A. It is the duty of the worker at the time of the worker’s employment or thereafter at the request of the employer to submit to examination by a physician or surgeon duly authorized to practice medicine in the state, or by a physician assistant, advanced practice registered nurse or certified nurse-midwife working within that person’s scope of practice, who shall be paid by the employer, for the purpose of determining the worker’s physical condition.
B. It is also the duty of the worker, if required, to give the names, addresses, relationship and degree of dependency of the worker’s dependents, if any, or any subsequent change thereof to the employer, and when the employer or the employer’s insurance carrier requires, the worker shall make a detailed verified statement relating to such dependents, matters of employment and other information incident thereto.
C. It is also the duty of the worker, if requested by the employer or the employer’s insurance carrier, to make a detailed verified statement as part of an application for employment disclosing specifically any preexisting permanent physical impairment.
HISTORY:
Laws 1929, ch. 113, § 23; C.S. 1929, § 156-123; 1941 Comp., § 57-924; 1953 59-10-24; 1987, ch. 235, § 25; 2015, ch. 116, § 14.
Amendment Notes.
The 2015 amendment, effective June 19, 2015, in A, substituted “the worker's” for “his” twice, deleted “himself” following “submit” and added “or by a physician assistant, advanced practice registered nurse or certified nurse-midwife working within that person's scope of practice; in B, substituted “the worker’s dependents” for “his dependents” and “the employer’s insurance” for “his insurance”; in C, substituted “the employer’s insurance” for “his insurance” and deleted “as that term is defined in Section 52-2-6 NMSA 1978” at the end; and made a stylistic change.
Temporary provisions.
Laws 2015, ch. 116, § 16, effective June 19, 2015, provides “By January 1, 2016, every cabinet secretary, agency head and head of a political subdivision of the state shall update rules requiring an examination by, a certificate from or a statement of a licensed physician to also accept such examination, certificate or statement from an advanced practice registered nurse, certified nurse-midwife or physician assistant working within that person's scope of practice.”
Notes to Decisions
Findings.
Given that one purpose of the former Subsequent Injury Act was to encourage the rehiring and retention of workers who had suffered injuries resulting in permanent impairments and provide that knowledge of a permanent impairment due to an earlier injury could be inferred, where a certificate of preexisting impairment was not filed until after a worker’s job-related accident, an employer was still entitled to recover against the subsequent injury fund. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Chavez, 1990-NMCA-133, 111 N.M. 366, 805 P.2d 633, 1990 N.M. App. LEXIS 146 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990).
Pre-existing impairment.
Subsequent Injury Act, former 52-2-1 to 52-2-13 NMSA 1978, is intended to encourage the hiring and retention of handicapped persons and to make logical and equitable adjustments of the employer’s liability; the purpose of filing a certificate is to provide notice to the employer of any pre-existing disability and to document the nature and extent of the disability. Therefore, a trial court properly found that the Subsequent Injury Fund was not liable for any portion of the workers’ compensation benefits awarded to the claimant, pursuant to former 52-2-6 NMSA 1978, because the employer did not have actual knowledge of the claimant’s preexisting physical impairment, and the certificate of preexisting physical impairment was not executed or filed until after the subsequent injury; it did not matter that the employer might have made diligent efforts to ascertain the existence of a pre-existing injury. Padilla v. Chavez, 1987-NMCA-001, 105 N.M. 349, 732 P.2d 876, 1987 N.M. App. LEXIS 664 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987).
Question of law or fact.
Where question of fact existed as to whether claimant’s injuries were latent, the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment in favor of an employer and its insurer, after finding that the claim was filed outside the limitations period provided by former 59-10-13.6, 1953 Comp. Linton v. Mauer-Neuer Meat Packers, 1963-NMSC-013, 71 N.M. 305, 378 P.2d 126, 1963 N.M. LEXIS 1874 (N.M. 1963).