All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.
Notes to Decisions
Automobile safety.
Federal law did not expressly preempt the entire field of automobile safety; thus, car owner’s New Mexico Unfair Practices Act claim could proceed as there was no conflict with applicable safety regulations that appeared on the face of the complaint. Lohman v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp., 2007-NMCA-100, 142 N.M. 437, 166 P.3d 1091, 2007 N.M. App. LEXIS 80 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007).
Construction with other law.
State products liability suit by plaintiff patient against defendant corporation for injuries caused by a defective silicone medical implant designed to treat hiatal hernias was not preempted by § 21 U.S.C.S. § 360k(a)-(b) of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 21 U.S.C.S. § 360c-360l under U.S. Const. art VI § 2; although the implant was a Class III medical device under 21 U.S.C.S. § 360c(a)(1)(C) and subject to approval by the Federal Drug Administration under 21 U.S.C.S. § 360e(c)(1) and 21 C.F.R. § 814.20(b)(2)-(12), Congress did not intend to exempt all state common law tort actions arising from injuries resulting from the use of Class III medical devices. Montoya v. Mentor Corp., 1996-NMCA-067, 122 N.M. 2, 919 P.2d 410, 1996 N.M. App. LEXIS 44 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).
Doctrine of preemption.
Mere existence of federal legislation in an area of law also addressed by state legislation, without more, is not enough to show preemption. Under the Supremacy Clause, state law is superseded when state and federal law conflict, and the conflict need not be direct for the doctrine of preemption to apply. Ashlock v. Sunwest Bank, N.A., 1988-NMSC-026, 107 N.M. 100, 753 P.2d 346, 1988 N.M. LEXIS 107 (N.M. 1988), overruled, Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp., 1995-NMSC-036, 120 N.M. 133, 899 P.2d 576, 1995 N.M. LEXIS 190 (N.M. 1995).
Preemption occurs when Congress legislates within a particular field and explicitly or implicitly excludes the states from legislating in that area. When the exclusion of the state is not explicitly articulated by Congress, courts look at several factors to determine if Congress has implicitly preempted the area, including the intent of Congress as disclosed by the statute or its legislative history, the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme, the demand for exclusive federal regulation by the nature of the statutory subject matter, and the creation of an obstacle to congressional objective by enactment of the state law. Ashlock v. Sunwest Bank, N.A., 1988-NMSC-026, 107 N.M. 100, 753 P.2d 346, 1988 N.M. LEXIS 107 (N.M. 1988), overruled, Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp., 1995-NMSC-036, 120 N.M. 133, 899 P.2d 576, 1995 N.M. LEXIS 190 (N.M. 1995).
Governmental immunity.
The New Mexico legislature did not intend to condition its waiver of sovereign immunity for certain torts in the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, 41-4-1 NMSA 1978 et seq., by prohibiting a plaintiff’s federal rights, for to do so would be a violation of the supremacy clause. Wells v. County of Valencia, 1982-NMSC-048, 98 N.M. 3, 644 P.2d 517, 1982 N.M. LEXIS 2838 (N.M. 1982).
Procedure.
—Trial.
State court was required to exercise jurisdiction to hear an injured person’s case which arose under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.S. §§ 51-60, notwithstanding former 16-1-7, 1953 Comp. (now 34-1-8 NMSA 1978), as the supremacy clause of the federal constitution, U.S. Const., art.VI, was binding on the state legislature. Bourguet v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.R., 1958-NMSC-148, 65 N.M. 200, 334 P.2d 1107, 1958 N.M. LEXIS 1402 (N.M. 1958).
OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
Construction with other law.
The various land use plans and ordinances adopted by several counties within the state had no legal effect because, to the extent the ordinances affected federal lands, they were preempted by the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution; to the extent the ordinances affected state lands, they were nullified by the state’s immunity from local zoning ordinances; and finally, to the extent the ordinances affected private lands, they were preempted by federal law, state law, or both. 1994 N.M. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 1994-1.