partner’s wrongful conduct, whether the employer had a “dual persona” that rendered it, and possibly the partnership, subject to a negligence claim based on the employer negligently acting in a capacity other than as an employer that caused the employee’s harm, and whether that negligent act qualified as partnership business. Salswedel v. Enerpharm, Ltd., 1988-NMCA-089, 107 N.M. 728, 764 P.2d 499, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 90 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).
Decedent was not limited to the remedies provided under the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act (52-1-1 NMSA 1978) where the court found that the lessee-carrier for whom decedent was driving at the time of his death was not decedent’s employer for purposes of the act and that the carrier had specifically contracted away the benefit of the act and subjected itself to liability for negligence. Matkins v. Zero Refrigerated Lines, 1979-NMCA-095, 93 N.M. 511, 602 P.2d 195, 1979 N.M. App. LEXIS 714 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979), limited, Vigil v. Digital Equip. Corp., 1996-NMCA-100, 122 N.M. 417, 925 P.2d 883, 1996 N.M. App. LEXIS 82 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).
Where an employer owned several businesses that, in total, employed more than four employees, the employer was an employer within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and an employee’s widow was entitled to compensation benefits resulting from the death of her husband who was killed in an automobile accident while returning home from a business trip. Clark v. Electronic City, 1977-NMCA-048, 90 N.M. 477, 565 P.2d 348, 1977 N.M. App. LEXIS 613 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977).
Where defendant employer did not carry workers’ compensation insurance, and he had not relieved himself of such requirement as required by former 59-10-3, 1953 Comp., the employer was not operating under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and, given those circumstances, plaintiff worker could not conclusively have been presumed to have accepted the provisions of the act; consequently, an action at law was tenable in favor of the employee and against the employer, and the defenses of former 59-10-5, 1953 Comp. were not available to the employer. Addison v. Tessier, 1957-NMSC-002, 62 N.M. 120, 305 P.2d 1067, 1957 N.M. LEXIS 878 (N.M. 1957).
Claimant could not recover for disability under the Workers’ Compensation Act because a dance hall operator who hired the claimant as a carpenter was neither an employer nor engaged in an extra-hazardous occupation for purposes of the Act; extra-hazardous occupations or pursuits did not include ranching, or dance hall operation. Williams v. Cooper, 1953-NMSC-050, 57 N.M. 373, 258 P.2d 1139, 1953 N.M. LEXIS 988 (N.M. 1953), superseded by statute as stated in Rodriguez v. Brand West Dairy, 2016-NMSC-029, 378 P.3d 13, 2016 N.M. LEXIS 150 (N.M. 2016).
Beneficial use.
Defendant residential center for the mentally disabled was entitled to summary judgment on loss of consortium claim by the unmarried partner of an employee who suffered a premature birth after being kicked in the stomach by a resident. Although the existence of a valid marriage no longer controlled whether consortium damages could be recovered, the claim was not viable because it was derivative. Paehl v. Lincoln County Care Ctr., Inc., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30349 (D.N.M. 2004).
Common law.
Where an employee’s workers’ compensation claim was denied on the grounds that he was not in the course of his employment at the time of the accident and that the accident was proximately caused by his voluntary intoxication, his tort claim was not barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-6E and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978. Sanchez v. San Juan Concrete Co., 1997-NMCA-068, 123 N.M. 537, 943 P.2d 571, 1997 N.M. App. LEXIS 63 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
Compliance.
Employer who waited until after two tort actions had been field against him to file his proof of workers’ compensation insurance did not substantially comply with the filing requirement of 52-1-4 NMSA 1978, and therefore, could not invoke the Act’s exclusive remedy provisions, 52-1-8 NMSA 1978 and 52-1-6D NMSA 1978, to bar the actions. Security Trust v. Smith, 1979-NMSC-024, 93 N.M. 35, 596 P.2d 248, 1979 N.M. LEXIS 1299 (N.M. 1979).
Wrongful death action brought against an employer by the administrator of a deceased employee’s estate was not foreclosed by the exclusivity provisions of the workmen’s compensation act, former 59-10-1, 1953 Comp. et seq. because the employer failed to substantially comply with former 59-10-3, 1953 Comp. Williams v. Montano, 1976-NMSC-022, 89 N.M. 252, 550 P.2d 264, 1976 N.M. LEXIS 805 (N.M. 1976).
Construction with other law.
In appellant employee’s action against appellee former employer, alleging sex discrimination under the New Mexico Human Rights Act (28-1-1 NMSA 1978), the employee’s sex discrimination claim was not precluded by the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act (NMWCA), 52-1-6 NMSA 1978, because the NMHRA was intended to eliminate unlawful discriminatory practices and the NMWCA was enacted to provide for disabled employees. Sabella v. Manor Care, 1996-NMSC-014, 121 N.M. 596, 915 P.2d 901, 1996 N.M. LEXIS 120 (N.M. 1996), limited, Mitchell-Carr v. McLendon, 1999-NMSC-025, 127 N.M. 282, 980 P.2d 65, 1999 N.M. LEXIS 154 (N.M. 1999).
