30-31-23.  Controlled substances; possession prohibited.

Constitutionality.

Deportation consequences.

Generally.

Any amount.

Burden of proof.

Construction.

Construction with other law.

Constructive possession.

Defenses.

           —Entrapment.

Double jeopardy.

Enhanced penalty.

Evidence.

           —Admissible.

           —Inadmissible.

           —Insufficient.

           —Sufficient.

Illegal search and seizure.

Instructions.

Jurisdiction.

Possessory.

Practice and procedure.

Probable cause.

Probable cause.

Probation.

Requirements.

Search and seizure.

Sentence.

           —Generally.

Weighing.

In defendant’s appeal from a conviction for unlawful possession of heroin in violation of former 54-11-23, 1953 Comp. (now 30-31-23 NMSA 1978) there was no merit to his claim that the statute violated his constitutional rights because he was a narcotic addict, where defendant presented no evidence of any addiction. State v. Jaramillo, 1975-NMCA-091, 88 N.M. 179, 538 P.2d 1201, 1975 N.M. App. LEXIS 690 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975).

In a prosecution for possession of marijuana weighing more than eight ounces, contrary to former 54-11-23B(3), 1953 Comp. (now 30-31-23 NMSA 1978), the fact that the Controlled Substances Act did not specifically state when the weighing was to be done did not make former 54-11-23B(3), 1953 Comp., void for vagueness; the language of the definitional section coupled with former 54-11-23B(3), 1953 Comp. was not so indefinite that men of common intelligence had to guess at its meaning and scope. State v. Olive, 1973-NMCA-131, 85 N.M. 664, 515 P.2d 668, 1973 N.M. App. LEXIS 782 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 85 N.M. 639, 515 P.2d 643, 1973 N.M. LEXIS 1359 (N.M. 1973).

Under 30-31-23 NMSA 1978 it is unlawful for any person intentionally to possess a controlled substance unless the substance is obtained pursuant to a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by the Controlled Substances Act. State v. Carr, 1981-NMCA-029, 95 N.M. 755, 626 P.2d 292, 1981 N.M. App. LEXIS 694 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 95 N.M. 669, 625 P.2d 1186, 1981 N.M. LEXIS 2288 (N.M. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 853, 102 S. Ct. 298, 70 L. Ed. 2d 145, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 3536 (U.S. 1981), overruled,  State v. Olguin, 1994-NMCA-050, 118 N.M. 91, 879 P.2d 92, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 56 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).

“Purchase” of heroin necessarily includes the actual or constructive “possession” of heroin, and actual or constructive possession of heroin is a felony under 30-31-6 (Schedule I(B)(10)) and 30-31-23 NMSA 1978.  State v. Montoya, 1980-NMSC-093, 94 N.M. 704, 616 P.2d 417, 1980 N.M. LEXIS 2721 (N.M. 1980).

While former 54-7-50, 1953 Comp. did not define unlawful use of marijuana, it did make all use of marijuana unlawful unless the use came within one of the exceptions stated in that section; as such, the statute was not void for vagueness. State v. Covens, 1971-NMCA-141, 83 N.M. 175, 489 P.2d 888, 1971 N.M. App. LEXIS 749 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971).

Former 57-5-14, 1953 Comp. and former 54-7-14, 1953 Comp. both prohibited traffic in marijuana and had to be construed in pari materia, and the more general statute, former 54-7-14, 1953 Comp., which had more recently been amended, was intended to control. State v. Chavez, 77 N.M. 79, 419 P.2d 456, 1966 N.M. LEXIS 2770 (N.M. 1966).

Where defendant had syringes that tested positive for cocaine, any clearly identifiable trace amount was sufficient to prove a violation of 30-31-23 NMSA 1978 and to support a conviction for possession of a controlled substance; the words “any amount” were interpreted in accordance with their plain meaning, and the possession of controlled substance statutes did not require possession of a “usable” amount or any certain quality or quantity of the marijuana or drugs. State v. Wood, 1994-NMCA-060, 117 N.M. 682, 875 P.2d 1113, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 58 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 117 N.M. 744, 877 P.2d 44, 1994 N.M. LEXIS 214 (N.M. 1994).

