52-1-28.  Compensable claims; proof.

Generally.

Accident.

Accidental injury.

Appeal.

Applicability.

Arising out of.

Burden of proof.

Causation.

Chiropractor.

Compensation.

Concurrent condition.

Construction.

Deposition.

Disability.

Disputed causation.

Eligibility.

Employment.

Error.

Evidence.

           —Generally.

           —Admissible.

           —Insufficient.

           —Medical testimony.

           —Sufficient.

Expert.

Expert medical testimony.

Extent of disability.

Findings.

           —Sufficient.

Incident to employment.

Independent action.

Legislative intent.

Liability.

Medical probability.

Notice.

Practice and procedure.

Presumptions.

Prior complaints.

Proof.

Remedies.

Requirements.

Risk.

Second injury.

Spouse.

Standard of proof.

Subsection A.

Subsequent injury.

Time limitations.

Workers’ compensation.

New Mexico courts do not apportion workers’ compensation benefits according to different causal factors, as long as the disability is a natural and direct result of the accident as required by the Workers’ Compensation Act in 52-1-28 NMSA 1978. Edmiston v. City of Hobbs, 1997-NMCA-085, 123 N.M. 654, 944 P.2d 883, 1997 N.M. App. LEXIS 74 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 123 N.M. 626, 944 P.2d 274, 1997 N.M. LEXIS 336 (N.M. 1997).

Proximate cause requirement of 52-1-9(C) NMSA 1978 is supplemented by the natural and direct result requirement of 52-1-28 NMSA 1978. Aragon v. State Corrections Dep't, 1991-NMCA-109, 113 N.M. 176, 824 P.2d 316, 1991 N.M. App. LEXIS 231 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).

Because the heart attack that the workers’ compensation claimant, who was a police officer, sustained was not an injury that arose out of and in the course of his employment within the meaning of 52-1-9, 52-1-19, 52-1-28A(1) NMSA 1978, the claimant was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits; the heart attack did not adequately relate to the claimant’s employment because it occurred while he was jogging as part of a self-directed off-duty athletic activity, over which the employer had no control, in which the claimant was engaged in an effort to meet the qualifications for enrollment in the state law enforcement academy in order to get the certification that 29-7-6B NMSA 1978 required in order for the claimant to transfer from his job as a deputy jailer to a job as a deputy field officer. Meeks v. Eddy County Sheriff's Dep't, 1994-NMCA-134, 118 N.M. 643, 884 P.2d 534, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 129 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 118 N.M. 731, 885 P.2d 1325, 1994 N.M. LEXIS 413 (N.M. 1994).

Where a decedent was killed after his murderer learned of a sexual relationship between the decedent and the murderer’s wife, who worked with decedent, the decedent’s widow could not recover workmen’s compensation benefits because the risk was personal and the death did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. Gutierrez v. Artesia Pub. Sch., 92 N.M. 112, 583 P.2d 476, 1978 N.M. App. LEXIS 592 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978).

In a workmen’s compensation action by the guardian of a minor, seeking benefits for the death of the minor’s deceased father, an employer and its insurer were entitled to summary judgment because the decedent’s accident occurred during heavy lifting and did not arise out of the course of his employment. Green v. Manpower, Inc., 1970-NMCA-100, 81 N.M. 788, 474 P.2d 80, 1970 N.M. App. LEXIS 633 (N.M. Ct. App. 1970).

Under 52-1-9 NMSA and 52-1-28 NMSA 1978, a psychological disability is compensable only if it results from an accidental injury arising out of and occurring in the course of the worker’s employment. Gutierrez v. Amity Leather Prods. Co., 1988-NMCA-006, 107 N.M. 26, 751 P.2d 710, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 3 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).

An employee was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits for a heart attack he had during a lunchtime basketball game because where the recreational activity occurred on the employer’s premises, and the employer knew of and acquiesced in the activity, the employee’s injury resulting therefrom satisfied both the “arising out of” and “in the course of employment” requirements under 52-1-19 and 52-1-28A(1) NMSA 1978. Kloer v. Las Vegas, 1987-NMCA-140, 106 N.M. 594, 746 P.2d 1126, 1987 N.M. App. LEXIS 793 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987), superseded by statute as stated in Fogleman v. Duke City Auto. Servs., 2000-NMCA-039, 128 N.M. 840, 999 P.2d 1072, 2000 N.M. App. LEXIS 26 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000).

Where a finding indicated that an injury was “exacerbated” this was equivalent to its arising out of, or having a causal relation with, the accident, and it was a sufficient finding for the purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Di Matteo v. County of Dona Ana, 1985-NMCA-099, 104 N.M. 599, 725 P.2d 575, 1985 N.M. App. LEXIS 633 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985).

Requirement that an accidental injury “arising out of” the employment is compensable excludes an injury that cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause. The causative danger must be peculiar to the work and cannot be independent of the relation of master and servant, and there must be proof that the accidental injury originated in a risk connected with the employment and flowed from that risk as a rational consequence. McDaniel v. Albuquerque, 1982-NMCA-164, 99 N.M. 54, 653 P.2d 885, 1982 N.M. App. LEXIS 958 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982).

Where insufficient evidence supported a lump-sum award for temporary total disability and payments for a partial permanent disability for the remainder of the statutory period under the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act, former 59-10-1 through 59-10-37, 1953 Comp., and the employee suffered from a preexisting condition, the employee was denied benefits. In cases where the medical testimony does not establish any causation and the employer denies liability, the employee bears the burden of proof under former 59-10-13.3(B), 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-28 NMSA 1978). Niederstadt v. Ancho Rico Consol. Mines, 1975-NMCA-059, 88 N.M. 48, 536 P.2d 1104, 1975 N.M. App. LEXIS 666 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 28, 536 P.2d 1085, 1975 N.M. LEXIS 907 (N.M. 1975).

