A. A motion to terminate parental rights may be filed at any stage of the abuse or neglect proceeding by a party to the proceeding.
B. The motion for termination of parental rights shall set forth:
(1) the date, place of birth and marital status of the child, if known;
(2) the grounds for termination and the facts and circumstances supporting the grounds for termination;
(3) the names and addresses of the persons or authorized agency or agency officer to whom legal custody might be transferred;
(4) whether the child resides or has resided with a foster parent who desires to adopt this child;
(5) whether the motion is in contemplation of adoption;
(6) the relationship or legitimate interest of the moving party to the child; and
(7) whether the child is subject to the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 [25 USCS § 1901 et seq.] and, if so:
(a) the tribal affiliations of the child’s parents;
(b) the specific actions taken by the moving party to notify the parents’ tribes and the results of the contacts, including the names, addresses, titles and telephone numbers of the persons contacted. Copies of any correspondence with the tribes shall be attached as exhibits to the petition; and
(c) what specific efforts were made to comply with the placement preferences set forth in the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 [25 USCS § 1901 et seq.] or the placement preferences of the appropriate Indian tribes.
C. Notice of the filing of the motion, accompanied by a copy of the motion, shall be served by the moving party on all other parties, the foster parent, preadoptive parent or relative providing care for the child with whom the child is residing, foster parents with whom the child has resided for six months within the previous twelve months, the custodian of the child, any person appointed to represent any party and any other person the court orders. Service shall be in accordance with the Children’s Court Rules for the service of motions, except that foster parents and attorneys of record in this proceeding shall be served by certified mail. The notice shall state specifically that the person served shall file a written response to the motion within twenty days if the person intends to contest the termination. In any case involving a child subject to the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 [25 USCS § 1901 et seq.], notice shall also be sent by certified mail to the tribes of the child’s parents and upon any “Indian custodian” as that term is defined in 25 U.S.C. Section 1903(6). Further notice shall not be required on a parent who has been provided notice previously pursuant to Section 32A-4-17 NMSA 1978 and who failed to make an appearance.
D. When a motion to terminate parental rights is filed, the moving party shall request a hearing on the motion. The hearing date shall be at least thirty days, but no more than sixty days, after service is effected upon the parties entitled to service under this section. The moving party shall also file a motion for court-ordered mediation between the parent and any prospective adoptive parent to discuss an open adoption agreement. If an open adoption agreement is reached at any time before termination of parental rights, it shall be made a part of the court record.
E. In any action for the termination of parental rights brought by a party other than the department and involving a child in the legal custody of the department, the department may:
(1) litigate a motion for the termination of parental rights that was initially filed by another party; or
(2) move that the motion for the termination of parental rights be found premature and denied.
F. When a motion to terminate parental rights is filed, the department shall perform concurrent planning.
G. When a child has been in foster care for not less than fifteen of the previous twenty-two months, the department shall file a motion to terminate parental rights, unless:
(1) a parent has made substantial progress toward eliminating the problem that caused the child’s placement in foster care; it is likely that the child will be able to safely return to the parent’s home within three months; and the child’s return to the parent’s home will be in the child’s best interests;
(2) the child has a close and positive relationship with a parent and a permanent plan that does not include termination of parental rights will provide the most secure and appropriate placement for the child;
(3) the child is fourteen years of age or older, is firmly opposed to termination of parental rights and is likely to disrupt an attempt to place the child with an adoptive family;
(4) a parent is terminally ill, but in remission, and does not want parental rights to be terminated; provided that the parent has designated a guardian for the child;
(5) the child is not capable of functioning if placed in a family setting. In such a case, the court shall reevaluate the status of the child every ninety days unless there is a final court determination that the child cannot be placed in a family setting;
(6) grounds do not exist for termination of parental rights;
(7) the child is an unaccompanied, refugee minor and the situation regarding the child involves international legal issues or compelling foreign policy issues;
(8) adoption is not an appropriate plan for the child; or
(9) the parent’s incarceration or participation in a court-ordered residential substance abuse treatment program constitutes the primary factor in the child’s placement in substitute care and termination of parental rights is not in the child’s best interest.