Under 52-1-28.1 NMSA 1978, any claim for unfair claim processing practices or bad faith by an employer, insurer or claim processing representative relating to any aspect of the Workers’ Compensation Act was within the exclusivity provisions of the Act, 52-1-6E NMSA 1978, which meant that a bad faith claim against an insurer for failure to pay for certain treatment after an award had been issued could not be brought in the district court. Cruz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1995-NMSC-006, 119 N.M. 301, 889 P.2d 1223, 1995 N.M. LEXIS 57 (N.M. 1995).
Summary judgment was found to have been properly granted in favor of an employee and employer in a tort action brought by another employee, which was based on a battery claim, because the common-law cause of action was not permitted under 52-1-8 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978 since the act was covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 to 52-1-69 NMSA 1978; 52-1-6D NMSA 1978, 52-1-8 NMSA 1978, and 52-1-56C NMSA 1978 were found to accord immunity for all causes of action, all common-law rights and remedies, for negligence or wrong. Gallegos v. Chastain, 1981-NMCA-014, 95 N.M. 551, 624 P.2d 60, 1981 N.M. App. LEXIS 683 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981), overruled in part, Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148, 2001 N.M. LEXIS 376 (N.M. 2001), overruled in part as stated in Richey v. Hammond Conservancy Dist., No. 32847, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 12 (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2015).
Employer’s failure to file a copy of its workmen’s compensation insurance policy as required by former 59-10-3, 1953 Comp. until 76 days after a worker was killed in a work-related accident did not permit the worker’s administratrix to maintain a wrongful death action against the employer, because subjecting the employer to such liability for a technical delay did not further the statutory purpose of the Workmen’s Compensation Act to cause employers to obtain compensation protection; even though the failure to file was a misdemeanor under former 59-10-25D, 1953 Comp. and former 59-10-31, 1953 Comp. subjected non-filing employers to injunctions from continuing their business operations until they complied, the employer’s liability was limited to the benefits set forth in the Act by former 59-10-4F, 59-10-5, and 59-10-6, 1953 Comp. Quintana v. Nolan Bros., 1969-NMCA-083, 80 N.M. 589, 458 P.2d 841, 1969 N.M. App. LEXIS 605 (N.M. Ct. App. 1969).
Former § 57-925, 1941 Comp. was reconcilable and consistent with the spirit of the Workers’ Compensation Act and was not repealed by the enactment of former §§ 57-904, 57-905, or 57-906, 1941 Comp.; former § 57-925, 1941 Comp. served to benefit both the employer and the employee and served a good purpose by bringing to account third party tortfeasors. Rader v. Rhodes, 1944-NMSC-060, 48 N.M. 511, 153 P.2d 516, 1944 N.M. LEXIS 78 (N.M. 1944).
Damages.
Section 52-1-6D NMSA 1978 permits a private right of action by a worker against a workers’ compensation insurer for an intentional, willful refusal to pay compensation benefits; damages sought must be unrelated to the worker’s physical or psychological job-related disability. Russell v. Protective Ins. Co., 107 N.M. 9, 751 P.2d 693, 1988 N.M. LEXIS 79 (1988), superseded by statute as stated in Cruz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 119 N.M. 301, 889 P.2d 1223 (1995) and Meyers v. Western Auto, 2002-NMCA-089, 132 N.M. 675, 54 P.3d 79, 2002 N.M. App. LEXIS 73 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 132 N.M. 551, 52 P.3d 411, 2002 N.M. LEXIS 297 (N.M. 2002).
Because 59A-16-30 NMSA 1978, which establishes a cause of action for damages against an insurer or agent, does not amend the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, as contained in 52-1-6D, 52-1-8, 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, a court erred in not dismissing an injured employee’s cause of action under 59A-16-30 NMSA 1978, even though he alleged that the workers’ compensation insurer for his employer refused to attempt in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of his workers’ compensation claim. Russell v. Protective Ins. Co., 1988-NMSC-025, 107 N.M. 9, 751 P.2d 693, 1988 N.M. LEXIS 79 (N.M. 1988), superseded by statute as stated in Meyers v. Western Auto, 2002-NMCA-089, 132 N.M. 675, 54 P.3d 79, 2002 N.M. App. LEXIS 73 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002), overruled in part as stated in Romero v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., 2015-NMCA-107, 357 P.3d 463, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 85 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
Eligibility.
Where an employer did not exempt himself from the operation of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the employer was conclusively presumed to have accepted its provisions and thus, an employee could sustain a personal injury action against the employer. Addison v. Tessier, 1957-NMSC-002, 62 N.M. 120, 305 P.2d 1067, 1957 N.M. LEXIS 878 (N.M. 1957).