Medical probability requirement did not apply when the employer and insurer admitted the causal connection between the employee’s accident and his death. Quintana v. East Las Vegas Mun. Sch. Dist., 1971-NMCA-029, 82 N.M. 462, 483 P.2d 936, 1971 N.M. App. LEXIS 669 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971).

Widow was not entitled to any workmen’s compensation benefits as to an employee’s death because the widow did not meet her burden under former 59-10-13.3B, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-28 NMSA 1978) of showing a required causal connection between the employee’s compensable injury and his death; an employer and an insurer’s presentation of conflicting evidence as to the cause of death did not shift the burden of persuasion onto them because the widow never met her initial burden of persuasion. Mayfield v. Keeth Gas Co., 1970-NMCA-032, 81 N.M. 313, 466 P.2d 879, 1970 N.M. App. LEXIS 568 (N.M. Ct. App. 1970).

Pursuant to former 59-10-13.3B, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-28B NMSA 1978) the employee was properly denied workmen’s compensation benefits because of his failure to produce medical evidence that supported the challenged finding and failed to prove a compensable injury arising out of his employment. Weston v. Carper Drilling Co., 77 N.M. 220, 421 P.2d 435, 1966 N.M. LEXIS 2786 (N.M. 1966).

Trial court’s finding in a workmen’s compensation claim that an employee failed to prove a causal connection between his disability and the accident was not erroneous as a matter of law because it was supported by medical expert testimony; the employee’s mere production of expert testimony establishing a causal connection did not satisfy the burden imposed upon him by former 59-10-13.3, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-28 NMSA 1978), where there was contrary expert medical testimony. Torres v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 1966-NMSC-160, 76 N.M. 623, 417 P.2d 435, 1966 N.M. LEXIS 2717 (N.M. 1966).

In workmen’s compensation proceedings, employee failed to sustain his burden of proof under former 59-10-13.3, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-28 NMSA 1978) that his hernia resulted from a work-related accident; where the employer did not cause him to be physically examined, the burden of proof under former 59-10-18.6, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-45 NMSA 1978) was not applicable. Michael v. Bauman, 1966-NMSC-079, 76 N.M. 225, 413 P.2d 888, 1966 N.M. LEXIS 2635 (N.M. 1966).

Causation requirement of 52-1-28 NMSA 1978 may be satisfied by proof that work-related stress was a factor contributing to a worker’s myocardial infarction. Mieras v. Dyncorp, 1996-NMCA-095, 122 N.M. 401, 925 P.2d 518, 1996 N.M. App. LEXIS 76 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 122 N.M. 279, 923 P.2d 1164, 1996 N.M. LEXIS 361 (N.M. 1996).

Where an employee suffered a work-related low back injury, and the employer sent him to a medical doctor for treatment, but the employee discontinued medical treatment and returned to the chiropractor he had visited previously, the trial court, finding that the disability from the time the employee discontinued treatment was caused by a fight with his ex-wife and by unnecessary and unreasonable chiropractic treatment, improperly accepted only the doctor’s testimony on causation; the chiropractor’s testimony, however, was admissible as expert medical testimony required in contested cases under 52-1-28B NMSA 1978 to establish the causal connection between the work-related injury and disability, and the chiropractor was a health care provider capable of providing diagnosis and treatment of injuries compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 through 52-1-69 NMSA 1978. Vallejos v. KNC, Inc., 1987-NMSC-030, 105 N.M. 613, 735 P.2d 530, 1987 N.M. LEXIS 3568 (N.M. 1987).

Workers’ compensation claim resolution rules implement the Workers’ Compensation Act (52-1-1 NMSA 1978), and they must be read in pari materia with Subsection B of this section, which requires a worker to establish causation through the testimony of a qualified “health care provider,” as defined by 52-4-1 NMSA 1978 and Paragraph L of 11.4.1.7 NMAC. Banks v. IMC Kalium Carlsbad Potash Co., 2003-NMSC-026, 134 N.M. 421, 77 P.3d 1014, 2003 N.M. LEXIS 227 (N.M. 2003).

That a worker is restricted under 52-1-24 and 52-1-28 NMSA 1978 to proving his or her claim by the testimony of a qualified health care provider agreed upon by the parties or approved by a Workers’ Compensation Judge and that the health care provider is directed to utilize the American Medical Association (AMA) Guide or other comparable publications of the AMA in establishing and quantifying the degree of disability does not limit the running of the statute of limitations to only those situations where a health care provider has actually informed a worker that he or she has sustained a permanent impairment. Montoya v. Kirk-Mayer, Inc., 1995-NMCA-104, 120 N.M. 550, 903 P.2d 861, 1995 N.M. App. LEXIS 100 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995).

Restrictions under 51-1-11 NMSA 1978 barring recovery where an injury is self-inflicted are generally interpreted not to preclude recovery where the original work-related injury sustained by the workman was accidental and otherwise compensable and the injury produced a mental disability which rendered the subsequent act of suicide of the workman non-purposeful; however, medical evidence must be presented to establish the causal connection between the work-related injury and the death when cause is disputed, and under 52-1-28 NMSA 1978, the burden of establishing the required causal nexus is upon the claimant. Schell v. Buell ECD Co., 1983-NMCA-093, 102 N.M. 44, 690 P.2d 1038, 1983 N.M. App. LEXIS 766 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).

Where a deputy sheriff died in his patrol car while watering his horses, the death was in the course of employment, under former 59-10-13.3, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-28 NMSA 1978), because he was on call pursuant to the employer’s fuel conservation policy minimizing patrols. Thigpen v. County of Valencia, 1976-NMCA-049, 89 N.M. 299, 551 P.2d 989, 1976 N.M. App. LEXIS 580 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 7, 558 P.2d 619, 1976 N.M. LEXIS 1000 (N.M. 1976).