Lesser penalties stated in former 54-11-23B(1), 1953 Comp. and 54-11-23B(2) (now 30-31-23 NMSA 1978) were not found to have applied to defendant’s violation of former 54-11-22C, 1953 Comp.  (now 30-31-22 NMSA 1978); therefore, a trial court was not found to have erred when it refused a requested instruction based on former  54-11-23B(1), 1953 Comp. and 54-11-23B(2), 1953 Comp. (now 30-31-23 NMSA 1978) because those provisions did not apply to distribution of marijuana. State v. Bustamante, 1978-NMCA-062, 91 N.M. 772, 581 P.2d 460, 1978 N.M. App. LEXIS 576 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978).

Defendant’s conviction for possession of marijuana based on the presence of seeds behind the back seat of his car was reversed, where the evidence showed that defendant was a “manufacturer” or grower of marijuana under former 54-7-2F, 1953 Comp. and therefore could not be convicted for possession under former 54-7-13, 1953 Comp. State v. Gonzales, 1967-NMCA-030, 78 N.M. 591, 435 P.2d 210, 1967 N.M. App. LEXIS 172 (N.M. Ct. App. 1967).

Defendant’s conviction of possession of marijuana, in violation of former 54-7-13, 1953 Comp. (now 30-31-23 NMSA 1978), was affirmed and his entrapment defense was not valid because he voluntarily offered to purchase marijuana for an undercover officer, and there could be no entrapment where the accused himself initiated the unlawful act. State v. Romero, 1968-NMCA-078, 79 N.M. 522, 445 P.2d 587, 1968 N.M. App. LEXIS 502 (N.M. Ct. App. 1968).

Separate crimes of possession under 30-31-23 NMSA 1978 and possession with intent to distribute under 30-31-22 NMSA 1978 were intended to apply in the alternative when based on a single act of possession; because the methamphetamine at issue was found in defendant’s control during a single occurrence, defendant committed only one act of possession, and the trial court subjected defendant to double jeopardy by convicting defendant of both offenses and imposing multiple punishments. State v. Quick, 2009-NMSC-015, 146 N.M. 80, 206 P.3d 985, 2009 N.M. LEXIS 360 (N.M. 2009).

Legislature does not intend to punish a defendant for both possession of a controlled substance and possession of paraphernalia, when the paraphernalia consists of only a container that is storing a personal supply of the charged controlled substance. State v. Almeida, 2008-NMCA-068, 144 N.M. 235, 185 P.3d 1085, 2008 N.M. App. LEXIS 57 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008).

Proving a violation of possess with intent to distribute necessarily required the state to prove that defendant possessed the methamphetamine and therefore simple possession was subsumed within possession with intent to distribute. State v. Lopez, 2008-NMCA-002, 143 N.M. 274, 175 P.3d 942, 2007 N.M. App. LEXIS 143 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 143 N.M. 213, 175 P.3d 307, 2007 N.M. LEXIS 687 (N.M. 2007).

Where defendant was convicted of trafficking cocaine, conspiracy to commit cocaine trafficking, and possession of cocaine, defendant’s double jeopardy claim failed because defendant’s actions in possessing and trafficking cocaine bore sufficient indicia of distinctness to support a finding that they were not unitary; there was evidence that defendant possessed the cocaine both before and after defendant sold some of it to an officer. State v. Contreras, 2007-NMCA-045, 141 N.M. 434, 156 P.3d 725, 2007 N.M. App. LEXIS 19 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 143 N.M. 157, 173 P.3d 764, 2007 N.M. LEXIS 585 (N.M. 2007).

Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and tampering with evidence. After applying the Blockburger test, and examining legislative intent, the supreme court concluded that defendant’s convictions on both charges did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy because a jury, after being advised of the elements of each offense, the jury had a separate, independent basis for finding defendant guilty of each act. State v. Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, 137 N.M. 447, 112 P.3d 1104, 2005 N.M. LEXIS 270 (N.M. 2005).