Employees.
Appellate court construed Subsection A of this section to require all incorporated construction employers to abide by the strictures of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), even those who employed only executive employees that elected to individually opt out of coverage under 52-1-7 NMSA 1978; the district court erred in reversing the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Administration, determining that the construction employer was subject to the Act and had to procure the required workers’ compensation insurance. Jackson Constr., Inc. v. Smith, 2012-NMCA-033, 277 P.3d 470, 2012 N.M. App. LEXIS 26 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012).
Where an employee of the New Mexico human services department was attacked and injured at work by an individual whose benefits had been reduced, the employee’s tort claims were barred by 52-1-6, 52-1-8, and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, which were exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act (52-1-1 NMSA 1978). Flores v. Danfelser, 1999-NMCA-091, 127 N.M. 571, 985 P.2d 173, 1999 N.M. App. LEXIS 61 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999), overruled in part, Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148, 2001 N.M. LEXIS 376 (N.M. 2001), overruled in part as stated in Richey v. Hammond Conservancy Dist., No. 32847, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 12 (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2015).
Temporary employer was entitled to immunity from common law tort claims according to the Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-6E NMSA 1978, 52-1-8 NMSA 1978, and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978 because it met the three-part test of special employer in that it was contractually assured that the general employer was to provide workers’ compensation coverage even though there was no specific evidence concerning how the special employer pays for that coverage and in that the worker at issue had signed a contract where he agreed to look to the general employer for his remedy for on-the-job injuries. Vigil v. Digital Equip. Corp., 1996-NMCA-100, 122 N.M. 417, 925 P.2d 883, 1996 N.M. App. LEXIS 82 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).
Decedent’s personal representative was not entitled to receive decedent’s workers’ compensation benefits because the decedent, as a business owner, failed to elect coverage on himself as an employee under 52-1-6B NMSA 1978. Junge v. John D. Morgan Constr. Co., 1994-NMCA-106, 118 N.M. 457, 882 P.2d 48, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 98 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
Error.
Where an employer testified that he had workmen’s compensation insurance, the carrier’s adjuster testified that he investigated the claim of an employee’s death, and an affidavit of the carrier’s regional claims manager averred that the carrier had paid funeral benefits as required by the workmen’s compensation law, the trial court erred in dismissing a wrongful death suit by the employee’s administrator because the employer failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of former 59-10-3, 1953 Comp. and the workmen’s compensation defense provided by former 59-10-4D and 59-10-5, 1953 Comp. were inapplicable. Montano v. Williams, 1976-NMCA-017, 89 N.M. 86, 547 P.2d 569, 1976 N.M. App. LEXIS 554 (N.M. Ct. App.), aff'd, 1976-NMSC-022, 89 N.M. 252, 550 P.2d 264, 1976 N.M. LEXIS 805 (N.M. 1976).
Evidence.
In a worker’s negligence suit for injuries sustained while working in a corporation’s manufacturing plant, the trial court properly concluded that the corporation was entitled to the protection of the exclusivity provisions of this section as the corporation was the worker’s employer. The corporation, through its plant manager, not only controlled the worker’s objectives, but also controlled the worker’s means and methods of his performance. Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp., 2005-NMCA-045, 137 N.M. 339, 110 P.3d 1076, 2005 N.M. App. LEXIS 24 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005).
—Parol evidence.
Where a workman’s compensation insurance application unambiguously stated the dates of coverage on its face, parol evidence was inadmissible to show that the commencement date endorsed on the policy was the result of a clerical mistake; in accord with legislative intent, the former Workman’s Compensation Act was liberally construed to favor compensation. Points v. Wills, 44 N.M. 31, 97 P.2d 374, 1939 N.M. LEXIS 64, 1939 N.M. LEXIS 65 (N.M. 1939).
Exclusive remedy.
Where an employee was injured but not disabled while working for a first employer, then his injury was aggravated while working for the second and third employers, there could not be contribution from the three employers based on theories outside workers’ compensation law because workers’ compensation is an exclusive remedy under 52-1-6E NMSA 1978, although this section allowed a subsequent employer to reduce its payments to avoid overlap of an initial employer’s payments. The liability of the employer(s) depended on when the employee’s disability began, and whether there was proper notice under 52-1-29A NMSA 1978. Tom Growney Equip. Co. v. Jouett, 2005-NMSC-015, 137 N.M. 497, 113 P.3d 320, 2005 N.M. LEXIS 292 (N.M. 2005).
Compensation benefits of the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act do not automatically and instantaneously terminate when an employee is terminated, but continue for a reasonable period while she is winding up her affairs and leaving her place of employment. Thus, the Act provides the exclusive remedy for the employee’s injuries under 52-1-6D, E, 52-1-8 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978. Martin-Martinez v. 6001, Inc., 1998-NMCA-179, 126 N.M. 319, 968 P.2d 1182, 1998 N.M. App. LEXIS 162 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 126 N.M. 532, 972 P.2d 351, 1998 N.M. LEXIS 435 (N.M. 1998).