Trial court committed reversible error in finding that an employee did not suffer an accidental and compensable injury where the medical expert’s undisputed testimony established a causal connection, as required by former 59-10-13.3B, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-28 NMSA 1978), between the employee’s operation of a snow grader and the fact that he suffered a ruptured disc. Lyon v. Catron County Comm'rs, 1969-NMCA-108, 81 N.M. 120, 464 P.2d 410, 1969 N.M. App. LEXIS 628 (N.M. Ct. App. 1969), cert. denied, 81 N.M. 140, 464 P.2d 559, 1970 N.M. LEXIS 1494 (N.M. 1970).

Where an employee did not present any expert testimony establishing a causal connection between a workplace fight and his alleged disability, the trial court’s judgment awarding workmen’s compensation benefits was error. Corzine v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 1969-NMCA-051, 80 N.M. 418, 456 P.2d 892, 1969 N.M. App. LEXIS 574 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 80 N.M. 388, 456 P.2d 221, 1969 N.M. LEXIS 1744 (N.M. 1969).

Under 52-1-28 NMSA 1978, expert testimony is required on the issue of causation when the cause of an employee’s injuries is contested; uncontradicted testimony on the issue of causation is binding on the trial court except when the facts providing the basis of the expert’s testimony are not worthy of belief. Peterson v. Northern Home Care, 1996-NMCA-030, 121 N.M. 439, 912 P.2d 831, 1996 N.M. App. LEXIS 10 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).

In an action to recover compensation benefits for a physical impairment, the trial court was not required, under 52-1-24A NMSA 1978, to base the employee’s impairment rating on the testimony of one doctor, even though 52-1-28 NMSA 1978 required expert testimony on the issue of causation, where the facts providing the basis for the doctor’s testimony were not worthy of belief. Peterson v. Northern Home Care, 1996-NMCA-030, 121 N.M. 439, 912 P.2d 831, 1996 N.M. App. LEXIS 10 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).

52-1-28B NMSA 1978 and the uncontradicted medical evidence rule are subject to exceptions and the evidence need not be accepted as true if (1) the witness is shown to be unworthy of belief, or (2) his testimony is equivocal or contains inherent improbabilities, (3) concerns a transaction surrounded by suspicious circumstances, or (4) is contradicted, or subjected to reasonable doubt as to its truth or veracity, by legitimate inferences drawn from the facts and circumstances of the case. Hernandez v. Mead Foods, 1986-NMCA-020, 104 N.M. 67, 716 P.2d 645, 1986 N.M. App. LEXIS 591 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).

52-1-28B NMSA 1978 and the uncontradicted medical evidence rule only apply to the causation issue; on other issues, such as percentage of disability, the medical testimony may be contradicted by the other facts and circumstances of the case. Hernandez v. Mead Foods, 1986-NMCA-020, 104 N.M. 67, 716 P.2d 645, 1986 N.M. App. LEXIS 591 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).

Uncontradicted medical evidence rule is an exception to the general rule that a trial court can accept or reject expert opinion as it sees fit, and it is based on 52-1-28B NMSA 1978, which requires the worker in a workers’ compensation case to prove causal connection between disability and accident as a medical probability by expert medical testimony. Because 52-1-28B NMSA 1978 requires a certain type of proof, uncontradicted evidence in the form of that type of proof is binding on the trial court. Hernandez v. Mead Foods, 1986-NMCA-020, 104 N.M. 67, 716 P.2d 645, 1986 N.M. App. LEXIS 591 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).

Employee was entitled to workmen’s compensation benefits because a causal connection between his disability and a work-related accident was established where physician testified that the disability was a natural and direct result of the accident. Medrano v. Ray Willis Constr. Co., 1981-NMCA-096, 96 N.M. 643, 633 P.2d 1241, 1981 N.M. App. LEXIS 774 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).

In a workers’ compensation action, the psychiatrists’ testimony on the issue of causation was admissible under Rule 11-705 NMRA and 52-1-28 NMSA 1978, which allows for expert testimony and for provides that causation exists within a reasonable medical probability when a qualified medical expert testifies as to his opinion concerning causation. Sanchez v. Molycorp, Inc., 1985-NMCA-067, 1985-NMCA-067, 103 N.M. 148, 703 P.2d 925, 1985 N.M. App. LEXIS 571 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985).

In a workmen’s compensation action, a claimant was not entitled to receive benefits for an alleged injury under former 59-10-13.3, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-28 NMSA 1978) where substantial evidence existed supporting the contention that no accident or injury occurred during the course of his employment. Montoya v. Leavell-Brennand Constr. Co., 1970-NMCA-077, 81 N.M. 616, 471 P.2d 186, 1970 N.M. App. LEXIS 611 (N.M. Ct. App. 1970).

A baker was not entitled to workmen’s compensation following an injury to his elbow on the job and the subsequent loss of use of his right hand, because he could not establish as a medical probability by expert medical testimony, as required by former 59-10-13.3, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-28 NMSA 1978), a causal connection between the accident and his disability. Irvin v. Rainbo Baking Co., 1966-NMSC-075, 76 N.M. 213, 413 P.2d 693, 1966 N.M. LEXIS 2632 (N.M. 1966).

Where the evidence supported a trial court’s findings of fact as to an employee’s failure to establish a causal connection, as a medical probability by expert medical testimony, that his alleged disability was a natural and direct result of an accident incident to his employment, his claim for workmen’s compensation benefits was properly denied. Luvaul v. A. Ray Barker Motor Co., 1963-NMSC-152, 72 N.M. 447, 384 P.2d 885, 1963 N.M. LEXIS 2012 (N.M. 1963).

When considering a motion for non-suit under former N.M. R. Civ. P. 41(b), the trial court was required to weigh the evidence and give to it such weight as he believed it was entitled to receive, and the testimony of a doctor concerning whether an injury caused an employee’s disability was opinion testimony and as such not conclusive of the issue under former 59-10-13.3, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-28 NMSA 1978); the trial court could accept, reject, or give such weight only as it deemed the same entitled to have, even though uncontradicted. Montano v. Saavedra, 1962-NMSC-095, 70 N.M. 332, 373 P.2d 824, 1962 N.M. LEXIS 1594 (N.M. 1962).