H. For purposes of this section, a child shall be considered to have entered foster care on the earlier of:
(1) the date of the first judicial finding that the child has been abused or neglected; or
(2) the date that is sixty days after the date on which the child was removed from the home.
I. The grounds for any attempted termination shall be proved by clear and convincing evidence. In any proceeding involving a child subject to the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 [25 USCS § 1901 et seq.], the grounds for any attempted termination shall be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and shall meet the requirements set forth in 25 U.S.C. Section 1912(f).
J. When the court terminates parental rights, it shall appoint a custodian for the child and fix responsibility for the child’s support.
K. In any termination proceeding involving a child subject to the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 [25 USCS § 1901 et seq.], the court shall in any termination order make specific findings that the requirements of that act have been met.
L. A judgment of the court terminating parental rights divests the parent of all legal rights and privileges and dispenses with both the necessity for the consent to or receipt of notice of any subsequent adoption proceeding concerning the child. A judgment of the court terminating parental rights shall not affect the child’s rights of inheritance from and through the child’s biological parents.
M. When the court denies a motion to terminate parental rights, the court shall issue appropriate orders immediately. The court shall direct the parties to file a stipulated order and interim plan or a request for hearing within thirty days of the date of the hearing denying the termination of parental rights.
HISTORY:
1978 32A-4-29, enacted by Laws 1993, ch. 77, § 123; 1997, ch. 34, § 10; 1999, ch. 77, § 11; 2001, ch. 315, § 1; 2003, ch. 108, § 1; 2005, ch. 189, § 52; 2009, ch. 239, § 49.
Amendment Notes.
The 2005 amendment, effective June 17, 2005, in Subsection A, substituted “by a party to the proceeding” for the former last sentence inclusive of Paragraphs A(1) through (3), which listed entities eligible to initiate a neglect of abuse proceeding; in Subsection B, deleted “shall be signed, verified by the moving party and filed with the court. The motion” following “parental rights”; in Paragraph B(3) and Subsection E, inserted “legal”; deleted former Subsection C, which pertained to a court determination of whether a parent, who has not previously been a party to the proceeding, should become a party based on whether the parent has established a protected liberty interest in his relationship with the child, and redesignated former Subsection D as Subsection C; in Subsection C, substituted “Children’s Court Rules for the service of motions” for “Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts for the service of motions in a civil action in this state”; deleted former Subsections E through G, which pertained to services of individuals when identity is not known, motions for termination of parental rights, and assurances by the court that a child will be represented in all parental rights termination proceedings by a guardian ad litem, respectively, and redesignated the remaining subsections accordingly; and in Paragraph G(3), substituted “fourteen years of age or older” for “thirteen years of age or older”.
The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, added the last two sentences in (D); added (G)(9); added (M); and made related and stylistic changes.
Applicability.
Laws 2009, ch. 239, § 71 makes the provisions of this act applicable to all children who, on July 1, 2009, are on release or are otherwise eligible to be placed on release as if the Juvenile Public Safety Advisory Board Act had been in effect at the time they were placed on release or became eligible to be released.
Notes to Decisions
Generally.
New Mexico Abuse and Neglect Act explicitly provides for terminating parental rights, but not kinship guardianships. Therefore, a district court erred by dismissing a kinship guardian from a case where her status had not yet been terminated. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Djamila B., 2014-NMCA-045, 322 P.3d 444, 2014 N.M. App. LEXIS 11 (N.M. Ct. App.), aff'd on other grounds, 2015-NMSC-003, 342 P.3d 698, 2014 N.M. LEXIS 393 (N.M. 2014).
Under 32A-4-29F NMSA 1978, an indigent mother is entitled to assistance of counsel at all stages of a proceeding to terminate the mother’s parental rights, including appeals if, in the court’s discretion, the interests of justice require appointment of counsel. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Alice P. (In re Jeramy P.), 1999-NMCA-098, 127 N.M. 664, 986 P.2d 460, 1998 N.M. App. LEXIS 199 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied, 127 N.M. 391, 981 P.2d 1209, 1999 N.M. LEXIS 192 (N.M. 1999).