Two employees of a state agency who were injured in a traffic accident, and had received workers’ compensation benefits, could not maintain an action against the State Highway Department, because the exclusivity provisions of 52-1-6D NMSA 1978 barred their action. Singhas v. New Mexico State Highway Dep't, 1997-NMSC-054, 124 N.M. 42, 946 P.2d 645, 1997 N.M. LEXIS 405 (N.M. 1997).
Plaintiff wife was barred from bringing a loss of consortium claim against respondents, her injured husband’s employer and co-worker, where her claim was precluded by the exclusivity provisions of the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-6, 52-1-8, and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978; her claim was derivative of the injured spouse’s right to recover. Archer v. Roadrunner Trucking, 1997-NMSC-003, 122 N.M. 703, 930 P.2d 1155, 1996 N.M. LEXIS 471 (N.M. 1996).
Laboratory was a statutory employer under 52-1-22 NMSA 1978 because the work that plaintiff was performing under his subcontractor-employer’s contract with the laboratory was to be performed wholly by plaintiff and was in the trade, business, or undertaking of the laboratory; thus, the laboratory was entitled to the exclusivity provisions in 52-1-6D NMSA 1978 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978 of the Workers’ Compensation Act with regard to plaintiff’s personal injury. Quintana v. University of California, 1991-NMCA-016, 111 N.M. 679, 808 P.2d 964, 1991 N.M. App. LEXIS 123 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 111 N.M. 678, 808 P.2d 963, 1991 N.M. LEXIS 85 (N.M. 1991), overruled in part, Harger v. Structural Servs., 1996-NMSC-018, 121 N.M. 657, 916 P.2d 1324, 1996 N.M. LEXIS 153 (N.M. 1996).
Employee’s claim of intentional spoliation of evidence against an employer was not barred by the exclusivity provision of the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-6, 52-1-8, and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978. Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 1995-NMSC-063, 120 N.M. 645, 905 P.2d 185, 1995 N.M. LEXIS 322 (N.M. 1995), overruled in part, Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148, 2001 N.M. LEXIS 376 (N.M. 2001), overruled in part as stated in Richey v. Hammond Conservancy Dist., No. 32847, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 12 (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2015).
New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act, particularly 52-1-8, 52-1-9, and 52-1-6D, expressly makes the remedies provided by the Act the sole and exclusive remedies available to an employee for claims against his employer or insurer. Dickson v. Mountain States Mut. Casualty Co., 1982-NMSC-090, 98 N.M. 479, 650 P.2d 1, 1982 N.M. LEXIS 2884 (N.M. 1982).
Exclusivity provisions.
Defendants did not meet their burden of demonstrating fraudulent joinder in federal court because they had not shown that plaintiff’s claims against another worker were barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of New Mexico’s workers’ compensation statute. Hernandez v. Menlo Logistics, Inc., No. CIV 12-0907 JB/WPL, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156746 (D.N.M. Sept. 30, 2013).
Where plaintiff state employee was injured in a parking lot owned by the New Mexico Department of Transportation (DOT) on her way to her daily commute to work by private bus, the exclusivity provision of the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act, as set forth in this section, did not bar plaintiff’s negligence action against the DOT because the going and coming rule applied under 52-1-19 NMSA 1978. The commuter lot was not provided exclusively for state employees, and plaintiff’s use of the parking lot was totally unrelated to her work duties. Quintero v. State DOT, 2010-NMCA-081, 148 N.M. 903, 242 P.3d 470, 2010 N.M. App. LEXIS 72 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010), cert. quashed, 269 P.3d 904, 2011 N.M. LEXIS 410 (N.M. 2011).
Tort claims brought by an employee attacked at work by a third-party non-employee were barred by the exclusivity provisions of the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-6, 52-1-8, and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978; and her husband’s claims, including loss of consortium, were also similarly barred. Flores v. Danfelser, 1999-NMCA-091, 127 N.M. 571, 985 P.2d 173, 1999 N.M. App. LEXIS 61 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999), overruled in part, Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148, 2001 N.M. LEXIS 376 (N.M. 2001), overruled in part as stated in Richey v. Hammond Conservancy Dist., No. 32847, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 12 (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2015).
Farm laborer.
Farm and ranch laborer exclusion of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 52-1-6(A) was unconstitutional under N.M. Const. art II § 18, where nothing distinguished farm and ranch laborers from other agricultural employees, and the purported government interests of cost savings, administrative convenience, and other justifications related to unique features of agribusiness bore no rational relationship to the New Mexico Workers' Compensation Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 52-1-1- et seq. Rodriguez v. Brand West Dairy, 2016-NMSC-029, 378 P.3d 13, 2016 N.M. LEXIS 150 (N.M. 2016).