In an appeal by plaintiff workmen’s compensation claimant, given that former 59-10-13.3(B), 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-28 NMSA 1978) made it incumbent upon the claimant to present one or more medical experts to testify that in his or their opinion there was a medical probability of causal connection between the accident alleged and the disability claimed, and a trial court found that the medical testimony only established that the claimant’s fall at work could, rather than that it did, as a medical probability, cause her disability, the conclusion that defendants, an employer and its workmen’s compensation insurer, were not liable had to be sustained even though the evidence would possibly have supported a different finding. Renfro v. San Juan Hosp., 1965-NMSC-067, 75 N.M. 235, 403 P.2d 681, 1965 N.M. LEXIS 1554 (N.M. 1965).

Section 52-1-28B NMSA 1978 requires proof of causation by a health care provider to establish a connection between a worker’s injury and a disability where an employer denies that the disability resulted from the worker’s accident, but does not require expert testimony to establish the cause of a worker’s accident; thus, expert testimony was not required to show that a worker’s exposure to chlorine while at work caused him to become dizzy. Garcia v. Borden, Inc., 1993-NMCA-047, 115 N.M. 486, 853 P.2d 737, 1993 N.M. App. LEXIS 44 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 115 N.M. 409, 852 P.2d 682, 1993 N.M. LEXIS 122 (N.M. 1993).

Claimant was entitled to death benefits where the evidence established that the working conditions included camping at the job site and her husband’s death was caused by an accidental injury that arose out of and in the course of his employment. Lujan v. Payroll Express, 1992-NMCA-063, 114 N.M. 257, 837 P.2d 451, 1992 N.M. App. LEXIS 56 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).

Evidence was sufficient to prove that a chemist’s trigeminal neuralgia was caused by exposure or inhalation to lab substances where medical experts gave opinions that the claimant’s symptoms, including trigeminal neuralgia, were triggered by her exposure to chemicals at work. Fuyat v. Los Alamos Nat'l Lab., 1991-NMCA-045, 112 N.M. 102, 811 P.2d 1313, 1991 N.M. App. LEXIS 146 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).

Where an employer derived “intangible” values from letting an employee work on his personal vehicle on the employer’s premises, a workers’ compensation judge’s finding that an injury “arose out of” employment was supported by substantial evidence; the claimant sharpened his skills as a mechanic, and the employer benefited by keeping the claimant working on an as-billed basis rather than an hourly basis by letting him work on a personal vehicle while waiting for jobs. Evans v. Valley Diesel, 1991-NMSC-027, 111 N.M. 556, 807 P.2d 740, 1991 N.M. LEXIS 126 (N.M. 1991).

There was substantial evidence to support the hearing officer’s determination that there was a causal connection between the false representation and the injury. Jaynes v. Wal-Mart Store No. 824, 1988-NMCA-076, 107 N.M. 648, 763 P.2d 82, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 80 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).

In a workmen’s compensation case, where medical experts testified that the cause of an employee’s eye hemorrhage was high blood pressure caused by job-related stress, the employee proved essential elements required under 52-1-28 NMSA 1978 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 52-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq., and was entitled to total disability benefits for loss of an eye. Crane v. San Juan County, 1983-NMCA-133, 100 N.M. 600, 673 P.2d 1333, 1983 N.M. App. LEXIS 806 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).

Circumstantial evidence alone was sufficient to prove that a dairyman was kidnapped and assaulted at work for purposes of receiving workmen’s compensation for accidental injury, although he suffered amnesia after the attack. Sena v. Continental Casualty Co., 1982-NMCA-060, 97 N.M. 753, 643 P.2d 622, 1982 N.M. App. LEXIS 841 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982).

Employee’s orthopedic surgeon’s medical testimony was sufficient evidence to support the finding that the employee’s disability was a natural an direct result of the 1978 accident. Smith v. Trailways Bus Sys., 1981-NMCA-041, 96 N.M. 79, 628 P.2d 324, 1981 N.M. App. LEXIS 717 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).

Employer and insurer were ordered to pay an additional 10 percent of workmen’s compensation benefits under 59-10-7, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-10 NMSA 1978) for the death of an employee caused by the employer’s failure to provide insulated rubber gloves because the evidence sustained the trial court’s finding that gloves were in general use for the protection of workmen working on poles carrying high voltage lines, and that the employee’s death was caused by the employer’s failure to supply such gloves. The medical probability of death requirement of former 59-10-13.3, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-28 NMSA 1978) was not applicable because defendants admitted the causal connection between the accident and the death. Quintana v. East Las Vegas Mun. Sch. Dist., 1971-NMCA-029, 82 N.M. 462, 483 P.2d 936, 1971 N.M. App. LEXIS 669 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971).

Cowboy who was injured in a ranch accident but continued to work for over a year after the accident presented substantial evidence to prove a causal connection between the accident and the resulting total and permanent disability even though the accident was attributable in part to a preexisting condition. Moorhead v. Gray Ranch Co., 1977-NMCA-017, 90 N.M. 220, 561 P.2d 493, 1977 N.M. App. LEXIS 580 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d 1347, 1977 N.M. LEXIS 1165 (N.M. 1977).

Rule is that when information exists about which a medical expert apparently had no knowledge, his opinion cannot serve as the basis for compliance with 52-1-28 NMSA 1978. This rule is only applicable when there is uncontradicted testimony of another medical expert that the information on prior injuries is pertinent. Mendez v. Southwest Community Health Servs., 1986-NMCA-066, 104 N.M. 608, 725 P.2d 584, 1986 N.M. App. LEXIS 643 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).

Where the parties stipulated that the employee suffered a work-related injury, the trial court was not bound by medical opinion or medical definitions in determining the date of commencement or the degree of compensable disability. Sedillo v. Levi-Strauss Corp., 1982-NMCA-069, 98 N.M. 52, 644 P.2d 1041, 1982 N.M. App. LEXIS 852 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794, 1982 N.M. LEXIS 2937 (N.M. 1982).