Possession of less than one ounce of marijuana in violation of former 54-11-23B, 1953 Comp. (now 30-31-23B NMSA 1978), is a lesser included offense of distribution of a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration in violation of former 54-11-22C, 1953 Comp. (now 30-31-22C NMSA 1978); principles of double jeopardy bar a prosecution for distribution after a defendant has been convicted of the lesser included charge of possession for the identical conduct. State v. Medina, 1975-NMCA-033, 87 N.M. 394, 534 P.2d 486, 1975 N.M. App. LEXIS 635 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975), abrogated as stated in State v. Morales, No. 29,311, 2010 N.M. App. Unpub. LEXIS 462 (N.M. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2010).

Defendant’s having told dispatcher that he had overdosed on cocaine was admissible evidence to convict defendant of possession of ingested cocaine under 30-31-23 NMSA 1978; the statement showed that cocaine was present in Defendant’s body, Defendant knew that it was cocaine that he ingested, and the ingestion was voluntary. State v. Franks, 1994-NMCA-097, 119 N.M. 174, 889 P.2d 209, 1994 N.M. App. LEXIS 163 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).

Defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine in violation of this section was affirmed and his motion for suppression of physical evidence and the disclosure of police informants was denied because an affidavit supporting a search warrant was based on an officer’s personal observation of an informant’s drug purchase. State v. Lovato, 1993-NMCA-163, 117 N.M. 68, 868 P.2d 1293, 1993 N.M. App. LEXIS 162 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 117 N.M. 121, 869 P.2d 820, 1994 N.M. LEXIS 43 (N.M. 1994).

With respect to a defendant’s conviction, under 54-11-23, 1953 Comp. (now 30-31-23 NMSA 1978), for unlawful possession of a controlled subtsance, the state proved chain of custody of the narcotic, where (1) on April 26, 1972, a detective, who participated in the April 26 search which found the narcotic, took the narcotic to a police department and checked the narcotic into evidence in a sealed envelope, (2) in August, the detective checked it out and took it to a biochemist for testing, (3) a receipt was given the detective on August 31, and (4) on September 1, the narcotic was tested and returned to the biochemist’s safe until the morning of trial, September 5, 1972. State v. Montoya, 1973-NMCA-060, 85 N.M. 126, 509 P.2d 893, 1973 N.M. App. LEXIS 713 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973).

Where the record was void of any facts that would directly or inferentially give rise to a finding that defendant knew the substance in a cigarette wrapper was cocaine, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for cocaine possession, a violation of 30-31-23 NMSA 1978. State v. Reed, 1998-NMSC-030, 125 N.M. 552, 964 P.2d 113, 1998 N.M. LEXIS 319 (N.M. 1998).

Where defendant was apprehended with a trace amount of cocaine in a cellophane cigarette wrapper, there was an insufficient basis to prove that defendant knew that the substance was cocaine in the absence of some corroboration, such as drug paraphernalia, suspicious or intoxicated behavior, positive urine sample, flight, or an admission. State v. Reed, 1998-NMSC-030, 125 N.M. 552, 964 P.2d 113, 1998 N.M. LEXIS 319 (N.M. 1998).

Defendant who was driving in his car when he was approached by a drug dealer, who paid $20 to the dealer to examine the drug, and who gave the drug back to the dealer was not guilty of possession of drugs under 30-31-23 NMSA 1978 because he did not buy any drugs. State v. Pinson, 1995-NMCA-045, 119 N.M. 752, 895 P.2d 274, 1995 N.M. App. LEXIS 38 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995).

Appellate court exceeded the scope of its review authority when it reversed defendants’ convictions for marijuana possession in violation of former 54-11-23B(3), 1953 Comp. (now 30-31-23 NMSA 1978) where evidence was seized after an initially lawful investigatory stop pursuant to a general roadblock. Where the testimony was conflicting as to whether one defendant gave an officer consent to open his trunk and a suitcase where marijuana residue was found, the appellate court had no authority to override the conclusions of the trial court that the search was consensual and that the stop, search, and seizure were lawfully accomplished because substantial evidence supported those conclusions. State v. Bloom, 1977-NMSC-016, 90 N.M. 192, 561 P.2d 465, 1977 N.M. LEXIS 1024 (N.M. 1977).

