Exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act which, for purposes of compensation, classify a non-dependent survivor of a deceased employee differently from dependent survivors or ordinary tort victims, did not violate equal protection by limiting the benefits such survivor could receive under 52-1-46A NMSA 1978 because the limitation of benefits is rationally related to the purposes of the act. Sanchez v. M.M. Sundt Constr. Co., 1985-NMCA-087, 103 N.M. 294, 706 P.2d 158, 1985 N.M. App. LEXIS 586 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985).

Generally.

Proximate cause requirement of 52-1-9C NMSA 1978 is supplemented by the natural and direct result requirement of 52-1-28 NMSA 1978. Aragon v. State Corrections Dep't, 1991-NMCA-109, 113 N.M. 176, 824 P.2d 316, 1991 N.M. App. LEXIS 231 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).

Award of six months of workers’ compensation pursuant to former 59-10-25, 1953 Comp. was not res judicata as to the claimant’s application for an extension of the duration of compensation and medical expenses, and the relief granted was justified based on his worsening condition. Segura v. Jack Adams Gen. Contractor, 1958-NMSC-101, 64 N.M. 413, 329 P.2d 432, 1958 N.M. LEXIS 1353 (N.M. 1958).

Agreement.

Where an employee released an employer and its predecessor from a claim under the New Mexico Occupational Disease Disablement Act, the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act, and otherwise, the agreement released the predecessor only in its role as a previous employer, and whether the predecessor and the employer were sufficiently connected so as to be a single corporate employer entitled to the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act and the release, was a matter for a jury in the employee’s action for damages for brucellosis. Garrity v. Overland Sheepskin Co., 1996-NMSC-032, 121 N.M. 710, 917 P.2d 1382, 1996 N.M. LEXIS 205 (N.M. 1996).

Appeal.

Employer argued in a workmen’s compensation case that an employee’s collapse was due to idiopathic sensitivity to tobacco smoke and not to any risk inherent in his employment; but there was evidence that the accident did arise out of the worker’s employment in a smoky environment in a closed space for an eight-hour work day, and it was the function of the trier of fact, and not of the appellate court to weigh the evidence against the eligibility requirement of 52-1-9C NMSA 1978. Schober v. Mountain Bell Tel., 1980-NMCA-113, 96 N.M. 376, 630 P.2d 1231, 1980 N.M. App. LEXIS 928 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).

Applicability.

Worker, who was employed under Medicaid as a personal care attendant for the worker's mentally disabled adult child, was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits because, when the son attacked the worker as the worker was driving home, the worker was not performing service arising out of and in the course of the worker's employment. Begay v. Consumer Direct Pers. Care, 2015-NMCA-025, 344 P.3d 1083, 2014 N.M. App. LEXIS 117 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014), cert. denied, 346 P.3d 370, 2015 N.M. LEXIS 44 (N.M. 2015).

Workers' Compensation Administration (WCA) lacked jurisdiction over a controversy between workers' compensation insurers because the dispute was not a claim that arose under the Workers' Compensation Act; it was not enough that the dispute between insurers generally related to a workers' compensation claim because the case contemplated complex legal issues that the WCA was simply not designed to adjudicate. Jones v. Holiday Inn Express, 2014-NMCA-082, 331 P.3d 992, 2014 N.M. App. LEXIS 70 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014).

By its terms, a dispute between insurers is simply not the type of claim the Workers' Compensation Act covers since it does not involve or affect a worker's claim for compensation; it is not enough that the dispute between insurers generally relates to a workers' compensation claim. Jones v. Holiday Inn Express, 2014-NMCA-082, 331 P.3d 992, 2014 N.M. App. LEXIS 70 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014).

Where an employee was injured but not disabled while working for a first employer, then his injury was aggravated while working for the second and third employers, there could not be contribution from the three employers based on theories outside workers’ compensation law because workers’ compensation is an exclusive remedy under 52-1-6E NMSA 1978, although 52-1-47D NMSA 1978 allowed a subsequent employer to reduce its payments to avoid overlap of an initial employer’s payments. The liability of the employer(s) depended on when the employee’s disability began, and whether there was proper notice under 52-1-29A NMSA 1978. Tom Growney Equip. Co. v. Jouett, 2005-NMSC-015, 137 N.M. 497, 113 P.3d 320, 2005 N.M. LEXIS 292 (N.M. 2005).

Former employees’ sexual harassment suit against their former employer was not barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act (52-1-1 NMSA 1978) because the injuries caused by sexual harassment did not arise out of employment, sexual harassment was not an “accident” that invoked workers’ compensation coverage, sufficient evidence showed that the former employer acted intentionally, and the former employees’ prolonged psychological injuries were not compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999-NMSC-013, 127 N.M. 47, 976 P.2d 999, 1999 N.M. LEXIS 199 (N.M. 1999).

Under 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, the Workers’ Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy for an employee, who was injured when he was struck by a truck driven by a fellow employee 2 miles from the employer’s premises while walking to work. Espinosa v. Albuquerque Publ. Co., 1997-NMCA-072, 123 N.M. 605, 943 P.2d 1058, 1997 N.M. App. LEXIS 65 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).

Employee’s claim of intentional spoliation of evidence against an employer was not barred by the exclusivity provision of the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-6, 52-1-8, and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978. Coleman v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 1995-NMSC-063, 120 N.M. 645, 905 P.2d 185, 1995 N.M. LEXIS 322 (N.M. 1995), overruled in part, Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148, 2001 N.M. LEXIS 376 (N.M. 2001), overruled in part as stated in Richey v. Hammond Conservancy Dist., No. 32847, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 12 (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2015).

Because the heart attack that the workers’ compensation claimant, who was a police officer, sustained was not an injury that arose out of and in the course of his employment within the meaning of 52-1-9, 52-1-19, 52-1-28A(1) NMSA 1978, the claimant was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits; the heart attack did not adequately relate to the claimant’s employment because it occurred while he was jogging as part of a self-directed off-duty athletic activity, over which the employer had no control, in which the claimant was engaged in an effort to meet the qualifications for enrollment in the state law enforcement academy in order to get the certification that 29-7-6B NMSA 1978 required in order for the claimant to transfer from his job as a deputy jailer to a job as a deputy field officer. Meeks v. Eddy County Sheriff's Dep't, 1994-NMCA-134, 118 N.M. 643, 884 P.2d 534, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 129 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 118 N.M. 731, 885 P.2d 1325, 1994 N.M. LEXIS 413 (N.M. 1994).

Claimant’s workers’ compensation case for death benefits under 52-1-46 NMSA 1978 was properly dismissed where her husband’s suicide was not a compensable injury under 52-1-9 NMSA 1978 because it was self-inflicted as was prohibited by 52-1-11 NMSA 1978. Holford v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., Los Alamos Nat'l Lab., 1990-NMCA-066, 110 N.M. 366, 796 P.2d 259, 1990 N.M. App. LEXIS 78 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).