Denial of an employee’s request to set aside a general release of a workmen’s compensation claim based upon a latent injury was proper where the trial court believed the expert’s testimony that there was not a medical probability that a causal connection existed between the employee’s current injury and his prior work-related injury. Chaffins v. Jelco Inc., 1971-NMCA-071, 82 N.M. 666, 486 P.2d 75, 1971 N.M. App. LEXIS 702 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 83 N.M. 22, 487 P.2d 1092, 1971 N.M. LEXIS 1633 (N.M. 1971).

Pursuant to former 59-10-13.3(B), 1953 Comp., where a causal connection between an accidental injury and a physiological condition was established by expert testimony as a medical probability, uncontradicted and fact based, it was conclusive upon a trier of facts in a workers’ compensation suit. Ross v. Sayers Well Servicing Co., 1966-NMSC-099, 76 N.M. 321, 414 P.2d 679, 1966 N.M. LEXIS 2655 (N.M. 1966).

Where an employee’s expert witnesses testified that the employee’s myocardial infarction suffered on the job was an accident arising out of the employment, and that there was a causal connection between the work being performed and the infarction, and the employer’s expert testified that there was no causal connection, the trial court’s decision finding no connection was supported by sufficient evidence. Yates v. Matthews, 1963-NMSC-038, 71 N.M. 451, 379 P.2d 441, 1963 N.M. LEXIS 1900 (N.M. 1963).

Substantial evidence was found to support the dismissal of an employee’s claim for workmen’s compensation because, based on the fact that a doctor testified that he thought the employee had the back condition all of his life, that there were considerable arthritic changes around it, that there was no evidence of a traumatic episode that caused the disability as alleged, and because in his opinion the unloading of cement blocks did not aggravate the employee’s back condition as alleged, the employee failed to prove the causal connection as a medical probability by expert medical testimony as required by former 59-10-13.3, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-28 NMSA 1978); moreover, the employee failed to establish that his wage-earning ability had been decreased as a result of the alleged accidental injury as required by former 59-10-12.18, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-15 NMSA 1978) and former 59-10-12.19, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-26 NMSA 1978). Gallegos v. Kennedy, 1968-NMSC-170, 79 N.M. 590, 446 P.2d 642, 1968 N.M. LEXIS 2016 (N.M. 1968).

Although neither of plaintiff employee’s physician testified as to the extent of the employee’s disability during the period in question, former 59-10-13.3(B), 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-28 NMSA 1978) did not require that the extent of the disability be established as a medical probability by expert medical testimony. Garcia v. Genuine Parts Co., 1977-NMCA-007, 90 N.M. 124, 560 P.2d 545, 1977 N.M. App. LEXIS 569 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d 1347, 1977 N.M. LEXIS 1168 (N.M. 1977).

Where a trial court found that claimant sustained an accidental injury to his left knee during the scope of his employment and that as “a natural and direct result” of the accidental injury, he sustained a compensable claim within the meaning of the New Mexico Workmen’s Compensation Act; that the injury to the left knee caused stress to be placed upon the claimant’s right knee, thereby resulting in pain; that the right knee problems would be transient if claimant’s left knee could not be repaired to take back the load, but that the condition of his left knee was permanent and would only get worse; and there was a reasonable medical probability that the claimant was totally disabled due to a combination of his physical and psychological conditions; his depression and aggravation had become so severe that he became suicidal; two psychiatrists diagnosed the claimant as suffering from depression, and in one psychiatrist’s opinion, most patients like the claimant suffered from depression when they found themselves unable to do the type of work they formerly performed, the findings were sufficient to uphold the trial court’s award of reasonable and necessary medical and psychological services to the claimant under the burden of proof set by 52-1-28 NMSA 1978. Montney v. State, 1989-NMCA-002, 108 N.M. 326, 772 P.2d 360, 1989 N.M. App. LEXIS 13 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Moya v. City of Albuquerque, 2007-NMCA-057, 141 N.M. 617, 159 P.3d 266, 2007 N.M. App. LEXIS 29 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007).

Failure of the trial court in a claimant’s workers’ compensation case to adopt an express finding on the issue of causation and the claimant’s mental condition does not require denial of an award of medical benefits for treatment of depression where other findings adopted by the court were sufficient to support the court’s ultimate findings on this issue of causation, which the claimant had the burden to prove under 52-1-28 NMSA 1978. Montney v. State, 1989-NMCA-002, 108 N.M. 326, 772 P.2d 360, 1989 N.M. App. LEXIS 13 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Moya v. City of Albuquerque, 2007-NMCA-057, 141 N.M. 617, 159 P.3d 266, 2007 N.M. App. LEXIS 29 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007).

Trial court’s denial of a workmen’s compensation claim was affirmed under former 59-10-13.3(1), 1953 Comp. because while the trial court might have found the issues in favor of the employee, a careful review of the evidence in the light of the applicable tests showed that the evidence supporting the findings of fact made by the trial court was substantial. Grisham v. Nelms, 1962-NMSC-146, 71 N.M. 37, 376 P.2d 1, 1962 N.M. LEXIS 1481 (N.M. 1962).

Under former 59-10-13.3, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-28 NMSA 1978), an employee who was injured while driving his own vehicle after he had left his job for the day was not entitled to workmen’s compensation because he was not acting within the course or scope of his employment when the injury occurred. McAfoos v. Borden Implement Co., 75 N.M. 50, 400 P.2d 470, 1965 N.M. LEXIS 1514 (N.M. 1965).

Legislature intended to include psychological injuries arising out of work-related accidents within the coverage of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-1 NMSA 1978 et seq., but to exclude compensation for purely mental injuries. Maestas v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 1990-NMCA-092, 110 N.M. 609, 798 P.2d 210, 1990 N.M. App. LEXIS 105 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied, 110 N.M. 653, 798 P.2d 1039, 1990 N.M. LEXIS 307 (N.M. 1990), overruled in part, Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148, 2001 N.M. LEXIS 376 (N.M. 2001), overruled in part as stated in Richey v. Hammond Conservancy Dist., No. 32847, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 12 (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2015).