Termination of parental rights pursuant to a court judgment divests the parent of all legal rights and privileges with respect to the child in question, in accordance with 32A-4-29K NMSA 1978, 32A-4-29L NMSA 1978, and 32A-4-29M NMSA 1978. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. T.J., 1997-NMCA-021, 123 N.M. 99, 934 P.2d 293, 1997 N.M. App. LEXIS 7 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
Active efforts.
Proper standard of proof for determinations of active efforts under the Indian Child Welfare Act is the clear and convincing standard, which is applicable to the underlying termination of parental rights proceedings. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Yodell B., 2016-NMCA-029, 367 P.3d 881, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 133 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
Department met with the father to create a treatment plan and referred him to one parenting class, but did little else to assist him in implementing the plan and instead shouldered the father with the burden of locating and obtaining services and ensuring the service providers were communicating with the department; the evidence was insufficient to show that the Department complied with the active efforts requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act, and because a showing of active efforts is a mandatory predicate to the termination of parental rights under the Act, the termination order was reversed. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Yodell B., 2016-NMCA-029, 367 P.3d 881, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 133 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
Agency reports.
Trial court was found to have properly declared that a mother’s children had been lawfully adopted by the child’s paternal grandparents without the consent of the mother under former 22-2-6D, 1953 Comp. (now 32A-4-28 NMSA 1978) after it considered in part a report from the Child Welfare Division of the New Mexico Department of Public Welfare, which had been provided under former 22-2-7, 1953 Comp. (now 32A-4-29 NMSA 1978), because substantial evidence supported the finding that the mother, who could have contributed to the support of her children, was guilty of gross negligence in that she completely abandoned her responsibilities towards her children for a period of five years and failed to support her children during that time in violation of former 40A-6-2B, 1953 Comp. (now 30-6-2 NMSA 1978). Petition of Quintana, 1972-NMSC-038, 83 N.M. 772, 497 P.2d 1404, 1972 N.M. LEXIS 875 (N.M. 1972).
Applicable rules.
In an action in which the trial court terminated a mother’s parental rights to her 11-year-old daughter, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to former 32-1-55B NMSA 1978, because a series of petitions and amended petitions were filed by the Human Services Department. The Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts, Rules 1-001 to 1-102 NMRA applied to such proceedings, rather than the Children’s Code, former 32-1-1 to 32-1-55 NMSA 1978, and the Children’s Court Rules, Rule 10-101 to 10-311 NMRA; therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the Department to amend its pleadings, pursuant to Rule 1-015(A) NMRA, because the mother, who was aware of the nature of the proceedings and the proposed amendments, was not prejudiced by the amendment. In re Laurie R., 1988-NMCA-055, 107 N.M. 529, 760 P.2d 1295, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 131 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).
Child support.
Section 32A-4-29 NMSA 1978 requires “the court” to appoint a custodian for the child and fix responsibility for the child’s support when it terminates parental rights. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. T.J., 1997-NMCA-021, 123 N.M. 99, 934 P.2d 293, 1997 N.M. App. LEXIS 7 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
Children.
Mother’s due process rights were not violated when a district court denied a motion to continue a termination of parental rights proceeding; the district court attempted to ensure the mother’s participation in the proceedings, it was not in the best interest of the minor children to continue the proceedings indefinitely, and there was clear and convincing evidence to support the termination. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Mafin M. (In re Chance M.), 2003-NMSC-015, 133 N.M. 827, 70 P.3d 1266, 2003 N.M. LEXIS 172 (N.M. 2003).
Because the Children’s Court erred in not ascertaining, as required by 32A-5-21A(5) and (6) NMSA 1978, whether a mother voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived her right to contest a proposed termination of her parental rights, and because the use by the Children, Youth, and Families Department (New Mexico) of a proffer of evidence was an improper means of meeting its burden of establishing grounds for termination by clear and convincing proof, 32A-4-28A and B, and 32A-4-29J NMSA 1978, the termination of the mother’s parental rights was reversed and remanded. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Stella P. (In re Diamond-Jerome P.), 1999-NMCA-100, 127 N.M. 699, 986 P.2d 495, 1999 N.M. App. LEXIS 70 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999).
