Dangerous use of explosives consists of maliciously exploding, attempting to explode or placing any explosive with the intent to injure, intimidate or terrify another, or to damage another’s property.
Whoever commits dangerous use of explosives is guilty of a third degree felony.
HISTORY:
1953 40A-7-4, enacted by Laws 1963, ch. 303, § 7-4.
Notes to Decisions
Constitutionality.
Defendant’s challenge to his conviction for unlawfully, feloniously, and maliciously exploding a charge of dynamite at or near a water tank used to supply a town, in violation of former 1929 Code, § 35-2516, based on an argument that the statute was unconstitutional under N.M. Const. art IV § 16 because it embraced more than one subject, was rejected because the main subject of the act was the control of the handling of explosives. State v. Ornelas, 1937-NMSC-080, 42 N.M. 17, 74 P.2d 723, 1937 N.M. LEXIS 98 (N.M. 1937).
Construction with other law.
Defendant’s throwing of a Molotov cocktail into a home occupied by 12 people violated the arson statute, 30-17-5A NMSA 1978, the dangerous use of explosives statute, 30-7-5 NMSA 1978, and the aggravated assault statute, 30-3-2 NMSA 1978; because the statutes were written with many alternatives, and a jury was instructed in the alternatives, in applying the Blockburger test, it was necessary for a court to look to the legal theory of the case, or to the elements of the crime, for double jeopardy purposes. State v. Rodriguez, 1992-NMCA-035, 113 N.M. 767, 833 P.2d 244, 1992 N.M. App. LEXIS 96 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 636, 830 P.2d 553, 1992 N.M. LEXIS 130 (N.M. 1992).
Crime of dangerous use of explosives under 30-7-5 NMSA 1978 merged into defendant’s conviction for arson under 30-17-5 NMSA 1978 where the only theory of arson submitted to the jury was that defendant started a fire with the intent to destroy a house belonging to another and it was unclear which alternative theory of guilt on the dangerous use of explosives charge was chosen; one theory required that defendant intended to injure, intimidate, or terrify a person, while the other required that he intended to damage property. State v. Rodriguez, 1992-NMCA-035, 113 N.M. 767, 833 P.2d 244, 1992 N.M. App. LEXIS 96 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 636, 830 P.2d 553, 1992 N.M. LEXIS 130 (N.M. 1992).
Defendant who helped two other men lower a bomb into the kitchen of a restaurant through a roof vent could not be convicted of both aggravated burglary under 30-16-4A NMSA 1978 and dangerous use of explosives under 30-7-5 NMSA 1978 because under the facts of the case, the aggravated burglary could not have been committed without also committing the crime of dangerous use of explosives and the explosives offense was thus included in and merged with the aggravated burglary offense. State v. Jacobs, 1985-NMCA-054, 102 N.M. 801, 701 P.2d 400, 1985 N.M. App. LEXIS 598 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985).
Research References and Practice Aids
Cross references.
Definitions, 31-18-15.2 NMSA 1978.
Definitions, 31-26-3 NMSA 1978.
Definitions, 32A-2-3 NMSA 1978.
Eligibility for earned meritorious deductions, 33-2-34 NMSA 1978.