Former 59-10-13.3B, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-28 NMSA 1978) provides that in all cases where defendants deny that an alleged disability is a natural and direct result of the accident, the workman must establish that causal connection as a medical probability by expert medical testimony; no award of compensation shall be based on speculation or on expert testimony that as a medical possibility the causal connection exists. This section requires the causal connection between the disability and the accident be established as a medical probability by expert medical testimony. Garcia v. Genuine Parts Co., 1977-NMCA-007, 90 N.M. 124, 560 P.2d 545, 1977 N.M. App. LEXIS 569 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 254, 561 P.2d 1347, 1977 N.M. LEXIS 1168 (N.M. 1977).

In a workers’ compensation action, a claimant’s request for benefits was properly denied under 52-1-11 NMSA 1978 when proof of the claimant’s intoxication could be established by circumstantial evidence under 52-1-28 NMSA 1978. Estate of Mitchum v. Triple S Trucking, 1991-NMCA-118, 113 N.M. 85, 823 P.2d 327, 1991 N.M. App. LEXIS 218 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 16, 820 P.2d 1330, 1991 N.M. LEXIS 372 (N.M. 1991), overruled in part, Villa v. City of Las Cruces, No. 29456, 2010 N.M. App. LEXIS 88 (N.M. Ct. App. July 22, 2010).

Unexplained homicide of a bookkeeper at the hands of her manager, who then committed suicide, was presumed to have arisen out of the bookkeeper’s employment under former 59-10-13.3, 1953 Comp.; therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing the action of the bookkeeper’s daughter for workers’ compensation benefits. Ensley v. Grace, 1966-NMSC-181, 76 N.M. 691, 417 P.2d 885, 1966 N.M. LEXIS 2737 (N.M. 1966).

Where the reason or cause for a death is not explained, and it occurred during the time the employee was at work, it will be presumed that the death arose out of the employment for the purpose of former 59-10-13.3, 1953 Comp. Ensley v. Grace, 1966-NMSC-181, 76 N.M. 691, 417 P.2d 885, 1966 N.M. LEXIS 2737 (N.M. 1966).

Where an employee had a compensable claim under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, former 59-10-13.3, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-28 NMSA 1978) by reason of the alleged negligence of his employer, the employee was precluded by former 59-10-4D, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-6 NMSA 1978) from bringing a common law negligence action against the employer because the Act provided the exclusive remedy to the employee under former 59-10-6, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-8 NMSA 1978). Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Montoya, 1978-NMSC-057, 91 N.M. 788, 581 P.2d 1283, 1978 N.M. LEXIS 944 (N.M. 1978).

Where the shotgun in the trunk of decedent’s car that was parked on company premises, accidentally fired killing decedent, the decedent’s death did not arise from a risk incident to his employment and workmen’s compensation was properly denied. Ward v. Halliburton Co., 1966-NMSC-124, 76 N.M. 463, 415 P.2d 847, 1966 N.M. LEXIS 2680 (N.M. 1966).

Where an employee was no longer disabled at the time of the original judgment and his subsequent motion to increase compensation was really an action to recover compensation benefits under 52-1-28 NMSA 1978 by medical testimony of a causal connection between the accidental injury and the subsequent surgery, the original judgment was a conclusive bar as to every issue that was or could have been litigated in the previous case. Sena v. Gardner Bridge Co., 1979-NMCA-042, 93 N.M. 358, 600 P.2d 304, 1979 N.M. App. LEXIS 861 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 675, 593 P.2d 1078, 1979 N.M. LEXIS 1406 (N.M. 1979).

Despite argument by employer and its insurer that, because none of an employee’s doctors specifically mentioned the word “disability,” using “injury” or “accident” instead, the mandatory requisites of former 59-10-13.3B, 1953 Comp., had not been met, a medical expert was not required to state an opinion in positive, dogmatic language or in the exact language of the statute, and the employee was properly awarded total and permanent disability benefits. Trujillo v. Beaty Elec. Co., 1978-NMCA-021, 91 N.M. 533, 577 P.2d 431, 1978 N.M. App. LEXIS 541 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978).

Under former 59-10-13.3, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-28 NMSA 1978), the surviving husband of a state agency employee who died from injuries she sustained in a motor vehicle accident, was not entitled to workmen’s compensation benefits because his deceased wife was not performing any duties of her employment at the time of the accident, even though travel on the employer’s business required the employee to be on the road after work. Edens v. New Mexico Health & Social Servs. Dep't, 1975-NMCA-064, 88 N.M. 366, 540 P.2d 846, 1975 N.M. App. LEXIS 710 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975), rev'd, 1976-NMSC-008, 89 N.M. 60, 547 P.2d 65, 1976 N.M. LEXIS 788 (N.M. 1976).

Where an employer denied a causal connection between a claimant’s alleged disability and a work-related accident, the claimant was required to prove that fact as a medical probability by expert medical testimony under 52-1-28(B) NMSA 1978. The claimant did not have to prove disability by a reasonable medical certainty. Archuleta v. Safeway Stores, 1986-NMCA-092, 104 N.M. 769, 727 P.2d 77, 1986 N.M. App. LEXIS 659 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).

Where an employee was injured in the course of his employment, and as a result one eye could not be corrected by glasses as well after the injury as before, he was entitled to compensation whether or not there was a change in his vision without glasses because he lost partial use of the eye and of its function; trial court’s finding that the eye condition was a natural and direct result of a work-related accident was supported by proof as required by former 59-10-13.3(B), 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-28 NMSA 1978). Sessing v. Yates Drilling Co., 1964-NMSC-225, 74 N.M. 550, 395 P.2d 824, 1964 N.M. LEXIS 2298 (N.M. 1964).