Carpenter who framed a house for a general contractor, hired and fired his own workers, owned his own equipment, and received a lump-sum payment at the end of the job was not entitled to benefits under the New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, for an accidental injury that arose out of and in the course of his work for the general contractor because the carpenter was an independent contractor and not a workman as defined by 52-1-16 NMSA 1978. Dibble v. Garcia, 1982-NMCA-040, 98 N.M. 21, 644 P.2d 535, 1982 N.M. App. LEXIS 836 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 50, 644 P.2d 1039, 1982 N.M. LEXIS 2931 (N.M. 1982).

Teacher who injured her knee while skiing was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits where she was acting as a chaperone to the students on a ski team at the time of the injury and was skiing recreationally as she waited for them. Velkovitz v. Penasco Indep. Sch. Dist., 1981-NMSC-075, 96 N.M. 577, 633 P.2d 685, 1981 N.M. LEXIS 2378 (N.M. 1981).

Former 59-10-6 and 59-10-5, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-9 and 52-1-8 NMSA 1978) did not make void an entire contract between an oil corporation and an employer but only those provisions related to the employer’s indemnification of the corporation; therefore, the employer was not subject to liability in addition to the Workers’ Compensation Act based on an action brought by an administrator against the corporation for an employee’s wrongful death. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Rota-Cone Field Operating Co., 1972-NMCA-167, 84 N.M. 483, 505 P.2d 78, 1972 N.M. App. LEXIS 885 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972), rev'd, 505 P.2d 855 (N.M. 1973).

Driller’s right to the compensation provided for in the Workmen’s Compensation Act was for any personal injury accidentally sustained or death resulting therefrom, and obtained in all cases when the conditions and circumstances stated and required by former § 57-906, 1941 Comp. were present. Wilson v. Rowan Drilling Co., 55 N.M. 81, 227 P.2d 365, 1950 N.M. LEXIS 655, 1950 N.M. LEXIS 656, 1951 N.M. LEXIS 706 (N.M. 1950).

Burden of proof.

Government failed to carry its burden of establishing that an individual affiliated with the government’s jobs program was not acting within the scope of his employment when he bit a plaintiff’s finger while intoxicated while plaintiff was taking him to isolation because the record on appeal was devoid of information about what the individual was doing when he was ordered to the isolation area and because the government did not offer any evidence of the nature of the individual’s authorized employment; without such evidence, the court was left to speculate that the individual’s intoxicated state was an abandonment of his work. Nichols v. United States, 796 F.2d 361, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 27217 (10th Cir. N.M. 1986).

Common law.

Where an employee’s workers’ compensation claim was denied on the grounds that he was not in the course of his employment at the time of the accident and that the accident was proximately caused by his voluntary intoxication, his tort claim was not barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-6E and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978. Sanchez v. San Juan Concrete Co., 1997-NMCA-068, 123 N.M. 537, 943 P.2d 571, 1997 N.M. App. LEXIS 63 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).

Summary judgment was found to have been properly granted in favor of an employee and employer in a tort action brought by another employee, which was based on a battery claim, because the common-law cause of action was not permitted under 52-1-8 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978 since the act was covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 to 52-1-69 NMSA 1978; 52-1-6D, 52-1-8, and 52-1-56C NMSA 1978 were found to accord immunity for all causes of action, all common-law rights and remedies, for negligence or wrong. Gallegos v. Chastain, 1981-NMCA-014, 95 N.M. 551, 624 P.2d 60, 1981 N.M. App. LEXIS 683 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981), overruled in part, Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148, 2001 N.M. LEXIS 376 (N.M. 2001), overruled in part as stated in Richey v. Hammond Conservancy Dist., No. 32847, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 12 (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2015).

Compliance.

Wrongful death action brought against an employer by the administrator of a deceased employee’s estate was not foreclosed by the exclusivity provisions of the workmen’s compensation act, former 59-10-1, 1953 Comp. et seq. because the employer failed to substantially comply with former 59-10-3, 1953 Comp. Williams v. Montano, 1976-NMSC-022, 89 N.M. 252, 550 P.2d 264, 1976 N.M. LEXIS 805 (N.M. 1976).

Construction.

Court’s interpretation of the exclusive remedy rule holding that the employer indirectly paid for the employee’s workmen’s compensation insurance premiums through payment to the temporary agency for the employee’s services, which agency purchased the requisite insurance, did not go against the established rule that the court was to liberally construe the act in favor of the worker. Garcia v. Smith Pipe & Steel Co., 1988-NMCA-078, 107 N.M. 808, 765 P.2d 1176, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 106 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 673, 763 P.2d 689, 1988 N.M. LEXIS 266 (N.M. 1988).

Employer was properly granted summary judgment in connection with a claim filed by an employee against the employer for alleged malpractice by his two treating physicians, even though a former version of 52-1-49B NMSA 1978 gave the employer the option of holding the employer liable or of suing the physicians, because, pursuant to the authority of various portions of the New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-6D NMSA 1978, 52-1-8 NMSA 1978, and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, the New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy and compensation benefits were already being paid by the employer. Fields v. D & R Tank & Equip. Co., 1985-NMCA-061, 103 N.M. 141, 703 P.2d 918, 1985 N.M. App. LEXIS 575 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985).

Where an employer telephoned an employee at home to terminate her, and she suffered a mental breakdown, the injury was not in the course of employment, and compensability was not provided by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 to 52-1-69 NMSA 1978; the exclusivity provision of the Act, 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, provided the exclusive mechanism for personal injury recovery and did not establish a remedy for breach of contract. Hernandez v. Home Educ. Livelihood Program, 1982-NMCA-079, 98 N.M. 125, 645 P.2d 1381, 1982 N.M. App. LEXIS 875 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794, 1982 N.M. LEXIS 2940 (N.M. 1982).

In former C.S. 1929 § 156-112(1), unless the context otherwise required, the words ‘injuries sustained in extrahazardous occupations or pursuit,’ as used in former § 156-112 included death resulting from injury. Vukovich v. St. Louis, Rocky Mountain & Pac. Co., 1936-NMSC-053, 40 N.M. 374, 60 P.2d 356, 1936 N.M. LEXIS 54 (N.M. 1936).

Construction with other law.

Plain meaning of 51-1-8C NMSA 1978 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978 is that the New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act), 52-1-1 through 52-1-69 NMSA 1978, is an exclusive remedy unless otherwise provided for in the Act. Kent Nowlin Constr. Co. v. Gutierrez, 1982-NMSC-123, 99 N.M. 389, 658 P.2d 1116, 1982 N.M. LEXIS 3038 (N.M. 1982).