Supreme Court of New Mexico's holding that the farm and ranch laborer exclusion contained in N.M. Stat. Ann. § 52-1-6(A) was unconstitutional was given modified prospective application where the reliance interests of employers combined with the practical difficulties that would have resulted from retroactive application were sufficient to overcome the presumption of retroactivity. Rodriguez v. Brand West Dairy, 2016-NMSC-029, 378 P.3d 13, 2016 N.M. LEXIS 150 (N.M. 2016).
Although the Supreme Court of New Mexico's holding that the farm and ranch laborer exclusion contained in N.M. Stat. Ann. § 52-1-6(A) was unconstitutional was given modified prospective application, it applied to the litigants in the instant case for having afforded the Court the opportunity to change an outmoded and unjust rule of law. Rodriguez v. Brand West Dairy, 2016-NMSC-029, 378 P.3d 13, 2016 N.M. LEXIS 150 (N.M. 2016).
Exclusion of farm and ranch laborers from coverage violates workers' rights to equal protection because there is nothing rational about a law that excludes from worker's compensation benefits employees who harvest crops from the field while providing benefits for employees who sort and bag the same crop; there is no substantial relationship between the exclusion and the purported government interests of increased workers' compensation efficiency and lower costs for the agricultural industry. Rodriguez v. Brand West Dairy, 2015-NMCA-097, 356 P.3d 546, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 69 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
Exclusion of farm and ranch laborers from coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act is arbitrary on its face and as applied because workers whose primary duties are essential to the cultivation of crops are considered farm laborers, while workers involved primarily in the processing of the same crops are not; this distinction is seemingly without purpose or reason and leads to absurd results since in some instances, employees working for the same agricultural employer may not all be covered. Rodriguez v. Brand West Dairy, 2015-NMCA-097, 356 P.3d 546, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 69 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
Classification created by the exclusion of farm and ranch laborers from coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act is under-inclusive because the statutes do not exclude all transient or mobile workers from coverage; as to the purported state interest in protecting the agricultural industry from the cost of providing workers' compensation coverage, the legislation is under-inclusive because it does not exclude all agricultural workers. Rodriguez v. Brand West Dairy, 2015-NMCA-097, 356 P.3d 546, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 69 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
Exclusion of farm and ranch laborers from coverage violates workers' rights to equal protection because excluding farm and ranch laborers from workers' compensation coverage directly controverts the purpose and evenhanded philosophy of the Workers' Compensation Act by placing farm and ranch employers at an advantage and denying workers the benefits the Act was intended to provide. Rodriguez v. Brand West Dairy, 2015-NMCA-097, 356 P.3d 546, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 69 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
Holding that exclusion of farm and ranch laborers from coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act violated the workers' rights to equal protection applied to workers' claims that were pending as of March 30, 2012, and that were filed thereafter because the Workers' Compensation Administration was on notice that the district court had declared the exclusion to be unconstitutional on March 30, 2012 and did not appeal that ruling. Rodriguez v. Brand West Dairy, 2015-NMCA-097, 356 P.3d 546, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 69 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
Farm and ranch laborers seeking compensation are similarly situated to other workers who are likewise seeking compensation because both groups consist of workers suffering work-related injuries or disabilities who are in need of indemnity and medical benefits; not only do the distinctions created by the farm and ranch laborers exclusion fail to serve the stated purpose, policy, and philosophy of the Workers' Compensation Act but they result in dissimilar treatment of similarly situated workers. Rodriguez v. Brand West Dairy, 2015-NMCA-097, 356 P.3d 546, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 69 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
Excluding farm and ranch laborers from compensation coverage denies them the benefits the Workers' Compensation Act was intended to provide and circumvents the policy and philosophy of the Act, to balance the interests and rights of the worker and the employer; the exclusion creates classifications that are not based on real differences since workers who perform tasks essential to the cultivation of crops are excluded from coverage, but those performing tasks incidental to farming are included. Rodriguez v. Brand West Dairy, 2015-NMCA-097, 356 P.3d 546, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 69 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
Because there was no basis to conclude that workers belonged to a sensitive class, the court of appeals reviewed the constitutionality of the exclusion of farm and ranch laborers from coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act applying the rational basis test. Rodriguez v. Brand West Dairy, 2015-NMCA-097, 356 P.3d 546, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 69 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
Beekeeping by a worker was part of the harvesting of honey and was thus farm labor, which was exempted from coverage under the Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-6A NMSA 1978. Tanner v. Bosque Honey Farm, 1995-NMCA-053, 119 N.M. 760, 895 P.2d 282, 1995 N.M. App. LEXIS 42 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995).
Determination of whether a particular worker is a farm laborer is based on the nature of the employee’s primary job responsibilities, not the nature of the employer’s business. Similarly, the mere fact of handling an agricultural product is not sufficient to make a particular type of employment farm labor. Holguin v. Billy the Kid Produce, 1990-NMCA-073, 110 N.M. 287, 795 P.2d 92, 1990 N.M. App. LEXIS 54 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).