A father who was incarcerated for sexually abusing his two daughters did not show ineffective assistance despite his claims that counsel should have had the girls independently examined by experts, where his counsel’s decisions were reasonable tactical decisions, and where the father had stipulated in an earlier abuse and neglect proceeding that he had sexually abused his daughters. In re Termination of Parental Rights of James W.H., 1993-NMCA-028, 115 N.M. 256, 849 P.2d 1079, 1993 N.M. App. LEXIS 22 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 115 N.M. 545, 854 P.2d 872, 1993 N.M. LEXIS 179 (N.M. 1993).
Right of a parent to counsel at a proceeding for termination of parental rights includes a right to competent counsel. In re Termination of Parental Rights of James W.H., 1993-NMCA-028, 115 N.M. 256, 849 P.2d 1079, 1993 N.M. App. LEXIS 22 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 115 N.M. 545, 854 P.2d 872, 1993 N.M. LEXIS 179 (N.M. 1993).
Appeals court upheld decision of a trial court judge who balanced the best interests of the minor children and the policy of protecting parental rights in denying maternal grandparents’ adoption petition since they had prevented parent-child contact; former 40-7-4K, 1953 Comp. (now 32A-4-29L and 32A-5-16H NMSA 1978) provided that statutory requisites for termination of parental rights had to be proven by clear and convincing evidence but also required that courts balance the best interests of the children while being sensitive to protecting the parental rights of parents. In re Adoption of Doe, 1984-NMCA-005, 101 N.M. 34, 677 P.2d 1070, 1984 N.M. App. LEXIS 611 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984).
Appeals court upheld decision of a trial court judge who balanced the best interests of the minor children and the policy of protecting parental rights in denying maternal grandparents’ adoption petition since they had prevented parent-child contact; former 40-7-4K, 1953 Comp. (now 32A-4-29L and 32A-5-16H NMSA 1978) provided that statutory requisites for termination of parental rights had to be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re Adoption of Doe, 1984-NMCA-005, 101 N.M. 34, 677 P.2d 1070, 1984 N.M. App. LEXIS 611 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984).
Counsel.
At the hearing regarding whether to terminate the father’s parental rights, the father did not show in the motion for relief from judgment that he filed under Rule 1-060(B)(6) NMRA and the motion for a stay pending the resolution of his appeal that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel where, not having the daughters examined for physical signs of sexual abuse and not having the father take a polygraph test was not prejudicial and was not ineffective assistance of counsel under the standard that was used in criminal cases due to the strong evidence of guilt in the form of the father’s conviction for sexually abusing the daughters and his stipulation in an earlier abuse and neglect proceeding that he had sexually abused them. In re Termination of Parental Rights of James W.H., 1993-NMCA-028, 115 N.M. 256, 849 P.2d 1079, 1993 N.M. App. LEXIS 22 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 115 N.M. 545, 854 P.2d 872, 1993 N.M. LEXIS 179 (N.M. 1993).
Custody.
Under 32A-2-16A NMSA 1978, the jury has no role in the disposition process in delinquency proceedings, and the legislature’s use of the same terminology in the termination of parental rights portion of the Children’s Code, 32A-4-28 and 32A-4-29 NMSA 1978, thus indicates that the jury has no role in the termination process either. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. T.J., 1997-NMCA-021, 123 N.M. 99, 934 P.2d 293, 1997 N.M. App. LEXIS 7 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
32A-4-28 and 32A-4-29 NMSA 1978 clearly refer to the trial judge as making the decision to terminate parental rights rather than to some other fact finder, and by specifically stating that the court is to make the decision to terminate parental rights, and by using that term in situations where it is clear that a judge and not a jury will be the decision maker (such as approving an adoption), the legislature has made it plain that the question presented at termination proceedings will be decided by a judge rather than a jury. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. T.J., 1997-NMCA-021, 123 N.M. 99, 934 P.2d 293, 1997 N.M. App. LEXIS 7 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
Dismissal.
In an action to terminate parental rights, dismissal was not warranted by reason of the fact that the termination hearing was not held within 60 days of service of the motion on the interested parties, as required by 32A-4-29H NMSA 1978. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dept. v. Anne McD. (In re Megan L.), 2000-NMCA-020, 128 N.M. 618, 995 P.2d 1060, 2000 N.M. App. LEXIS 11 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000).