Employer’s failure to file a copy of its workmen’s compensation insurance policy as required by former 59-10-3, 1953 Comp. until 76 days after a worker was killed in a work-related accident did not permit the worker’s administratrix to maintain a wrongful death action against the employer, because subjecting the employer to such liability for a technical delay did not further the statutory purpose of the Workmen’s Compensation Act to cause employers to obtain compensation protection; even though the failure to file was a misdemeanor under former 59-10-25D, 1953 Comp. and former 59-10-31, 1953 Comp. subjected non-filing employers to injunctions from continuing their business operations until they complied, the employer’s liability was limited to the benefits set forth in the Act by former 59-10-4F, 59-10-5, and 59-10-6, 1953 Comp. Quintana v. Nolan Bros., 1969-NMCA-083, 80 N.M. 589, 458 P.2d 841, 1969 N.M. App. LEXIS 605 (N.M. Ct. App. 1969).

Injured employee’s common law negligence action against his employer was barred by former 59-10-6, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-9 NMSA 1978), where the employer had substantially complied with former 59-10-3, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-5 NMSA 1978) by filing with a district court an insurance policy that provided a plan of continuous coverage for a three-year period, and the insurer notified the employer two months before the employee was injured that the policy would be renewed for one year in compliance with that agreement, even though the actual policy that provided coverage for the ensuing year was not filed until 40 days after the employee’s injury. Mirabal v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 77 N.M. 576, 425 P.2d 740, 1967 N.M. LEXIS 2658 (N.M. 1967).

In a workmen’s compensation action, a certain section of the statute, relative to liability to a workman of any person other than the employer for damages inflicted, had not been repealed by subsequent legislation. Rader v. Rhodes, 1944-NMSC-060, 48 N.M. 511, 153 P.2d 516, 1944 N.M. LEXIS 78 (N.M. 1944).

Contracts.

The New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, provides the exclusive mechanism for personal injury recovery. It does not establish a remedy for breach of contract. Hernandez v. Home Educ. Livelihood Program, 1982-NMCA-079, 98 N.M. 125, 645 P.2d 1381, 1982 N.M. App. LEXIS 875 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794, 1982 N.M. LEXIS 2940 (N.M. 1982).

Elements.

Under former 59-10-6, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-9 NMSA 1978), where an employee was killed in a car accident on the way home while he was carrying a report that his immediate supervisor was to pick up the following morning at the employee’s house, sign, and deliver to the employer’s offices, the workmen’s compensation claim by the employee’s widow was improperly denied because the employee was performing a service that arose out of and in the course of his employment and a statutory exclusion of going and coming from work did not apply. Brown v. Arapahoe Drilling Co., 1962-NMSC-051, 70 N.M. 99, 370 P.2d 816, 1962 N.M. LEXIS 1549 (N.M. 1962).

Eligibility.

Workers’ compensation judge erred in denying a widow’s claim for medical and survivor benefits because a police officer’s death arose out of and in the course of his employment; there was a sufficient nexus between his actions in undertaking the rescue of a drowning child while off duty and the duties of his employment as a police officer. Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Dep't, 2014-NMCA-019, 317 P.3d 866, 2013 N.M. App. LEXIS 77 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013).

Off-duty police officer’s accidental death while rescuing a drowning child arose out of and within the course of his employment, and therefore he was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits because there was a sufficient nexus between his actions and the duties of his employment. Rendering assistance to a drowning child was among those risks to which an on-duty officer would be expected to respond and the officer was not prohibited by employer regulations from undertaking the rescue in his official capacity. Schultz v. Pojoaque Tribal Police Dep't, No. 28508, 2013 N.M. App. LEXIS 81 (N.M. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2013).

Where a supervisor’s treatment of an employee amounted to a form of intentional and unjustified harassment, a prima facie tort claim for emotional and mental distress was not barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act and was properly submitted to a jury. Because the employee’s psychological disability had been determined by a workers’ compensation judge to have been incurred outside the provisions of 52-1-24 NMSA 1978 and to be noncompensable under the act, the exclusivity provision of the act, 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, did not bar the employee’s tort claim. Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., 1995-NMCA-070, 120 N.M. 343, 901 P.2d 761, 1995 N.M. App. LEXIS 74 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 120 N.M. 68, 898 P.2d 120, 1995 N.M. LEXIS 256 (N.M. 1995).

Pursuant to 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, psychogenic pain disorder, insofar as it is a psychological disability, is compensable so long as it was proximately caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Gutierrez v. Amity Leather Prods. Co., 1988-NMCA-006, 107 N.M. 26, 751 P.2d 710, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 3 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).

Where an employer telephoned an employee at home to terminate her, and she suffered a mental breakdown, the injury was not in the course of employment, and compensability was not provided by the Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-9 NMSA 1978. Hernandez v. Home Educ. Livelihood Program, 1982-NMCA-079, 98 N.M. 125, 645 P.2d 1381, 1982 N.M. App. LEXIS 875 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794, 1982 N.M. LEXIS 2940 (N.M. 1982).

Where a corporate executive and the majority shareholder of a corporation was performing non-executive work that was ordinarily performed by workmen when he fell and suffered fatal injuries, he was a workman at the time of the accident, notwithstanding his stock ownership and his executive position, and his wife was entitled to receive workmen’s compensation benefits. Shillinglaw v. Owen Shillinglaw Fuel Co., 1962-NMSC-047, 70 N.M. 65, 370 P.2d 502, 1962 N.M. LEXIS 1546 (N.M. 1962).

Employees.

Where an employee of the New Mexico human services department was attacked and injured at work by an individual whose benefits had been reduced, the employee’s tort claims were barred by 52-1-6, 52-1-8, and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, which were exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Flores v. Danfelser, 1999-NMCA-091, 127 N.M. 571, 985 P.2d 173, 1999 N.M. App. LEXIS 61 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999), overruled in part, Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148, 2001 N.M. LEXIS 376 (N.M. 2001), overruled in part as stated in Richey v. Hammond Conservancy Dist., No. 32847, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 12 (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2015).

In plaintiff’s personal injury action against a non-profit corporation and a volunteer, the corporation failed to show that it was plaintiff’s statutory employer and thus immune from the action under the exclusivity provisions of the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act where the trial court did not direct as a matter of law that the corporation controlled the details of tree cutting by plaintiff’s employer as argued by the corporation, where any finding of local control sufficient to merit imposition of a duty of care on the corporation would not necessarily be sufficient to automatically make it a statutory employer, and where the corporation presented no evidence to establish that its relationship with plaintiff and his employer should be deemed subject to the Act. Enriquez v. Cochran, 1998-NMCA-157, 126 N.M. 196, 967 P.2d 1136, 1998 N.M. App. LEXIS 140 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 1998-NMCA-157, 126 N.M. 532, 972 P.2d 351, 1998 N.M. LEXIS 355 (N.M. 1998).

Evidence.

—Insufficient.

