A. All judgments based upon a supplementary compensation order pursuant to Section 52-5-10 NMSA 1978 shall be against the defendants and each of them for the amount then due and shall also contain an order upon the defendants for the payment to the worker, at regular intervals during the continuance of his disability, the further amounts he is entitled to receive. The judgment shall be so framed as to accomplish the purpose and intent of the Workers’ Compensation Act [52-1-1 NMSA 1978] in all particulars. In addition to executions for any amount already due in the judgment, executions for amounts to become due in the future shall be issued by the clerk of the court at any time after the time provided in the judgment for the payment thereof if the worker files his affidavit with the clerk that the same is unpaid and that his disability still continues; provided, however, if application is made for a physical examination of the worker under Section 52-1-51 NMSA 1978, issuance of execution shall await the further order of a workers’ compensation judge.
B. All judgments and executions based upon a supplementary compensation order pursuant to Section 52-5-10 NMSA 1978 issued in workers’ compensation cases shall be governed by the laws of this state with respect to judgments or executions in civil cases and shall have the same force and effect.
C. When a judgment or execution based upon a supplementary compensation order pursuant to Section 52-5-10 NMSA 1978 is paid or satisfied by a defendant who has an agreement that the judgment or execution should have been paid or satisfied by another party as insurer, guarantor, surety or otherwise, the defendant is entitled to judgment over against the party in the same case. Application for judgment shall be made within ninety days after judgment is paid or execution satisfied. Notice shall be given to the party against whom judgment over is sought, and the application shall be heard according to the procedures for notice and hearing of motions in other civil actions.
D. In any case where the employer has failed to file the undertaking or certificate required by Section 52-1-4 NMSA 1978, the court has power to enforce compliance with any judgment or order granted in a case against the employer by proceedings in contempt against a party failing or refusing to comply.
HISTORY:
Laws 1929, ch. 113, § 15; C.S. 1929, § 156-115; 1941 Comp., § 57-916; 1953 59-10-16; Laws 1959, ch. 67, § 17; 1986, ch. 22, § 10; 1989, ch. 263, § 21.
Notes to Decisions
Construction with other law.
Trial court’s failure to issue any factual findings or any legal conclusions in conjunction with its grant of the employer and the insurer’s motion to dismiss the workmen’s compensation action that the employee claimant filed did not invalidate that ruling; although former 21-1-1(41)B, 1953 Comp. requires a trial court to make findings if it rendered a judgment against a plaintiff, former 21-1-1(52)B(a)(6), 1953 Comp. stated that the employee’s failure to either make a general written request for findings or to tender specific findings waived the right to require the issuance of such findings and former 59-10-13.9, 1953 Comp. provided that the fact that the claimant filed a workmen’s compensation action did not preclude applying the terms of former 21-1-1(52)B(a)(6), 1953 Comp. because that waiver provision did not directly conflict with any workmen’s compensation law. Guidry v. Petty Concrete Co., 77 N.M. 531, 424 P.2d 806, 1967 N.M. LEXIS 2663 (N.M. 1967).
Costs.
Assessment of the costs of jury fees for two days plus the filing or docket fee against an employer and its insurance carrier in an employee’s action for workers’ compensation benefits was erroneous because there was no authority for imposing those items of cost. Reck v. Robert E. McKee Gen. Contractors, 1955-NMSC-074, 59 N.M. 492, 287 P.2d 61, 1955 N.M. LEXIS 1055 (N.M. 1955).
Double recovery.
Where a trial court’s order required the New Mexico Subsequent Injury Fund to pay a percentage of all benefits due to an injured worker, and the order resulted in a partial double recovery by the worker, the matter was remanded; the trial court was directed to enter a judgment that specified a quantifiable sum of compensation due to the worker. Mares v. Valencia County Sheriff's Dep't, 1988-NMCA-003, 106 N.M. 744, 749 P.2d 1123, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 2 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).
Evidence.
—Inadmissible.