Defendant was properly convicted of possession of morphine, a violation of former 54-11-23A, 1953 Comp. (now 30-31-23 NMSA 1978), where the trial court properly took judicial notice under former N.M. R. Evid. 201(b)(2) (now Rule 11-201 NMRA) that morphine was an opium derivative when “morphine” did not appear in the former controlled substances schedules; the presence of morphine in defendant’s urine was substantial proof that he possessed morphine. State v. Yanez, 1976-NMCA-073, 89 N.M. 397, 553 P.2d 252, 1976 N.M. App. LEXIS 595 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possession of heroin where ten aluminum foil packets containing heroin were found in a prescription bottle and that the prescription had been made out to defendant. State v. Kenard, 1975-NMCA-077, 88 N.M. 107, 537 P.2d 1003, 1975 N.M. App. LEXIS 677 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 88 N.M. 318, 540 P.2d 248, 1975 N.M. LEXIS 904 (N.M. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1024, 96 S. Ct. 468, 46 L. Ed. 2d 398, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 3697 (U.S. 1975).

Where defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance in violation of former 54-11-23, 1953 Comp. (now 30-31-23 NMSA 1978), the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction; although defendant did not have exclusive possession of the premises, defendant’s statements and admission of former addiction were substantial evidence of his constructive knowledge and possession of heroin. State v. Baca, 1974-NMCA-098, 87 N.M. 12, 528 P.2d 656, 1974 N.M. App. LEXIS 740 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 5, 528 P.2d 649, 1974 N.M. LEXIS 1468 (N.M. 1974).

There was sufficient evidence for a trial court to find that defendant had constructive possession of heroin where defendant’s wife left a case containing heroin in a police car after she and defendant were arrested, and there were syringes in defendant’s car and fresh needle marks on his arm. State v. Bauske, 1974-NMCA-078, 86 N.M. 484, 525 P.2d 411, 1974 N.M. App. LEXIS 683 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974).

Evidence that defendant had possession of a room for six days before the legal search began, which uncovered a heroin cap in the room, was sufficient to show that defendant was in constructive possession of the heroin cap, a narcotic, with knowledge thereof and, thus, to support his conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance, heroin, under former 54-11-23, 1953 Comp. State v. Montoya, 1973-NMCA-060, 85 N.M. 126, 509 P.2d 893, 1973 N.M. App. LEXIS 713 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of unlawful possession of LSD where police received information from a reliable informant that the drug was to be delivered; police observed the car described by the informant and saw defendant get out, approach another car, and reach into his pocket; as police approached, defendant made a throwing motion; and police found two tablets in his shirt and a packet with 25 tablets under the car. State v. McAdams, 1972-NMCA-029, 83 N.M. 544, 494 P.2d 622, 1972 N.M. App. LEXIS 749 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972).

Officer’s testimony that defendant sold him marijuana was sufficient to support convictions for possession of and sale of marijuana; the fact that the transaction was not witnessed and that defendant was later observed smoking some of the officer’s marijuana did not render the evidence against defendant inherently improbable. State v. Soliz, 1969-NMCA-043, 80 N.M. 297, 454 P.2d 779, 1969 N.M. App. LEXIS 567 (N.M. Ct. App. 1969).

Where defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance (heroin), in violation of former 54-11-23,  1953 Comp. (now  30-31-23 NMSA 1978), and a jury was unable to reach a verdict “without further aid” and the district judge gave an additional instruction, in which the jury was urged to review the original instructions, including reasonable doubt, and not to require more of the defendant or the State than was “required,” the additional instruction was not coercive and the reference to “required,” in relation to defendant, did not shift the burden of proof, but referred to what was “required” by the prior instructions, pursuant to former 41-23-43, 1953 Comp.  State v. Padilla, 1974-NMCA-105, 86 N.M. 695, 526 P.2d 1288, 1974 N.M. App. LEXIS 718 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974).