Evidence.
Evidence of abuse and neglect under 32A-4-2B NMSA 1978, which included an injury to a child and more incidents of domestic violence thereafter, met the higher standard of proof set forth in Subsection I of this section and 25 U.S.C.S. § 1912(f) for termination of parental rights in Indian Child Welfare Act cases. State ex rel. Children Youth & Families Dep't v. Arthur C., 2011-NMCA-022, 149 N.M. 472, 251 P.3d 729, 2011 N.M. App. LEXIS 4 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011).
Under 32A-4-29J NMSA 1978 the inability of a mother, who was diagnosed as having borderline personality disorder and borderline intellectual function resulting from cognitive difficulties, neurological soft signs, and seizure activity, to learn to provide the care or control necessary for her children’s well-being is clear and convincing evidence of neglect. State ex rel. Human Servs. Dep't v. Penny J., 1994-NMCA-143, 119 N.M. 328, 890 P.2d 389, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 134 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 119 N.M. 20, 888 P.2d 466, 1994 N.M. LEXIS 449 (N.M. 1994).
Insufficient.
District court improperly terminated a father’s parental rights, where the social workers agreed that the father was motivated to comply with the directives of the Children, Youth & Families Department, and made some steps to improve his parenting skills, and the problem was mainly with the mother, because the record did not contain evidence that the district court could have properly found to be clear and convincing that the department made reasonable efforts to help father terminate his relationship with mother so he could become an adequate parent. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Joseph M., 2006-NMCA-029, 139 N.M. 137, 130 P.3d 198, 2006 N.M. App. LEXIS 6 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
Sufficient.
State was entitled to summary judgment in parental rights termination proceedings against father pursuant to 32A-4-28 and 32A-4-29 NMSA 1978 where state made a prima facie showing by clear and convincing evidence that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law where the father failed to rebut state’s showing; the father, who was imprisoned for murdering the child’s mother, had neglected the child. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Joe R (In re Sara R.), 1997-NMSC-038, 123 N.M. 711, 945 P.2d 76, 1997 N.M. LEXIS 323 (N.M. 1997).
Trial court’s judgment that terminated the parental rights of the Indian father and the mother was affirmed; the evidence was proven beyond a reasonable doubt as required under former 32-1-54 NMSA 1978 that the minor children suffered from deprivation syndrome, and the conditions and causes of neglect and abuse were unlikely to change. In re Wayne R.N., 1988-NMCA-048, 107 N.M. 341, 757 P.2d 1333, 1988 N.M. App. LEXIS 59 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).
Findings.
Section 32A-4-28 and 32A-4-29 NMSA 1978 clearly refer to the judge as making the decision to terminate parental rights rather than to some other fact finder such as a jury. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. T.J., 1997-NMCA-021, 123 N.M. 99, 934 P.2d 293, 1997 N.M. App. LEXIS 7 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
Before terminating the mother’s parental rights, the district court was required to make three separate findings: (1) that the children were abused or neglected, (2) that the conditions and causes of the abuse and neglect were unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, and (3) that the State made reasonable efforts to assist the mother in adjusting the conditions that rendered her unable to properly care for the children. The district court found that all three elements were proved by clear and convincing evidence, as required under 32A-4-29J NMSA 1978, and properly terminated the mother’s parental rights. State v. Eventyr J. (In re Eventyr J.), 1995-NMCA-087, 120 N.M. 463, 902 P.2d 1066, 1995 N.M. App. LEXIS 85 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995).
Nature of hearing.
According to 32A-4-25B NMSA 1978, judicial reviews are held to assess the New Mexico Children, Youth and Families Department’s implementation of a treatment plan and a parent’s progress and compliance with it; such hearings do not conform to the constraints of a usual adversarial hearing, as cross-examination is not conducted and the rules of evidence do not apply. No such exceptions are found in the guiding authority for the conduct of termination hearings; termination hearings are more formal and comply with the rules of court because of the weighty issue final termination of parental rights that is being considered at them. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Erika M. (In re R.C.), 1999-NMCA-036, 126 N.M. 760, 975 P.2d 373, 1999 N.M. App. LEXIS 12 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999).
Practice and procedure.