Whether a particular worker is a farm laborer within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Act is determined by the general character of the worker’s work, rather than his activity on any particular day. Holguin v. Billy the Kid Produce, 1990-NMCA-073, 110 N.M. 287, 795 P.2d 92, 1990 N.M. App. LEXIS 54 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).
Section 52-1-6A NMSA 1978 has been interpreted to exempt only farm and ranch laborers, rather than all the employees of an employer who employs some farm and ranch laborers. Holguin v. Billy the Kid Produce, 1990-NMCA-073, 110 N.M. 287, 795 P.2d 92, 1990 N.M. App. LEXIS 54 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).
Under 52-1-6A NMSA 1978, the employee was not entitled to coverage under the Workmen’s Compensation Act for injuries received because the employee was a farm laborer and therefore was exempt from coverage, even though the employee was performing some service that was not farm labor at the time of his injuries. Cueto v. Stahmann Farms, 1980-NMCA-036, 94 N.M. 223, 608 P.2d 535, 1980 N.M. App. LEXIS 836 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980), overruled, Rodriguez v. Brand West Dairy, 2015-NMCA-097, 356 P.3d 546, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 69 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
To the extent that an employer was operating a commercial dairy, former 59-10-4A, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-6 NMSA 1978) excluded the employer from the Workmen’s Compensation Act to the extent of employment of an employee, who was a farm laborer. Varela v. Mounho, 92 N.M. 147, 584 P.2d 194, 1978 N.M. App. LEXIS 599 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324, 1978 N.M. LEXIS 1110 (N.M. 1978).
Because the employee was clearly a farm laborer, the employee was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits for injuries she sustained while attempting to steady a cow being milked. Varela v. Mounho, 92 N.M. 147, 584 P.2d 194, 1978 N.M. App. LEXIS 599 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324, 1978 N.M. LEXIS 1110 (N.M. 1978).
Liability.
Trial court’s order that rendered summary judgment in favor of a general contractor in a family members’ action for wrongful death of an employee was reversed; the general contractor was not immune from third-party tort liability under the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-6E NMSA 1978, where he failed to show that there was no issue of fact regarding his status as the employer of the deceased employee. Chavez v. Sundt Corp., 1996-NMSC-046, 122 N.M. 78, 920 P.2d 1032, 1996 N.M. LEXIS 251 (N.M. 1996).
Although an employee’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against her employer was not barred under the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-6 NMSA 1978, her claim against individually named defendants was precluded under the Act. Snowdon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 932 F. Supp. 1267, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8497 (D.N.M. 1996).
Employee who was injured when a manlift malfunctioned could maintain a suit against the employer for intentional spoliation of evidence where the employer dissembled the manlift and disposed of it; the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act (52-1-1 NMSA 1978) did not bar the employee’s claim because the employer’s act was intentional and caused a separate and distinct injury that did not arise out of the course of employment. Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 1995-NMSC-063, 120 N.M. 645, 905 P.2d 185, 1995 N.M. LEXIS 322 (N.M. 1995), overruled in part, Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148, 2001 N.M. LEXIS 376 (N.M. 2001), overruled in part as stated in Richey v. Hammond Conservancy Dist., No. 32847, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 12 (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2015).
Under the New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act, an employee of an employer who has complied with the requirements of the Act is not subject to liability under the common law for the injury or death of a coemployee. Matkins v. Zero Refrigerated Lines, 1979-NMCA-095, 93 N.M. 511, 602 P.2d 195, 1979 N.M. App. LEXIS 714 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979), limited, Vigil v. Digital Equip. Corp., 1996-NMCA-100, 122 N.M. 417, 925 P.2d 883, 1996 N.M. App. LEXIS 82 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).
Rancher whose employee was injured in a work-related accident was not liable under former 59-10-4B, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-6 NMSA 1978) for the payment of workmen’s compensation benefits to the employee’s widow because the rancher had not elected to bring itself within the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Nix v. Times Enters., 1972-NMCA-070, 83 N.M. 796, 498 P.2d 683, 1972 N.M. App. LEXIS 792 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972).
Manager’s intentional misconduct.
Former employee’s action for intentional torts and negligence against her former employer and manager, which alleged that the manager broke one of her fingers by slamming a locker door on her hand after firing her, was barred by the exclusionary provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, specifically 52-1-6D, E; 52-1-8 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, because the intentional conduct of the manager was not the intentional conduct of the employer, as there was no evidence that he had an ownership interest or confidential relationship with the employer. Accordingly, the manager was not an alter ego of the employer, the managerial capacity rule was inapplicable, and the employer had not waived the Act’s protection. Martin-Martinez v. 6001, Inc., 1998-NMCA-179, 126 N.M. 319, 968 P.2d 1182, 1998 N.M. App. LEXIS 162 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 126 N.M. 532, 972 P.2d 351, 1998 N.M. LEXIS 435 (N.M. 1998).