Salesmen, who were killed in a plane crash while on a social trip, which they won in an employer-sponsored contest, were not entitled to benefits under the New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act where the court noted that the employees were not engaged in compulsory social activity and that during the flight the employees were not fulfilling any duties of their employment; however, the appellate court found that the next of kin could pursue with a wrongful death claim. Beckham v. Brown, 1983-NMCA-051, 100 N.M. 1, 664 P.2d 1014, 1983 N.M. App. LEXIS 709 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).

Where an employee had finished working, had clocked out, and slipped and fell as she left the store where she worked, and she did not prove that her employer was negligent, compensation for her injury was precluded by 52-1-9 NMSA 1978 and 52-1-19 NMSA 1978 since her injury would have been compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1, et seq. NMSA 1978, only if it was both “arising out of” and “in the course of” employment, but compensation was not allowed under the “going and coming” rule where her injury occurred while she was leaving work, and the trial court’s award of compensation was reversed. Romero v. S. S. Kresge Co., 1981-NMCA-001, 95 N.M. 484, 623 P.2d 998, 1981 N.M. App. LEXIS 677 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981), overruled, Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1987-NMSC-007, 105 N.M. 503, 734 P.2d 743, 1987 N.M. LEXIS 3520 (N.M. 1987).

Trial court erred in awarding an employee workers’ compensation because there was no substantial evidence to establish that as a medical probability the employee’s disability was the natural and direct result of the work-related accident that he had, and the employee’s doctor was unable to positively say that the employee’s injury from the accident was the proximate cause of the employee’s present disability or that it was not the proximate cause. Gammon v. Ebasco Corp., 1965-NMSC-015, 74 N.M. 789, 399 P.2d 279, 1965 N.M. LEXIS 1500 (N.M. 1965).

—Sufficient.

Circumstantial evidence alone was sufficient to prove that a dairyman was kidnapped and assaulted at work for purposes of receiving workmen’s compensation for accidental injury, although he suffered amnesia after the attack. Sena v. Continental Casualty Co., 1982-NMCA-060, 97 N.M. 753, 643 P.2d 622, 1982 N.M. App. LEXIS 841 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982).

Exclusive remedy.

Where supervisors convinced police officers to stage a mock arrest of an employee, the New Mexico Workers Compensation Act (WCA) barred the tort claims against the supervisors and the employer because (1) the employee’s injuries arose out of employment since the actions amounted to horseplay, (2) there was no willfulness since the supervisors considered the consequences of the mock arrest and in no way expected the employee to suffer psychological injury, and (3) the alleged injuries fell within the scope of the WCA. Fuerschbach v. Southwest Airlines Co., 439 F.3d 1197, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 5108 (10th Cir. N.M. 2006).

Pursuant to the Michaels decision by the New Mexico supreme court, the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act [52-1-1 NMSA 1978] is exclusive when it applies. Rubio v. McAnally Enters., LLC, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16272 (D.N.M. 2005).

Defendant residential center for the mentally disabled was entitled to summary judgment on tort claims by an employee who suffered a premature birth after being kicked in the stomach by a resident. Worker’s compensation was her exclusive remedy, and as there was no intentional or willful action on the part of the residential center, the Delgado exception did not apply. Paehl v. Lincoln County Care Ctr., Inc., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30349 (D.N.M. 2004).

Compensation benefits of the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act do not automatically and instantaneously terminate when an employee is terminated, but continue for a reasonable period while she is winding up her affairs and leaving her place of employment. Thus, the Act provides the exclusive remedy for the employee’s injuries under 52-1-6D, E; 52-1-8 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978. Martin-Martinez v. 6001, Inc., 1998-NMCA-179, 126 N.M. 319, 968 P.2d 1182, 1998 N.M. App. LEXIS 162 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 126 N.M. 532, 972 P.2d 351, 1998 N.M. LEXIS 435 (N.M. 1998).

Under 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, the right to compensation under the workmen’s compensation act is in lieu of any other liability whatsoever, to any and all persons whomsoever, for any personal injury accidentally sustained or death that resulted therefrom. City of Artesia v. Carter, 1980-NMCA-006, 94 N.M. 311, 610 P.2d 198, 1980 N.M. App. LEXIS 808 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 628, 614 P.2d 545, 1980 N.M. LEXIS 2802 (N.M. 1980).

Exclusivity provisions.

Employee’s case against employers was not brought outside the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act because while the employers’ conduct might have been negligent based on the failure to implement safety measures, the employee had successfully performed the task resulting in the accident several times previously; the conduct was not as egregious as that in Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, P24, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148 because the employee in Delgado had never been trained to perform the task at issue and the Delgado employer demonstrated profit-motivated disregard for easily implemented safety measures. May v. DCP Midstream, L.P., 2010-NMCA-087, 148 N.M. 595, 241 P.3d 193, 2010 N.M. App. LEXIS 121 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010), cert. quashed, 269 P.3d 904, 2011 N.M. LEXIS 394 (N.M. 2011).

In the Michaels decision, the New Mexico supreme court first recognized retaliatory discharge for filing a workers compensation. Based on a 1991 amendment to the Workers’ Compensation Act [52-1-1 NMSA 1978] that prohibited discharging an employee for filing a claim, the court held that: (1) the amendment provides a clear public policy statement that could serve as a predicate for retaliatory discharge, (2) the statute’s exclusive remedy provision does not apply to a claim of retaliatory discharge, and therefore, (3) an independent cause of action should be recognized to protect New Mexico workers who file compensation claims. Rubio v. McAnally Enters., LLC, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16272 (D.N.M. 2005).

Tort claims brought by an employee attacked at work by a third-party non-employee were barred by the exclusivity provisions of the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-6, 52-1-8, and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978; and her husband’s claims, including loss of consortium, were also similarly barred. Flores v. Danfelser, 1999-NMCA-091, 127 N.M. 571, 985 P.2d 173, 1999 N.M. App. LEXIS 61 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999), overruled in part, Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148, 2001 N.M. LEXIS 376 (N.M. 2001), overruled in part as stated in Richey v. Hammond Conservancy Dist., No. 32847, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 12 (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2015).

Because 59A-16-30 NMSA 1978, which establishes a cause of action for damages against an insurer or agent, does not amend the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, as contained in 52-1-6D, 52-1-8, 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, a court erred in not dismissing an injured employee’s cause of action under 59A-16-30 NMSA 1978, even though he alleged that the workers’ compensation insurer for his employer refused to attempt in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of his workers’ compensation claim. Russell v. Protective Ins. Co., 1988-NMSC-025, 107 N.M. 9, 751 P.2d 693, 1988 N.M. LEXIS 79 (N.M. 1988), superseded by statute as stated in Meyers v. Western Auto, 2002-NMCA-089, 132 N.M. 675, 54 P.3d 79, 2002 N.M. App. LEXIS 73 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002), overruled in part as stated in Romero v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., 2015-NMCA-107, 357 P.3d 463, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 85 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).

Findings.