Because 52-1-38A NMSA 1978 plainly mandated that a quantifiable sum be specified for medical expenses proved at trial, and, pursuant to 52-1-35A NMSA 1978 workers’ compensation claims, including medical expenses, were to be resolved at trial, a trial court’s refusal to receive additional medical bills into evidence after a judgment had been rendered was not error. Di Matteo v. County of Dona Ana, 1985-NMCA-099, 104 N.M. 599, 725 P.2d 575, 1985 N.M. App. LEXIS 633 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985).
Interest.
Because the granting of interest on a workmen’s compensation award was within the discretion of the trial court and was not a matter of right under former 59-10-16 and 50-6-3, 1953 Comp., and the employee had not shown an abuse of discretion, there was no error in the trial court’s failure to award interest. Trujillo v. Beaty Elec. Co., 1978-NMCA-021, 91 N.M. 533, 577 P.2d 431, 1978 N.M. App. LEXIS 541 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978).
Interlocutory appeals.
A workers’ compensation claimant was not entitled to an interlocutory appeal of the hearing officer’s denial of the claimant’s motion to dismiss the employer and the insurer’s petition that sought a reduction in the workers’ compensation benefits that the claimant was receiving. Sanchez v. Bradbury & Stamm Constr., 1989-NMCA-076, 109 N.M. 47, 781 P.2d 319, 1989 N.M. App. LEXIS 73 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 54, 781 P.2d 782, 1989 N.M. LEXIS 309 (N.M. 1989).
Judgment.
Award of compensation that stated that medical care, physician, hospital, and medication costs were the obligation of the insurer was uncertain and not in accordance with 52-1-38 NMSA 1978 and required a remand for a determination of the actual amount of the costs. Di Matteo v. County of Dona Ana, 1985-NMCA-099, 104 N.M. 599, 725 P.2d 575, 1985 N.M. App. LEXIS 633 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985).
Where an injured employee motioned to reopen his claim for workmen’s compensation over three years after entry of a final judgment disposing of his claim, the order reopening judgment was not an appealable order under statute, because it lacked any semblance of finality and did not adjudicate any rights of the parties. Davis v. Meadors-Cherry Co., 1957-NMSC-093, 63 N.M. 285, 317 P.2d 901, 1957 N.M. LEXIS 970 (N.M. 1957).
Even though a workmen’s compensation judgment has been entered, execution may be denied if application has been made for physical examination in accordance with § 57-920, 1941 Comp. (now 52-1-51 NMSA 1978). Fowler v. W. G. Const. Co., 1947-NMSC-049, 51 N.M. 441, 188 P.2d 160, 1947 N.M. LEXIS 775 (N.M. 1947).
Jurisdiction.
New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Act did not limit the court’s continuing jurisdiction to enforce prior workers’ compensation awards only to instances where the worker or employer has moved to increase or diminish disability benefits; both 52-1-38 NMSA 1978 and 52-1-56 NMSA 1978 invested the court with continuing jurisdiction in workers’ compensation actions. St. Clair v. County of Grant, 1990-NMCA-087, 110 N.M. 543, 797 P.2d 993, 1990 N.M. App. LEXIS 87 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).
In a workers’ compensation matter, the trial court had continuing jurisdiction under 52-1-38 NMSA 1978, 52-1-49 NMSA 1978 and 52-1-56 NMSA 1978 to enforce its original judgment requiring defendants to pay all reasonably necessary future medical benefits to the claimant, including future home nursing and attendant care expenses; the decision was nevertheless subject to compliance with the provisions of Rules 1-059 or 1-060 NMRA to provide proof of such expenses. St. Clair v. County of Grant, 1990-NMCA-087, 110 N.M. 543, 797 P.2d 993, 1990 N.M. App. LEXIS 87 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).
Under 52-1-38 NMSA 1978, the trial court had continuing jurisdiction to enforce its original judgment requiring the insurance company and the county to pay all reasonably necessary future medical benefits to the claimant, including reasonable and necessary future home nursing and attendant care expenses incurred by the claimant following the entry of the initial judgment. St. Clair v. County of Grant, 1990-NMCA-087, 110 N.M. 543, 797 P.2d 993, 1990 N.M. App. LEXIS 87 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).