Recovery.
Exclusive-remedy provisions, 52-1-6C-E and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978 of the Workers’ Compensation Act prohibited recovery by or on behalf of two state public defenders against the state highway department in tort as a result of an accident that occurred in the scope of their employment. Singhas v. State Highway Dep't, 1995-NMCA-089, 120 N.M. 474, 902 P.2d 1077, 1995 N.M. App. LEXIS 92 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995), aff'd, 1997-NMSC-054, 124 N.M. 42, 946 P.2d 645, 1997 N.M. LEXIS 405 (N.M. 1997).
Remedies.
Where two state employees were traveling for work, were involved in an automobile accident, and one of the employees was killed, the spouse of the deceased employee could not bring an action for loss of consortium against the employer because this remedy was barred by the exclusivity provision of 51-1-6D NMSA 1978. Singhas v. New Mexico State Highway Dep't, 1997-NMSC-054, 124 N.M. 42, 946 P.2d 645, 1997 N.M. LEXIS 405 (N.M. 1997).
Where an injured worker entered into a stipulated settlement with his employer’s general contractor, making him financially whole, in receiving benefits from his employer, the worker surrendered his rights to any other form of compensation from the employer under 52-1-6D NMSA 1978. Apodaca v. Formwork Specialists, 1990-NMCA-102, 110 N.M. 778, 800 P.2d 212, 1990 N.M. App. LEXIS 111 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied, 110 N.M. 749, 799 P.2d 1121, 1990 N.M. LEXIS 331 (N.M. 1990), overruled, Montoya v. AKAL Sec., 1992-NMSC-056, 114 N.M. 354, 838 P.2d 971, 1992 N.M. LEXIS 261 (N.M. 1992).
Where an employee had a compensable claim under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, former 59-10-13.3, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-28 NMSA 1978) by reason of the alleged negligence of his employer, the employee was precluded by former 59-10-4D, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-6 NMSA 1978) from bringing a common law negligence action against the employer because the Act provided the exclusive remedy to the employee under former 59-10-6, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-8 NMSA 1978). Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Montoya, 1978-NMSC-057, 91 N.M. 788, 581 P.2d 1283, 1978 N.M. LEXIS 944 (N.M. 1978).
Injured workman might settle with a third party tortfeasor responsible for his injuries, but when he does so without the knowledge or consent of his employer or his employer’s insurer, he is no longer entitled to workmen’s compensation for the same injuries. Castro v. Bass, 1964-NMSC-094, 74 N.M. 254, 392 P.2d 668, 1964 N.M. LEXIS 2188 (N.M. 1964), overruled, Montoya v. AKAL Sec., 1992-NMSC-056, 114 N.M. 354, 838 P.2d 971, 1992 N.M. LEXIS 261 (N.M. 1992).
Because defendant employer at all times knew that he did not carry workmen’s compensation insurance and had not relieved himself of doing that insuring as provided by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, he could not invoke the doctrine of estoppel as a bar to plaintiff worker’s tort cause of action. Addison v. Tessier, 1957-NMSC-002, 62 N.M. 120, 305 P.2d 1067, 1957 N.M. LEXIS 878 (N.M. 1957).
Common law action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by a minor employee while in the course of his employment was dismissed because of the exclusivity provision in the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Benson v. Export Equip. Corp., 1945-NMSC-044, 49 N.M. 356, 164 P.2d 380, 1945 N.M. LEXIS 430 (N.M. 1945).
Retaliatory discharge.
In the former employee’s action for retaliatory discharge which sought compensatory and punitive damages, the court held that the claim could be asserted independently of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Michaels v. Anglo Am. Auto Auctions, 1994-NMSC-015, 117 N.M. 91, 869 P.2d 279, 1994 N.M. LEXIS 52 (N.M. 1994).
Right of action.
Private right of action for a worker against a workers’ compensation insurer was created by 52-1-6D NMSA 1978 for an intentional, willful refusal to pay compensation benefits, and the damages sought had to be unrelated to the worker’s physical or psychological job-related disability. Russell v. Protective Ins. Co., 1988-NMSC-025, 107 N.M. 9, 751 P.2d 693, 1988 N.M. LEXIS 79 (N.M. 1988), superseded by statute as stated in Meyers v. Western Auto, 2002-NMCA-089, 132 N.M. 675, 54 P.3d 79, 2002 N.M. App. LEXIS 73 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002), overruled in part as stated in Romero v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., 2015-NMCA-107, 357 P.3d 463, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 85 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
Special employers.