Under former § 57-912(l), 1941 Comp. (now 52-1-9 NMSA 1978), an automobile accident that occurred when an employee was traveling to the employment site was held to be incurred in the course of the employee’s employment because the employee was on call 24 hours per day and because the employer had paid for the employee’s means of transportation, which was in a dangerous condition. Parr v. New Mexico State Highway Dep't, 1950-NMSC-016, 54 N.M. 126, 215 P.2d 602, 1950 N.M. LEXIS 598 (N.M. 1950).

Indemnity.

Exclusive remedy provisions under former 59-10-5 and 59-10-6, 1953 Comp., applied to the negligence claim in which the oil lease owner alleged a breach of contract by the employer, which worked for the owner, and that sought indemnity from the employer regarding any damages for which the owner was held liable as to the fire in which two workers of the employer died and a third was injured; there was only an implied agreement that the employer would not have been negligent, former 59-10-5, 1953 Comp., explicitly limited the employer’s liability and destroyed the common-law right of indemnity, and subjecting the employer to liability beyond that to which it is liable under the Act would have directly contravened the purpose of the Act regarding the limitation of the employer’s liability. Royal Indem. Co. v. Southern Cal. Petroleum Corp., 1960-NMSC-253, 67 N.M. 137, 353 P.2d 358, 1960 N.M. LEXIS 1161 (N.M. 1960).

Instructions.

Where supervisor’s treatment of employee amounted to intentional and unjustified harassment, because employee’s psychological disability was determined by a workers’ compensation judge to have been incurred outside the provisions of 52-1-24 NMSA 1978 and to be noncompensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, a prima facie tort claim for emotional and mental distress was not barred by 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, the exclusive remedy provision of the Act, and the claim was properly submitted to a jury under instructions contained in UJI 13-1631, not the instructions contained in UJI 13-1628. Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., 1995-NMCA-070, 120 N.M. 343, 901 P.2d 761, 1995 N.M. App. LEXIS 74 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 120 N.M. 68, 898 P.2d 120, 1995 N.M. LEXIS 256 (N.M. 1995).

Jurisdiction.

Where an injured employee missed over 52 weeks of work, her employment contract stated that a disability leave could be terminated after 52 weeks, and she was terminated from her employment, the employer’s motion to dismiss pursuant to N.M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), properly was granted; the employer and employee both having been covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 to 52-1-69 NMSA 1978, all the employee’s rights and remedies were defined exclusively by 52-1-9 NMSA 1978. Williams v. Amax Chem. Corp., 1986-NMSC-041, 104 N.M. 293, 720 P.2d 1234, 1986 N.M. LEXIS 2960 (N.M. 1986), overruled, Michaels v. Anglo Am. Auto Auctions, 1994-NMSC-015, 117 N.M. 91, 869 P.2d 279, 1994 N.M. LEXIS 52 (N.M. 1994).

In order to confer jurisdiction in the district courts, an employer must have either failed or refused to make compensation payments to an injured workman as provided in the New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act before he is entitled to file a claim. Therefore, a district court lacked jurisdiction to hear an employee’s suit to enforce his employer’s payment of workmen’s compensation award under former § 57-913 where the employer had not failed or refused to make payments due under former § 57-918. State ex rel. Mountain States Mut. Casualty Co. v. Swope, 1954-NMSC-082, 58 N.M. 553, 273 P.2d 750, 1954 N.M. LEXIS 1164 (N.M. 1954).

Liability.

Trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ wrongful death suit against an employer because the exclusive remedy was through the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act, pursuant to Subsection C of this section; the continuous exposure to pigeons and pigeon feces while working in a warehouse was a significant cause, if not the cause, of the worker’s injury. It was because of the worker’s employment that the worker contracted psittacosis and died. Castillo v. Caprock Pipe & Supply, Inc., 2012-NMCA-085, 285 P.3d 1072, 2012 N.M. App. LEXIS 52 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 295 P.3d 599, 2012 N.M. LEXIS 286 (N.M. 2012).

Former 59-10-6, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-9 NMSA 1978), which provides that an employer shall not be subject to any other liability whatsoever, is all inclusive and prohibits a third person from seeking to impose additional liability on an employer. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Rota-Cone Field Operating Co., 1972-NMCA-167, 84 N.M. 483, 505 P.2d 78, 1972 N.M. App. LEXIS 885 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972), rev'd, 505 P.2d 855 (N.M. 1973).

Plaintiff worker was entitled to workmen’s compensation benefits and was not entitled to sue in tort against defendant contractors because under former 59-10-5 and 59-10-6, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-8 NMSA 1978 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978), the worker was an employee as he was performing work for the contractors when he was injured and he was under the direction and control of the contractor’s field engineer. Shipman v. MacCo Corp., 1964-NMSC-091, 74 N.M. 174, 392 P.2d 9, 1964 N.M. LEXIS 2162 (N.M. 1964).

Explicit language of former § 57-905, 1941 Comp. (now 52-1-8 NMSA 1978) and § 57-906, 1941 Comp. (now 52-1-9 NMSA 1978), precluded a trucking company’s claim against an employer for contribution for injuries suffered by an employee. Hill Lines, Inc. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 222 F.2d 854, 1955 U.S. App. LEXIS 3892 (10th Cir. N.M. 1955).

Manager’s intentional misconduct.

Former employee’s action for intentional torts and negligence against her former employer and manager, which alleged that the manager broke one of her fingers by slamming a locker door on her hand after firing her, was barred by the exclusionary provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, specifically 52-1-6D, E; 52-1-8 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, because the intentional conduct of the manager was not the intentional conduct of the employer, as there was no evidence that he had an ownership interest or confidential relationship with the employer. Accordingly, the manager was not an alter ego of the employer, the managerial capacity rule was inapplicable, and the employer had not waived the Act’s protection. Martin-Martinez v. 6001, Inc., 1998-NMCA-179, 126 N.M. 319, 968 P.2d 1182, 1998 N.M. App. LEXIS 162 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 126 N.M. 532, 972 P.2d 351, 1998 N.M. LEXIS 435 (N.M. 1998).

Negligence.

Where the employee received workmen’s compensation benefits after being injured in a work-related truck accident with his co-employees, the trial court erred in dismissing his negligence action against the co-employees because the action was not barred by the provisions of former 59-10-5 and 59-10-6, 1953 Comp., as those provisions dealt only with the exclusiveness of the remedy between the employer and the employee. Hockett v. Chapman, 1961-NMSC-163, 69 N.M. 324, 366 P.2d 850, 1961 N.M. LEXIS 1659 (N.M. 1961).

Reimbursement provisions in former 59-10-25, 1953 Comp., which was designed to prevent a workmen’s compensation claimant from collecting a double recovery and to allow an employer or an insurer to recover the cost of the claimant’s benefits from a liable third party, in the New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act applied despite the employer’s negligence regarding the fire in which two claimants were killed and a third was injured and the insurer had a right of subrogation as to the owner of the oil lease, which had hired the employer, where the fire occurred; this ruling was partially based on the fact that former 59-10-25, 1953 Comp., was silent as to a circumstance in which an employer was negligent. Royal Indem. Co. v. Southern Cal. Petroleum Corp., 1960-NMSC-253, 67 N.M. 137, 353 P.2d 358, 1960 N.M. LEXIS 1161 (N.M. 1960).