32A-4-29H NMSA 1978 did not mandate a dismissal of termination proceedings on the basis that a hearing was not held within 60 days. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dept. v. Anne McD. (In re Megan L.), 2000-NMCA-020, 128 N.M. 618, 995 P.2d 1060, 2000 N.M. App. LEXIS 11 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000).
Where a trial court denied the motion for summary judgment filed by a state agency because it was unclear to the court whether practice and procedure allowed for summary judgment in termination of parental rights cases under 32A-4-29 NMSA 1978, the court ruled that the agency was entitled to have its motion for summary judgment considered, because termination proceedings, though initiated in an abuse and neglect case, were governed by the rules of civil procedure; the court noted that if the rules did not apply there would be no stated termination procedure, as the children’s code, 32A-1-1 NMSA 1978, provided none. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't, 1994-NMCA-096, 118 N.M. 352, 881 P.2d 712, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 100 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
Right to counsel.
Wife was not denied equal protection because she was unable to secure counsel; while termination of parental rights cases in New Mexico gave rise to the statutory provision of appointed counsel for indigent parents in those cases pursuant to 32A-4-29F NMSA 1978, a custody issue is not of the same fundamental nature as the potential loss of personal liberty or of access to one’s children because while a parent may be in jeopardy of losing some time with her children, she is not in danger of entirely losing her relationship with them. Thomas v. Thomas, 1999-NMCA-135, 128 N.M. 177, 991 P.2d 7, 1999 N.M. App. LEXIS 105 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 128 N.M. 150, 990 P.2d 824, 1999 N.M. LEXIS 386 (N.M. 1999).
Section 32A-4-29F NMSA 1978 guaranteed an indigent mother court-appointed counsel at all stages of a termination of parental rights proceeding, and counsel was obligated to raise all the contentions of her client, whether or not they were without merit. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Alice P. (In re Jeramy P.), 1999-NMCA-098, 127 N.M. 664, 986 P.2d 460, 1998 N.M. App. LEXIS 199 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied, 127 N.M. 391, 981 P.2d 1209, 1999 N.M. LEXIS 192 (N.M. 1999).
Decree terminating a mother’s parental rights was overturned because it was based on a decree of neglect, which was found to be void because the mother had not been notified of her right to counsel at the neglect hearing. State ex rel. Department of Human Servs. v. Perlman, 1981-NMCA-076, 96 N.M. 779, 635 P.2d 588, 1981 N.M. App. LEXIS 750 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).
Standard of proof.
Notwithstanding that the standard of proof in cases involving the termination of parental rights is clear and convincing evidence, a reviewing court will not reweigh the evidence on appeal nor assess the credibility of the witnesses but rather will view the evidence in a light most favorable to affirmance; the standard of review is therefore whether, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to affirming the termination of parental rights, the trial court could properly determine that the clear and convincing standard was met. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dept. v. Vanessa C., 2000-NMCA-025, 128 N.M. 701, 997 P.2d 833, 2000 N.M. App. LEXIS 13 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 128 N.M. 690, 997 P.2d 822, 2000 N.M. LEXIS 119 (N.M. 2000).
Standard of proof in cases involving the termination of parental rights is clear and convincing evidence. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dept. v. Vanessa C., 2000-NMCA-025, 128 N.M. 701, 997 P.2d 833, 2000 N.M. App. LEXIS 13 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 128 N.M. 690, 997 P.2d 822, 2000 N.M. LEXIS 119 (N.M. 2000).
Standing.
In loco parentis status does not entitle individuals to parental termination proceedings pursuant to former 32-1-55 NMSA 1978 (now 32A-4-29 and 32A-5-16 NMSA 1978). In re Agnes P., 1990-NMCA-091, 110 N.M. 768, 800 P.2d 202, 1990 N.M. App. LEXIS 112 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 110 N.M. 749, 799 P.2d 1121, 1990 N.M. LEXIS 340 (N.M. 1990).
Research References and Practice Aids
New Mexico Law Review.
Note: Family Law-New Mexico Expands Due Process Rights Of Parents In Termination Of Parental Rights: In Re Ruth Anne E., Patricia Fletcher Schroeder, 31 N.M. L. Rev. 439 (2001).