Section 52-1-28A(1) NMSA 1978 did not allow compensation to a police officer who suffered a heart attack while jogging near his home because he was engaged in self-directed, off-duty athletic activity; it was immaterial that the officer was attempting to become sufficiently physically fit to receive his mandatory law enforcement certification because physical activity was off-hours, off-premises, and not under the employer’s control and because there was no requirement that the officer prepare for the certification in any particular way or at all. Meeks v. Eddy County Sheriff's Dep't, 1994-NMCA-134, 118 N.M. 643, 884 P.2d 534, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 129 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 118 N.M. 731, 885 P.2d 1325, 1994 N.M. LEXIS 413 (N.M. 1994).

Denial of a claim for workers’ compensation benefits under 52-1-28A(1) NMSA 1978 was affirmed where there was sufficient evidence in the record as a whole to support the finding that wrestling horseplay was not a regular incident of the claimant’s employment. Woods v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 1992-NMCA-046, 114 N.M. 162, 836 P.2d 81, 1992 N.M. App. LEXIS 38 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 744, 832 P.2d 1223, 1992 N.M. LEXIS 166 (N.M. 1992).

Trial court properly denied worker’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits because a mental disability due to perceived job harassment was not compensable in a workers’ compensation case in New Mexico; a disability could not be based on something imagined and had to be a natural and direct result of a work related accident. Green v. City of Albuquerque, 1991-NMCA-104, 112 N.M. 784, 819 P.2d 1342, 1991 N.M. App. LEXIS 204 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).

Substantial evidence supported a hearing examiner’s finding that a decedent’s heart attack was causally related to on-the-job stress and that a claimant was therefore entitled to death benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act (52-1-1 NMSA 1978); the claimant was not required under 52-1-28B NMSA 1978 to prove that stress was the only factor causing the fatal heart attack, but only that the heart attack was more likely than not the result of stress, and the requirement of a job-related injury was met where a preexisting condition was aggravated by employment-related stress. Herman v. Miners' Hosp., 1991-NMSC-021, 111 N.M. 550, 807 P.2d 734, 1991 N.M. LEXIS 108 (N.M. 1991).

Legislature intended to include psychological injuries arising out of work-related accidents within the coverage of the Workers’ Compensation Act, under 52-1-28 NMSA 1978, but to exclude compensation for purely mental injuries. Maestas v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 1990-NMCA-092, 110 N.M. 609, 798 P.2d 210, 1990 N.M. App. LEXIS 105 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied, 110 N.M. 653, 798 P.2d 1039, 1990 N.M. LEXIS 307 (N.M. 1990), overruled in part, Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148, 2001 N.M. LEXIS 376 (N.M. 2001), overruled in part as stated in Richey v. Hammond Conservancy Dist., No. 32847, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 12 (N.M. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2015).

Worker’s death at his place of employment did not satisfy the “arising out of” employment requirement of the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act, 52-1-28 NMSA 1978, where the insurer overcame the presumption that the worker’s death arose out of his employment by showing that the worker’s homicide had nothing to do with his job. Mortgage Inv. Co. v. Griego, 1989-NMSC-014, 108 N.M. 240, 771 P.2d 173, 1989 N.M. LEXIS 82 (N.M. 1989).

It is only necessary to reach a discussion of 52-1-28B NMSA 1978 if an employer or insurance company deny that an alleged disability is a natural and direct result of an accident. In such a situation, the worker or next of kin must then prove a “causal connection” between the accident and the disability which, if established, makes it pointless to proceed backwards to a determination of the requirements specified in 52-1-28A NMSA 1978. Oliver v. Albuquerque, 1987-NMSC-096, 106 N.M. 350, 742 P.2d 1055, 1987 N.M. LEXIS 3741 (N.M. 1987).

Although not licensed to practice medicine in New Mexico, the expert witness could have been qualified on other foundations to testify in an employee’s workmen’s compensation action; lack of state license was an insufficient basis for the exclusion of the testimony. Madrid v. University of California, 1987-NMSC-022, 105 N.M. 715, 737 P.2d 74, 1987 N.M. LEXIS 3830 (N.M. 1987).

Because a doctor testified that an employee’s disability resulted from an on-the-job back injury the evidence was sufficient to establish causation under 52-1-28B NMSA 1978 of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Beyale v. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 1986-NMCA-071, 105 N.M. 112, 729 P.2d 1366, 1986 N.M. App. LEXIS 677 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).

Trial court improperly considered an employee’s post-injury breast cancer in determining that the employee suffered a permanent partial disability and that she was unable to work, because the employee, her employer, and the employer’s insurer stipulated and the trial court found that her cancer was not causally related to her employment; under 52-1-28 NMSA 1978, liability for workers’ compensation claims was imposed only when the employee’s disability was a natural and direct result of the accident, and the employee failed to establish a causal connection between her compensable injury and her cancer as required by 52-1-25 NMSA 1978. Clavery v. ZIA Co., 1986-NMCA-056, 104 N.M. 321, 720 P.2d 1262, 1986 N.M. App. LEXIS 615 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).

Section 52-1-28B NMSA 1978 did not require the worker to exclude all other possible factors in establishing a work-related injury as long as there was substantial evidence of a “causal connection” between the injury and the employment. Lopez v. Smith's Management Corp., 1986-NMCA-054, 106 N.M. 416, 744 P.2d 544, 1986 N.M. App. LEXIS 717 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).

Where an employee had been released to return to work after sustaining injuries, the court was able to apply the uncontradicted medical evidence pursuant to 52-1-28B NMSA 1978, which required the employee to prove causal connections between the disability and accident as a medical probability by expert medical testimony, to discredit medical testimony that was suspicious where the inference from the facts was that the employee was able to work in spite of his injuries given he had been released to return to work after his prior injuries. Hernandez v. Mead Foods, 1986-NMCA-020, 104 N.M. 67, 716 P.2d 645, 1986 N.M. App. LEXIS 591 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).