Pleadings.

Since the complaint contained no genuine dispute about the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act [52-1-1 NMSA 1978] on its face, the act was present only indirectly as evidence of public policy. As a result, the former employee’s claim of retaliatory discharge did not arise under the act. Rubio v. McAnally Enters., LLC, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16272 (D.N.M. 2005).

Post-injury employment.

Workmen’s compensation claimant’s background, his work experience, training, and education were in a specialized area of electronics, but since his collapse, and because of his allergic reaction to tobacco smoke, he has been unable to obtain a job that would utilize his electronics skills; therefore, the claimant was disabled, and the existence of post-injury employment did not necessarily disqualify the workman from disability benefits. Post injury employment is evidence going to the question of whether a disability exists, but compensation for disability depends on the inability to perform some of the work for which the workman is fitted, not on whether or not the workman is employed. Schober v. Mountain Bell Tel., 1980-NMCA-113, 96 N.M. 376, 630 P.2d 1231, 1980 N.M. App. LEXIS 928 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).

Psychological disability.

Under 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, psychogenic pain disorder, insofar as it is a psychological disability, is compensable so long as it was proximately caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Gutierrez v. Amity Leather Prods. Co., 1988-NMCA-006, 107 N.M. 26, 751 P.2d 710, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 3 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).

Remedies.

New Mexico’s Workers’ Compensation Act [52-1-1 NMSA 1978] does not create a civil remedy for retaliatory discharge. Rubio v. McAnally Enters., LLC, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16272 (D.N.M. 2005).

Public defenders, as state employees, were barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of 52-1-6C through E NMSA 1978 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978 from recovering against the highway department in tort for injuries suffered in the course and scope of their employment. Singhas v. State Highway Dep't, 1995-NMCA-089, 120 N.M. 474, 902 P.2d 1077, 1995 N.M. App. LEXIS 92 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995), aff'd, 1997-NMSC-054, 124 N.M. 42, 946 P.2d 645, 1997 N.M. LEXIS 405 (N.M. 1997).

An employee was entitled to workmen’s compensation benefits under 52-1-9 NMSA 1978 where his injuries arose out of in the course of his employment as he pushed a company truck that he was authorized to use in order to alleviate congestion for the employer’s benefit. Wilson v. Richardson Ford Sales, 1981-NMSC-123, 97 N.M. 226, 638 P.2d 1071, 1981 N.M. LEXIS 2412 (N.M. 1981).

Former 52-1-56C NMSA 1978 operated to prevent the employee from recovering damages from the wrongdoer as well as from his employer for the negligence or wrong of any person other than the employer; the employee’s settlement of his malpractice suit against doctor raised issues of fact that supported the denial of the employee’s motion to dismiss in the employer’s insurer’s action for reimbursement. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sydow, 1981-NMCA-121, 97 N.M. 51, 636 P.2d 322, 1981 N.M. App. LEXIS 777 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).

Where an employee was struck by a security guard as the employee was leaving the employer’s premises, the employee was awarded workmen’s compensation benefits; however, because the workmen’s compensation law was exclusive, the employee had no right to bring an action in common law negligence against his employer. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Montoya, 1978-NMSC-057, 91 N.M. 788, 581 P.2d 1283, 1978 N.M. LEXIS 944 (N.M. 1978).

Former 59-10-5, 1953 Comp. of the New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act did not preclude a farm laborer from filing a negligence suit against his employers for the damages the laborer suffered in a work-related injury, because former 59-10-4, 1953 Comp. exempted farm laborers from the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Thompson v. Dale, 1955-NMSC-040, 59 N.M. 290, 283 P.2d 623, 1955 N.M. LEXIS 1021 (N.M. 1955).

Legislative intent of former § 57-913, 1941 Comp., is that a claimant’s right to bring suit to enforce payment of a workmen’s compensation award matures upon a failure to pay compensation when due, whether or not that failure is intentional or inadvertent. Therefore, although an adjuster for an employer’s carrier threatened that an injured employee’s regular installments would stop if he did not choose to settle, the employee’s suit to enforce his employer’s payment of workmen’s compensation award under the terms of former § 57-918, 1941 Comp., was filed prematurely because the payments had not stopped. State ex rel. Mountain States Mut. Casualty Co. v. Swope, 1954-NMSC-082, 58 N.M. 553, 273 P.2d 750, 1954 N.M. LEXIS 1164 (N.M. 1954).

Requirements.

Complaint’s allegations, upon which defendants solely relied to carry their burden of establishing fraudulent joinder, did not indicate that defendants complied with the insurance provisions, as required by this statute. Thus, defendants had not met their burden of demonstrating fraudulent joinder because they had not shown that plaintiff’s claims against another worker were barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers’ compensation statute. Hernandez v. Menlo Logistics, Inc., No. CIV 12-0907 JB/WPL, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156746 (D.N.M. Sept. 30, 2013).

Under 52-1-9C NMSA 1978, which requires that an injury be proximately caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and 52-1-28B NMSA 1978, which added that the injury must be the natural and direct result of the accident, a worker could not establish her entitlement to benefits merely by showing that her present disability was a consequence of the aggravation of the original injury; she needed to demonstrate that the injury was the direct and natural result of the original accident and the normal physical strains of daily life. Gomez v. Bernalillo County Clerk's Office, 1994-NMCA-102, 118 N.M. 449, 882 P.2d 40, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 106 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).

Principles of “arising out of” and “in the course of his employment” within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-9 NMSA 1978 must exist simultaneously at the time of the injury in order for compensation to be awarded. Mine worker’s injury that occurred when he was struck by an underground rock fall arose out of a risk incident to his employment, and since it occurred during his period of employment and at his assigned work area, while he was completing the duties of a miner, his injury occurred in the course of his employment. Garcia v. Homestake Mining Co., 1992-NMCA-018, 113 N.M. 508, 828 P.2d 420, 1992 N.M. App. LEXIS 15 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).

Where an employee suffered a mental injury due to the loss of his job, the employee was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits, because a mental injury due to the loss of his job was not an accidental injury arising out of his employment. Kern v. Ideal Basic Indus., 1984-NMCA-099, 101 N.M. 801, 689 P.2d 1272, 1984 N.M. App. LEXIS 712 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984).

Under the New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, whether an accident arose out of and in the course of employment is a question of law; “arise out of” and “in the course of” are two distinct requirements. Hernandez v. Home Educ. Livelihood Program, 1982-NMCA-079, 98 N.M. 125, 645 P.2d 1381, 1982 N.M. App. LEXIS 875 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794, 1982 N.M. LEXIS 2940 (N.M. 1982).