District court properly dismissed an employee’s negligence claim on the ground that a company was immune from tort liability, where the employee had made a contract of hire with the company, he performed his work as a graphic designer at the company’s facilities and in support of the company’s marketing efforts, the company provided day-to-day technical direction over the employee, and as a result, the company met the special employer test. Hamberg v. Sandia Corp., 2007-NMCA-078, 142 N.M. 72, 162 P.3d 909, 2007 N.M. App. LEXIS 54 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007), aff'd, 2008-NMSC-015, 143 N.M. 601, 179 P.3d 1209, 2008 N.M. LEXIS 125 (N.M. 2008).
Standing.
In view of the language of the former statute, whether a claimant had received payment or recovered damages from a tortfeasor was the controlling and decisive consideration in whether to allow him to recover workmen’s compensation; the question of whether or not claimant had received the tortfeasor’s payment on the date he filed the workmen’s compensation action was immaterial. Castro v. Bass, 1964-NMSC-094, 74 N.M. 254, 392 P.2d 668, 1964 N.M. LEXIS 2188 (N.M. 1964), overruled, Montoya v. AKAL Sec., 1992-NMSC-056, 114 N.M. 354, 838 P.2d 971, 1992 N.M. LEXIS 261 (N.M. 1992).
Summary judgment.
In a wrongful death case by plaintiff representative of the estate of a deceased employee against defendant employer, summary judgment for the employer was improper because the employer failed to substantially comply with the statutory requirements of 52-1-6C NMSA 1978 that it file proof of insurance coverage with the administration in order to take advantage of the exclusive remedies of the Workers’ Compensation Act (52-1-1 NMSA 1978). The proof of coverage provided by the employer made no mention of either the employer or the employer’s parent company, and as a result, the administration had no record of insurance for the employer. Peterson v. Wells Fargo Armored Servs. Corp., 2000-NMCA-043, 129 N.M. 158, 3 P.3d 135, 2000 N.M. App. LEXIS 34 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 129 N.M. 207, 4 P.3d 35, 2000 N.M. LEXIS 162 (N.M. 2000).
Trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of managers with respect to an employee’s tort action was proper because the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) (52-1-1 NMSA 1978) was the employee’s exclusive remedy pursuant to 52-1-6D, E; 52-1-8 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, and the employer did not waive the protection of the Act; even though the employee had been fired, the injuries she suffered while cleaning out her locker were compensable under the Act. Martin-Martinez v. 6001, Inc., 1998-NMCA-179, 126 N.M. 319, 968 P.2d 1182, 1998 N.M. App. LEXIS 162 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 126 N.M. 532, 972 P.2d 351, 1998 N.M. LEXIS 435 (N.M. 1998).
Statutory employers, as defined by 52-1-22 NMSA 1978 of the Workers’ Compensation Act, fall within the general definition of employers who are subject to the Act’s terms, and who, in return, are immune from tort liability under the Act’s exclusivity provisions, set forth in 52-1-6E, 52-1-8, and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978. Harger v. Structural Servs., 1996-NMSC-018, 121 N.M. 657, 916 P.2d 1324, 1996 N.M. LEXIS 153 (N.M. 1996).
Notes to Unpublished Opinions
Exclusive remedy.
Unpublished decision: Plaintiffs’ negligence claim failed because they had not adequately alleged the elements of a negligence claim against any city defendant, and statutory immunities under the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act and the New Mexico Tort Claims Act protected the city defendants from liability. Tapia v. City of Albuquerque, F. Supp. 2d (D.N.M. Mar. 31, 2014).
Research References and Practice Aids
Cross references.
Employers who come within act, 52-1-2 NMSA 1978.
Worker’s compensation; definition, 52-1-6.1 NMSA 1978.
Uninsured employers’ fund; workers’ compensation administration; additional duties, 52-1-9.1 NMSA 1978.
Employer, 52-1-15 NMSA 1978.
New Mexico Law Review.
Note: Workers’ Compensation: Exclusivity, Common Law Remedies, And The Reconsideration Of The Actual Intent Test—Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., Mariposa Padilla Sivage, 32 N.M. L. Rev. 567 (2002).
Workers’ Compensation—The District Court Should Make The Initial Determination Of Jurisdiction In Workers’ Compensation Cases Involving Intentional Tort Claims — Eldridge v. Circle K Corp., Justin Lesky, 28 N.M. L. Rev. 665 (1998).
Trends In New Mexico Law: 1994-95: Workers’ Compensation Law — New Mexico Clarifies The Meaning Of A Special Employer As Distinct From A Statutory Employer: Rivera v. Sagebrush Sales, Inc., Christine M. Landavazo, 26 N.M. L. Rev. 655 (1996).
Comment: A Comparison Of Workers’ Compensation In The United States And Mexico, Renee L. Camacho, 26 N.M. L. Rev. 133 (1996).
Workers’ Compensation Law — The Sexual Harassment Claim Quandary: Workers’ Compensation As An Inadequate And Unavailable Remedy: Cox v. Chino Mines/Phelps Dodge, Carlos M. Quinones, 24 N.M. L. Rev. 565 (1994).