Court lacked jurisdiction in convicting and sentencing defendant under the general Act, the Uniform Narcotics Drug Act, 54-7-14, 1953 Comp. (now 30-31-20 NMSA 1978), for the crime of selling marijuana where the prosecution should have been based on the specific Act, former 54-5-14, 1953 Comp. (now 30-31-23 NMSA 1978), which applies specifically to marijuana offenses. State v. Gonzales, 82 N.M. 535, 484 P.2d 755, 1971 N.M. App. LEXIS 793 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971).

Defendant’s conviction for unlawful possession of narcotics and his sentence in accordance with former 54-7-15B, 1953 Comp. (now 30-31-23 NMSA 1978) was vacated, because a trial court erroneously denied defendant’s motion without a hearing upon the ground that the allegation of that motion was the same as in one of defendant’s previous motions for postconviction relief. State v. Chavez, 1970-NMCA-041, 81 N.M. 427, 467 P.2d 999, 1970 N.M. App. LEXIS 574 (N.M. Ct. App. 1970).

Where the complaint charged defendant with possessing marijuana in violation of former 54-5-14, 1953 Comp., but the information charged defendant with same conduct in violation of former 54-7-13, 1953 Comp., the information was sufficient because the crime charged was kindred to the offense listed in the complaint; defendant was not deprived of his right to a preliminary examination because the offense charged in the complaint was mere surplusage. State v. Vasquez, 1969-NMCA-082, 80 N.M. 586, 458 P.2d 838, 1969 N.M. App. LEXIS 607 (N.M. Ct. App. 1969).

Defendant conviction for possession of heroin, in violation of former 54-11-23, 1953 Comp. (now 30-31-23 NMSA 1978), was affirmed because there was probable cause to arrest defendant based on a police detective’s affidavit detailing the victim’s identification of defendant as the assailant. State v. Alderete, 1975-NMCA-058, 88 N.M. 14, 536 P.2d 278, 1975 N.M. App. LEXIS 658 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975).

Appellate court was unable to determine whether a trial court erred in revoking defendant’s probation because of his failure to pay a fine and costs of probation under 31-12-3C NMSA 1978 following entry of his guilty plea to possession of marijuana under 30-31-23 NMSA 1978; the trial court failed to meet the requirement that it adopt findings of fact or indicate in the record its determination of whether defendant had the ability to pay the sums ordered, and whether defendant’s failure to pay was willful, and the lack of any finding in the record precluded review of the evidence in the case. State v. Parsons, 1986-NMCA-027, 104 N.M. 123, 717 P.2d 99, 1986 N.M. App. LEXIS 594 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).

Where defendant pled guilty to possession of cocaine, and he did so pursuant to a plea bargain that provided that he would receive a deferred sentence, the trial court was required by former 40A-29-17 NMSA 1978, (now 31-20-5 NMSA 1978), to impose probation but was precluded by former 40A-29-18 NMSA 1978, (now 31-20-6 NMSA 1978), which stated the authorized conditions for probation under a deferred sentence, from imposing a fine as a condition of probation; a fine was among the penalties authorized by former 54-11-23 and 40A-29-11, 1953 Comp. (now 30-31-23 and 30-31-20 NMSA 1978), for possession of cocaine. State v. Holland, 1978-NMCA-008, 91 N.M. 386, 574 P.2d 605, 1978 N.M. App. LEXIS 529 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978).

Defendant was not entitled to reversal of his conviction for unlawful possession of marijuana, contrary to former 54-11-23, 1953 Comp. (now 30-31-23 NMSA 1978), because the car in which defendant was riding as a passenger was stopped pursuant to a lawful routine stop and there was probable cause to search the lockers, which contained the marijuana, because of the strong odor of marijuana emanating from within. State v. Bidegain, 1975-NMSC-060, 88 N.M. 466, 541 P.2d 971, 1975 N.M. LEXIS 858 (N.M. 1975).