Special errand exception possibly applied to an employee injured returning to work from speech therapy that was focused to help the employee gain skills needed to operate a flower shop; to establish a compensable claim under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the claimant had to prove that: he sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his or her employment and the accident was reasonably incident to the worker’s employment pursuant to 52-1-28 NMSA 1978. Barton v. Las Cositas, 1984-NMCA-136, 102 N.M. 312, 694 P.2d 1377, 1984 N.M. App. LEXIS 746 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984).

Under 52-1-28A(3) NMSA 1978, workers’ compensation is allowed when the disability is a natural and direct result of the accident; the primary test of disability is the capacity to perform work; an award was upheld for workers’ compensation benefits for total permanent disability arising out of a heart attack while on the job. Bufalino v. Safeway Stores, 1982-NMCA-127, 98 N.M. 560, 650 P.2d 844, 1982 N.M. App. LEXIS 916 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982).

Widow’s presentation of the expert testimony of a pathologist as to a causal connection between a worker’s fatal heart attack and his employment was adequate to show that the widow was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits; the pathologist demonstrated a sufficient knowledge of cardiology to show that her opinion was credible and 52-1-28B NMSA 1978 only required that the widow show by a medical probability that a causal connection existed between an alleged disability and employment and did not limit the means for meeting that burden of proof to expert testimony on causation by a specialist in the area of injury. Turner v. New Mexico State Highway Dep't, 1982-NMCA-097, 98 N.M. 256, 648 P.2d 8, 1982 N.M. App. LEXIS 891 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794, 1982 N.M. LEXIS 2951 (N.M. 1982).

Where an employee became nauseated after eating a doughnut at work and placed a pen down her throat to try to induce vomiting, her injury from swallowing the pen did not arise out of employment entitling her to workmen’s compensation benefits because, under 52-1-9B NMSA 1978 and 52-1-28A NMSA 1978, swallowing the pen was not a risk of her employment. Losinski v. Drs. Corcoran,  Barkoff & Stagnone, P. A., 1981-NMCA-127, 97 N.M. 79, 636 P.2d 898, 1981 N.M. App. LEXIS 803 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).

Where an employee was traveling home from a business trip when he was killed in a one car automobile accident, the employee’s widow was entitled to workmen’s compensation, as the employee was in the course of his employment when the accident occurred, pursuant to 59-10-13.3, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-28 NMSA 1978). Clark v. Electronic City, 1977-NMCA-048, 90 N.M. 477, 565 P.2d 348, 1977 N.M. App. LEXIS 613 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977).

Trial court’s finding that an employee was not disabled within the meaning of former 59-10-13.3, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-28 NMSA 1978) and therefore not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits was not manifestly wrong or clearly opposed to the evidence where the employee’s treating physician testified that the employee was not disabled. Martinez v. Universal Constructors, 1971-NMCA-160, 83 N.M. 283, 491 P.2d 171, 1971 N.M. App. LEXIS 769 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971).

Denial of an employee’s request to set aside a general release of a workmen’s compensation claim based upon a latent injury, under former 59-10-13.3A(3), 1953 Comp., was proper where the evidence supported the notion that the employee’s subsequent injury was not caused by his work accident. Chaffins v. Jelco Inc., 1971-NMCA-071, 82 N.M. 666, 486 P.2d 75, 1971 N.M. App. LEXIS 702 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 83 N.M. 22, 487 P.2d 1092, 1971 N.M. LEXIS 1633 (N.M. 1971).

Where a widow filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits and argued that her husband’s heart attack was brought on by strenuous activity he performed at work, but the husband’s treating doctor gave his opinion that there was no causal connection as a medical probability between the myocardial infarction which caused his death and his activities at work, the widow failed to raise a genuine issue of fact on the issue of causal relationship; the doctor’s medical testimony did not reasonably connote what former 59-10-13.3(B), 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-28 NMSA 1978) required, and an award of compensation could not be based on speculation or on mere medical possibility of a causal connection. Bertelle v. Gallup, 1970-NMCA-095, 81 N.M. 755, 473 P.2d 369, 1970 N.M. App. LEXIS 630 (N.M. Ct. App. 1970).

Employee failed to meet his burden under 52-1-28 NMSA 1978 because the mere production of experts testifying as to a causal connection between the employee’s injury and disability did not satisfy the requirements of the statute; one expert testified that the employee had the back condition all his life, given considerable arthritic changes around it and no evidence of a traumatic episode casing the alleged disability. Gallegos v. Kennedy, 1968-NMSC-170, 79 N.M. 590, 446 P.2d 642, 1968 N.M. LEXIS 2016 (N.M. 1968).

Appellee employee provided proof of a concurrence of reduction, stated in percentages, of ability to perform work undertaken when injured and other work for which he had been qualified; the employee’s physician testified that in his opinion, the employee was 100 percent disabled to do the kind of work he had been doing at the time of injury or the type being performed at the time of trial and whether or not the employee was suffering from some defect or condition arising prior to his employment by appellant employer, he was doing his work and had been doing it for many months prior to the incident that incapacitated him. Ortega v. New Mexico State Highway Dep't, 77 N.M. 185, 420 P.2d 771, 1966 N.M. LEXIS 2800 (N.M. 1966).

Where causal connection is denied by an employer, in order to prevail, it is incumbent upon a claimant to present one or more qualified medical experts to testify that in his or their opinion there is a causal connection as a medical probability as opposed to possibility. Gammon v. Ebasco Corp., 1965-NMSC-015, 74 N.M. 789, 399 P.2d 279, 1965 N.M. LEXIS 1500 (N.M. 1965).

Words “natural and direct,” as used in former 59-1-13.3, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-28A(3) NMSA 1978), signify an understandable and reasonable proximity of cause and effect as distinguished from remote and doubtful consequences resulting from a given occurrence; if a disability is established by expert medical testimony to be the result of an accidental injury, as a medical probability, as opposed to a medical possibility, the requirements of the statute have been satisfied. Stuckey v. Furr Food Cafeteria, 1963-NMSC-064, 72 N.M. 15, 380 P.2d 172, 1963 N.M. LEXIS 1918 (N.M. 1963).