There is no requirement that there be a physical tissue change for there to be a compensable disability within the scope of 52-1-9C NMSA 1978, so the distinction made by an employer between an allergen and an irritant was irrelevant for the purposes of an employer’s injury claim that arose from exposure to cigarette smoke; the condition of being physically affected by the presence of a certain substance was a permanent condition, if the susceptibility is permanent. Schober v. Mountain Bell Tel., 1980-NMCA-113, 96 N.M. 376, 630 P.2d 1231, 1980 N.M. App. LEXIS 928 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).

Employee was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits, because his injuries, which occurred when his car swerved off the road and overturned on his way to work at an earlier time than usual in order to perform a task requested by his employer, did not result from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, as required by former 59-10-6, 1953 Comp.; the employer’s request did not constitute a “special errand” that took the employee out of the operation of former 59-10-12(l), 1953 Comp.’s going and coming rule. Ross v. Marberry & Co., 1960-NMSC-013, 66 N.M. 404, 349 P.2d 123, 1960 N.M. LEXIS 1127 (N.M. 1960).

Prerequisites to the right to workmen’s compensation, pursuant to former § 57-906, 1941 Comp. (now 52-1-9 NMSA 1978), are that the injury to or death of the employee must be proximately caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and, at the time of the accident, the employee must have been performing services arising out of and in the course of his employment. Campbell v. Schwers-Campbell, Inc., 1955-NMSC-056, 59 N.M. 385, 285 P.2d 497, 1955 N.M. LEXIS 1039 (N.M. 1955).

Special employers.

District court properly dismissed an employee’s negligence claim on the ground that a company was immune from tort liability, where the employee had made a contract of hire with the company, he performed his work as a graphic designer at the company’s facilities and in support of the company’s marketing efforts, the company provided day-to-day technical direction over the employee, and as a result, the company met the special employer test. Hamberg v. Sandia Corp., 2007-NMCA-078, 142 N.M. 72, 162 P.3d 909, 2007 N.M. App. LEXIS 54 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007), aff'd, 2008-NMSC-015, 143 N.M. 601, 179 P.3d 1209, 2008 N.M. LEXIS 125 (N.M. 2008).

Suicide.

Workman’s suicide could be compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act notwithstanding two separate statutory provisions barring recovery under the act where an injury is self-inflicted 51-1-11 NMSA 1978 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, as long as the claimant could establish (1) the occurrence of an original work-related injury and resulting disability to the workman within the scope and course of the decedent’s employment; (2) subsequent mental derangement of the workman; (3) the death of the workman by suicide; and (4) that the death of the workman was directly and proximately attributable to the original work-related compensable injury sustained by the workman. Schell v. Buell ECD Co., 1983-NMCA-093, 102 N.M. 44, 690 P.2d 1038, 1983 N.M. App. LEXIS 766 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).

Termination of benefits.

Former employee’s action for intentional torts and negligence against her former employer and manager, which alleged that the manager broke one of her fingers by slamming a locker door on her hand after firing her, was barred by the exclusionary provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, specifically 52-1-6D, E; 52-1-8 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, because the compensation benefits of the Act did not automatically and instantaneously terminate when the employee was fired, but continued for a reasonable period while she was at her locker “winding up” her affairs and leaving her place of employment. Martin-Martinez v. 6001, Inc., 1998-NMCA-179, 126 N.M. 319, 968 P.2d 1182, 1998 N.M. App. LEXIS 162 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 126 N.M. 532, 972 P.2d 351, 1998 N.M. LEXIS 435 (N.M. 1998).

Tobacco smoke.

This court has already decided that an allergic reaction to tobacco smoke which causes a workman eventually to collapse is an accidental injury under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Schober v. Mountain Bell Telephone, 93 N.M. 337, 600 P.2d 283 (Ct. App. 1978), cert. quashed, 92 N.M. 621, 593 P.2d 62 (1979). Schober v. Mountain Bell Tel., 1980-NMCA-113, 96 N.M. 376, 630 P.2d 1231, 1980 N.M. App. LEXIS 928 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).

Workers’ compensation.

In an action for workers’ compensation the trial court concluded that the employer had not substantially complied with 52-1-6C and D, 52-1-8, and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978 that required the filing of a proof of insurance, such that workers’ compensation was not the exclusive remedy in the employee’s action. Peterson v. Wells Fargo Armored Servs. Corp., 2000-NMCA-043, 129 N.M. 158, 3 P.3d 135, 2000 N.M. App. LEXIS 34 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 129 N.M. 207, 4 P.3d 35, 2000 N.M. LEXIS 162 (N.M. 2000).

Trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of managers with respect to an employee’s tort action was proper because the Workers’ Compensation Act (52-1-1 NMSA 1978) was the employee’s exclusive remedy pursuant to 52-1-6D, E; 52-1-8 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978, and the employer did not waive the protection of the act; even though the employee had been fired, the injuries she suffered while cleaning out her locker were compensable under the act. Martin-Martinez v. 6001, Inc., 1998-NMCA-179, 126 N.M. 319, 968 P.2d 1182, 1998 N.M. App. LEXIS 162 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 126 N.M. 532, 972 P.2d 351, 1998 N.M. LEXIS 435 (N.M. 1998).

Plaintiff wife was barred from bringing a loss of consortium claim against respondents, her injured husband’s employer and co-worker, where her claim was precluded by the exclusivity provisions of the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-6, 52-1-8, and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978; her claim was derivative of the injured spouse’s right to recover. Archer v. Roadrunner Trucking, 1997-NMSC-003, 122 N.M. 703, 930 P.2d 1155, 1996 N.M. LEXIS 471 (N.M. 1996).

Temporary employer was entitled to immunity from common law tort claims according to the Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-6E NMSA 1978, 52-1-8 NMSA 1978, and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978 because it met the three-part test of special employer in that it was contractually assured that the general employer was to provide workers’ compensation coverage even though there was no specific evidence concerning how the special employer pays for that coverage and in that the worker at issue had signed a contract where he agreed to look to the general employer for his remedy for on-the-job injuries. Vigil v. Digital Equip. Corp., 1996-NMCA-100, 122 N.M. 417, 925 P.2d 883, 1996 N.M. App. LEXIS 82 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).

Statutory employers, as defined by 52-1-22 NMSA 1978 of the Workers’ Compensation Act, fall within the general definition of employers who are subject to the Act’s terms, and who, in return, are immune from tort liability under the Act’s exclusivity provisions, set forth in 52-1-6E, 52-1-8, and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978. Harger v. Structural Servs., 1996-NMSC-018, 121 N.M. 657, 916 P.2d 1324, 1996 N.M. LEXIS 153 (N.M. 1996).