Where police officers entered room of defendant convicted of possession of narcotics without first identifying themselves and after defendant’s acquaintance gained permission from defendant to enter the room, the officers’ entry into the room was not constitutionally unreasonable and the narcotics paraphernalia found in defendant’s room was admissible. State v. Chavez, 1974-NMCA-148, 87 N.M. 180, 531 P.2d 603, 1974 N.M. App. LEXIS 767 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 179, 531 P.2d 602, 1975 N.M. LEXIS 784 (N.M. 1975), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1011, 95 S. Ct. 2635, 45 L. Ed. 2d 675, 1975 U.S. LEXIS 2026 (U.S. 1975), limited, State v. Reynaga, 2000-NMCA-053, 129 N.M. 257, 5 P.3d 579, 2000 N.M. App. LEXIS 40 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000).

Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a narcotic drug under former 54-7-2, 1953 Comp. and former 54-7-13, 1953 Comp.; defendant was not entitled to relief from his possession conviction because an informant’s statement that he made numerous purchases of heroin at the residence to be searched supported a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant. State v. Archuleta, 1973-NMCA-062, 85 N.M. 146, 509 P.2d 1341, 1973 N.M. App. LEXIS 707 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 85 N.M. 145, 509 P.2d 1340, 1973 N.M. LEXIS 1336 (N.M. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876, 94 S. Ct. 85, 38 L. Ed. 2d 121, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 890 (U.S. 1973).

Defendant was not entitled to reversal of his conviction for possession of marijuana, contrary to 54-7-13, 1953 Comp.  (now  30-31-23 NMSA 1978), because the seizure of the marijuana found in defendant’s home was not in violation of N.M. Const. art II  § 10 and the Fourth Amendment where defendant consented to the police officers’ entry into his home and the marijuana was in plain view.  State v. Miller, 1969-NMCA-017, 80 N.M. 227, 453 P.2d 590, 1969 N.M. App. LEXIS 540 (N.M. Ct. App. 1969).

Where defendant, a habitual offender under 31-18-17 NMSA 1978, pled guilty to possession of heroin, a violation of 30-31-23 NMSA 1978, and the state agreed to a suspended sentence and probation provided that she attend an in-house drug rehabilitation program immediately following her release from prison, the trial court improperly changed the condition and instead required her to attend Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous; trial court could not amend or modify a sentence that was imposed pursuant to a valid plea agreement in such a way that allowed one party to renege on its part of the agreement. State v. Trujillo, 1994-NMSC-066, 117 N.M. 769, 877 P.2d 575, 1994 N.M. LEXIS 229 (N.M. 1994).

In a prosecution for possession of marijuana weighing more than eight ounces, contrary to former  54-11-23B(3), 1953 Comp. (now 30-31-23 NMSA 1978), the fact that the Controlled Substances Act did not specifically state when the weighing was to be done did not mean that former 54-11-23B(3), 1953 Comp., as applied to defendant, was a violation of his rights to equal protection; it was the possession of marijuana, on the date of the offense, which was the prohibited act and not the amount in some subsequent form suitable to a particular defendant. State v. Olive, 1973-NMCA-131, 85 N.M. 664, 515 P.2d 668, 1973 N.M. App. LEXIS 782 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 85 N.M. 639, 515 P.2d 643, 1973 N.M. LEXIS 1359 (N.M. 1973).

In a prosecution for possession of marijuana weighing more than eight ounces, contrary to former 54-11-23B(3), 1953 Comp. (now 30-31-23 NMSA 1978), a trial court did not err in refusing defendant’s offer to reweigh the marijuana at trial; defendant was not prejudiced by the refusal because the trial court had accepted the testimony of defendant’s expert witness that the weight of the marijuana would be less than eight ounces. State v. Olive, 1973-NMCA-131, 85 N.M. 664, 515 P.2d 668, 1973 N.M. App. LEXIS 782 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 85 N.M. 639, 515 P.2d 643, 1973 N.M. LEXIS 1359 (N.M. 1973).

Construction with other law.

Probable cause.

Search and seizure.

Illegal search and seizure.

Controlled or counterfeit substances; distribution prohibited, 30-31-22 NMSA 1978.

Overdose prevention; limited immunity, 30-31-27.1 NMSA 1978.

Definitions, 33-2A-3 NMSA 1978.