Unlawful possession of switchblades consists of any person, either manufacturing, causing to be manufactured, possessing, displaying, offering, selling, lending, giving away or purchasing any knife which has a blade which opens automatically by hand pressure applied to a button, spring or other device in the handle of the knife, or any knife having a blade which opens or falls or is ejected into position by the force of gravity or by any outward or centrifugal thrust or movement.
Whoever commits unlawful possession of switchblades is guilty of a petty misdemeanor.
HISTORY:
1953 40A-7-7, enacted by Laws 1963, ch. 303, § 7-7.
Notes to Decisions
Constitutionality.
Defendant's substantive due process rights were not violated because the statute was not repugnant to the right to bear arms under a federal standard. State v. Murillo, 2015-NMCA-046, 347 P.3d 284, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 9 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
Legislature did not violate the constitutional right to bear arms in enacting the statute because the purpose of the legislation, protection of the public from the surprise use of a dangerous weapon utilized in large part for unlawful activity, is an important governmental purpose; prohibiting the possession of a switchblade is substantially related to this narrow, but important, purpose. State v. Murillo, 2015-NMCA-046, 347 P.3d 284, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 9 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
Court of appeals analyzes the statute through the lens of intermediate scrutiny because it can no longer apply rational basis scrutiny to challenges under the right to bear arms; the statute does not warrant departure from the application of intermediate scrutiny preferred under federal law. State v. Murillo, 2015-NMCA-046, 347 P.3d 284, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 9 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
Switchblade statute is a modest infringement; because the statute bans only a small subset of knives, which are themselves a peripheral subset of arms typically used for self-defense or security, the statute effects an unsubstantial burden on the right to keep and bear arms. State v. Murillo, 2015-NMCA-046, 347 P.3d 284, 2015 N.M. App. LEXIS 9 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015).
30-7-8 NMSA 1978 was not unconstitutionally vague because the terms of the statute had specific meanings and were defined unambiguously; giving the words of the statute their ordinary meanings resulted in a reasonable and practical construction that the statute intended to include butterfly knives within its ambit. State v. Riddall, 1991-NMCA-033, 112 N.M. 78, 811 P.2d 576, 1991 N.M. App. LEXIS 144 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
Double jeopardy.
Where the court concluded there was ample evidence that a knife was a switchblade, the knife was a deadly weapon within the meaning of 30-7-2 NMSA 1978; however, defendant should not have been sentenced for both unlawful possession of a switchblade, 30-7-8 NMSA 1978, and unlawful carrying of a deadly weapon, as the convictions merged. State v. Riddall, 1991-NMCA-033, 112 N.M. 78, 811 P.2d 576, 1991 N.M. App. LEXIS 144 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
Evidence.
—Generally.
There was no error in the admission of a demonstration during a criminal trial for unlawful possession of a switchblade, 30-7-8 NMSA 1978, of how a butterfly knife was commonly used. State v. Riddall, 1991-NMCA-033, 112 N.M. 78, 811 P.2d 576, 1991 N.M. App. LEXIS 144 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
Butterfly knife is within the definition of “switchblade”. State v. Riddall, 1991-NMCA-033, 112 N.M. 78, 811 P.2d 576, 1991 N.M. App. LEXIS 144 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
Legislative intent.
Phrase “any outward or centrifugal thrust or movement” in 30-7-8 NMSA 1978 suggested a legislative intent to include knives that required a combination of forces to operate; it was of no legal significance that a knife might require several steps to operate, as did a butterfly knife, because it was the speed and ease of operation that concerned the legislature. State v. Riddall, 1991-NMCA-033, 112 N.M. 78, 811 P.2d 576, 1991 N.M. App. LEXIS 144 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).