Section 52-1-9 NMSA 1978 provides that for an injury to be compensable the accident must have occurred when the employee was performing service arising out of and in the course of his employment; the worker, who had a prior work-related back injury, was injured five years later when he was working on a car and could not prove that his disability was a consequence of aggravation of his prior injury. Aragon v. State Corrections Dep't, 1991-NMCA-109, 113 N.M. 176, 824 P.2d 316, 1991 N.M. App. LEXIS 231 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).

Laboratory was a statutory employer under 52-1-22 NMSA 1978 because the work that plaintiff was performing under his subcontractor-employer’s contract with the laboratory was to be performed wholly by plaintiff and was in the trade, business, or undertaking of the laboratory; thus, the laboratory was entitled to the exclusivity provisions in 52-1-6D NMSA 1978 and 52-1-9 NMSA 1978 of the Workers’ Compensation Act with regard to plaintiff’s personal injury. Quintana v. University of California, 1991-NMCA-016, 111 N.M. 679, 808 P.2d 964, 1991 N.M. App. LEXIS 123 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 111 N.M. 678, 808 P.2d 963, 1991 N.M. LEXIS 85 (N.M. 1991), overruled in part, Harger v. Structural Servs., 1996-NMSC-018, 121 N.M. 657, 916 P.2d 1324, 1996 N.M. LEXIS 153 (N.M. 1996).

Workers’ compensation judge properly granted the employer’s motion to dismiss claimant’s request for death benefits for her husband’s suicide because the death was not proximately caused by an accident that arose out of and in the course of his employment and was intentionally self-inflicted. Holford v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., Los Alamos Nat'l Lab., 1990-NMCA-066, 110 N.M. 366, 796 P.2d 259, 1990 N.M. App. LEXIS 78 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).

Decedent’s were not in the course of their employment pursuant to 52-1-9 NMSA 1978 when the decedents were killed in an airplane crash while they were traveling to a basketball game, the prize awarded by the employer in a sales contest, because the time of the flight was after the salesmen departed their day’s work; the salesmen were not on the employer’s premises when the crash occurred, and the decedents were engaged in a noncompulsory social activity; wrongful death actions were not barred by the exclusive remedy of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Beckham v. Brown, 1983-NMCA-051, 100 N.M. 1, 664 P.2d 1014, 1983 N.M. App. LEXIS 709 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).

New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq., particularly 52-1-9, 52-1-8, and 52-1-6D NMSA 1978, expressly makes the remedies provided by the Act the sole and exclusive remedies available to an employee for claims against his employer or insurer. Dickson v. Mountain States Mut. Casualty Co., 1982-NMSC-090, 98 N.M. 479, 650 P.2d 1, 1982 N.M. LEXIS 2884 (N.M. 1982).

Where an employee became nauseated after eating a doughnut at work and placed a pen down her throat to try to induce vomiting, her injury from swallowing the pen did not arise out of employment entitling her to workmen’s compensation benefits because, under 52-1-9B NMSA 1978 and 52-1-28A NMSA 1978, swallowing the pen was not a risk of her employment. Losinski v. Drs. Corcoran, Barkoff & Stagnone, P. A., 1981-NMCA-127, 97 N.M. 79, 636 P.2d 898, 1981 N.M. App. LEXIS 803 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).

Minor employee who was injured while operating a fork lift was not barred from maintaining a common law action against his employer and was not limited to the remedies provided in the former Workmen’s Compensation Act, 59-10-6, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-9 NMSA 1978), because the minor’s employment was illegal under the former Child Labor Act, 59-6-5, 1953 Comp. (now 50-6-4 NMSA 1978). Maynerich v. Little Bear Enters., 1971-NMCA-079, 82 N.M. 650, 485 P.2d 984, 1971 N.M. App. LEXIS 711 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971).

An employee who was injured in an automobile accident on his way home from work in an employer provided vehicle was not entitled to workmen’s compensation because the injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment. Rinehart v. Mossman-Gladden, Inc., 77 N.M. 470, 423 P.2d 991, 1967 N.M. LEXIS 2632 (N.M. 1967).

Former § 57-906, 1941 Comp. (now 52-1-9 NMSA 1978) provides as prerequisites to the right to compensation that the injury to or death of the employee shall be proximately caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment and that at the time of the accident the employee shall be performing services arising out of and in the course of his employment; thus, an employee’s accidental death while traveling during his hours of work and at a place where the performance of his duties could reasonably have required him to go, was entitled to a natural inference that the accident in which the employee was killed arose out of and in the course of his employment. Southwestern Portland Cement Co. v. Simpson, 135 F.2d 584, 1943 U.S. App. LEXIS 3329 (10th Cir. N.M. 1943).

Where an employee had complained of heart disease, and had seen a doctor, but died as a result of a fall after he apparently had a heart attack while working as a roofer, the employee’s widow could receive workers compensation benefits for the employee’s death. Christensen v. Dysart, 1938-NMSC-008, 42 N.M. 107, 76 P.2d 1, 1938 N.M. LEXIS 7 (N.M. 1938).

Where a decedent’s widow sought workers’ compensation benefits under the Workman’s Compensation Act, the trial court did not err when it found that even though decedent had left his duties when he was fatally injured, his widow was entitled to compensation benefits; the fatal injury arose out of and in the course of the employment of the deceased within the meaning of the former 1929 Code, § 156-112(l). Cuellar v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 1932-NMSC-018, 36 N.M. 141, 9 P.2d 685, 1932 N.M. LEXIS 21 (N.M. 1932).

Research References and Practice Aids

Cross references.

Uninsured employers’ fund; workers’ compensation administration; additional duties, 52-1-9.1 NMSA 1978.

Compliance with and applicability of workers’ compensation laws, 60-13A-5 NMSA 1978.

New Mexico Law Review.

Article: Bartlett Revisited: The Impact of Several Liability on Pretrial Procedure in New Mexico — Part Two, M.E. Occhialino, 35 N.M. L. Rev. 37 (2005).

Workers’ Compensation—The District Court Should Make The Initial Determination Of Jurisdiction In Workers’ Compensation Cases Involving Intentional Tort Claims — Eldridge v. Circle K Corp., Justin Lesky, 28 N.M. L. Rev. 665 (1998).

Trends In New Mexico Law: 1994-95: Workers’ Compensation Law — New Mexico Clarifies The Meaning Of A Special Employer As Distinct From A Statutory Employer: Rivera v. Sagebrush Sales, Inc., Christine M. Landavazo, 26 N.M. L. Rev. 655 (1996).

Comment: A Comparison Of Workers’ Compensation In The United States And Mexico, Renee L. Camacho, 26 N.M. L. Rev. 133 (1996).

Tort Law — New Mexico Imposes Strict Liability On A Private Employer Of An Independent Contractor For Harm From Dangerous Work, But Bestows Immunity On A Government Employer: Saiz v. Belen School District, Jane Marshall Gagne, 23 N.M. L. Rev. 399 (1993).

52-1-9. Right to compensation; exclusive.

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