In an action by the personal representative of a decedent widow’s estate against an employer and an insurer for workers’ compensation benefits awarded for the death of the widow’s husband, the widow’s failure to file an affidavit of non-payment did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed in the representative’s action. Clauss v. Electronic City, 1979-NMCA-066, 93 N.M. 75, 596 P.2d 518, 1979 N.M. App. LEXIS 835 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979).
Although a suit filed by an employer and its insurer, which sought reimbursement of workmen’s compensation payments made to the employee, was dismissed, the trial court still had jurisdiction over employee’s counterclaim for total permanent disability pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act, former 59-10-1 to 59-10-37, 1953 Comp., because the rules of civil procedure applied to workmen’s compensation cases under former 59-10-13.9, 1953 Comp., because counterclaims such as the one filed by the employee were allowed by the rules of civil procedure under former 21-1-1(13), 1953 Comp., and because the counterclaim was not prohibited by the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Sentry Ins. Co. v. Gallegos, 1975-NMCA-008, 87 N.M. 249, 531 P.2d 1222, 1975 N.M. App. LEXIS 617 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 239, 531 P.2d 1212, 1975 N.M. LEXIS 792 (N.M. 1975).
Liability.
In a workers’ compensation case, where the former New Mexico Subsequent Injury Fund is joined as a party, and where it is alleged that the Fund is liable for paying a portion of a worker’s disability, a trial court is required to adopt a finding that specifically apportions the extent of liability between an employer or its insurer and the Fund; an appellate court will not second-guess the fact-finder as to its apportionment of liability if the apportionment is supported by substantial evidence. Mares v. Valencia County Sheriff's Dep't, 1988-NMCA-003, 106 N.M. 744, 749 P.2d 1123, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 2 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).
Payments.
In an action in which the uncontradicted evidence showed that a workmen’s compensation claimant was totally disabled within the meaning of former 59-10-12.18, 1953 Comp., the court’s award of benefits for a temporary total disability did not violate former 59-10-16A, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-38 NMSA 1978), even though the claimant argued that the judgment should have provided for compensation for 600 weeks from the date of the accident. The judgment provided for the payment of weekly benefits of a specified amount from the date of the accident to entry of the judgment, and because total disability payments are to be made “during the period of that disability,” pursuant to former 59-10-18.2, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-41 NMSA 1978), the judgment stated the “further amounts he was entitled to receive,” as required by former 59-10-16A, 1953 Comp. (now 52-1-38 NMSA 1978). Pacheco v. Alamo Sheet Metal Works, 1978-NMCA-057, 91 N.M. 730, 580 P.2d 498, 1978 N.M. App. LEXIS 571 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978).
Relief from judgment.
Although the Workmen’s Compensation Act does not provide a method of procedure by which a workman can return to court after an initial claim is settled and final judgment is entered, the Act is governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure except where the provisions of the Act directly conflict with those rules, pursuant to former 59-10-13.9 NMSA 1953; thus, former 21-1-1(60)(b) NMSA 1953 [now Rule 1-060(B), NMRA] is generally used when a worker seeks relief from a judgment. Ruiz v. City of Albuquerque, 1978-NMCA-015, 91 N.M. 526, 577 P.2d 424, 1978 N.M. App. LEXIS 540 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 491, 576 P.2d 297, 1978 N.M. LEXIS 1008 (N.M. 1978).
Workers’ compensation.
Under former 1929 Code, 156-124, the worker who released a negligent third party from liability after the negligent third party caused his injuries, without the knowledge or the consent of his employer and its insurer, was estopped from claiming benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Law as he deprived the employer and its insurer of their rights to subrogation from the negligent third party. White v. New Mexico Highway Comm'n, 1938-NMSC-060, 42 N.M. 626, 83 P.2d 457, 1938 N.M. LEXIS 64 (N.M. 1938).